【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 egulation, financial entities are motivated to manage earnings in order to circumvent these regulations. Secondly, Antitrust regulation also is a motivation for earnings management (Healy amp。 Wahlen 1999, ). Antitrust regulation prohibits collusion between market 5 participants,(delete) and any monopolization phenomena, in order to protect consumers (Antitrust regulation 2021). Under this definition, large panies have more possibility to be investigated by agencies for Antitrust regulation violation, since such panies are more likely to be monopolies. So that any panies under the investigation for Antitrust regulation violation have strong motivations to manage their earnings downwards, there are two reasons to support this statement. Firstly, agencies always rely heavily on pany’s accounting data to judge any Antitrust regulation violation, secondly, the political costs associated with unfavorable Antitrust judgment is too high, such as higher tax rate (Cahan 1992, ). As a result, base on(because of) these two reasons, panies that are vulnerable to Antitrust regulation violation investigation have motivations to manage earnings downwards. Managers thus will choose different methods to decrease ines。 the basic method is ―misreporting‖depreciation, such as change equipments’ using life to increase depreciation expense. However, besides this, managers also can manage earnings by using different accounting policy, such as pany’s inventories,(.) Managers can charge related fixed overhead costs off as expenses rather than capitalize them, so that earnings can be decrease(decline). In order to support the above statement, 48 sample panies were selected by Cahan (1992, ), which were investigated for monopolyrelated investigation during the year of 1970 to 1983, base on the one tail test calculation,(.) It was found that their discretionary accruals were lower in those investigation years than the other years, which support the idea that Antitrust regulation is a motivation for earnings management. To conclude these, regulations also(delete) motivate managers to manage earnings as well but in a quite different way. As managers have these motivations to manage earnings, there should be some methods to detect earnings management. The empirical one is by using total accruals. Total accruals are posed of discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals. ―discretionary accrual is a nonobligatory expense that is yet to be recognized but is recorded in the account books‖ (Business dictionary 2021), while ―nondiscretionary accrual is an obligatory expense that has yet to be realized but is already recorded in the account books‖ (Business dictionary 2021), which means, discretionary accruals can be managed(modified) by managers, but nondiscretionary accruals can not,(.) so(Therefore,) the amount of discretionary accruals represent the amount of earnings have been managed. That is to say, researchers can detect earnings management by the amount of discretionary accruals, which is the difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary accrualsexpected total accruals. Based on modified Jones model, total accruals equals to the sum of a1*(1/At1), a2*(CHGREVt/At1), a3*(PPEt/At1), 6 and discretionary accruals represented by error term e, where a2 and a3 are coefficients represent the sensitivity of accruals to change in PPE and revenue, A is total assets(Jones 1991, ). So base on(by using) this formula, if researchers can estimate all these parameters, then(delete) the nondiscretionary accruals can be figured out, then pare total accruals and expected accruals, the difference is the amount of earnings management that need to be detected by researchers. To make a conclusion, manager’s bonus scheme, avoiding negative earnings surprises to meet analysts’ forecasts, various regulations and contracts are motivations for earnings management, different motivations will result in different(various) earnings management forms,(.) Basic form is ―mispricing‖ method, which is using(uses) discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward and(or) downward with different conditions given. For example, change straightline depreciation to declining depreciations method, increase inventory writeoff can understate earnings, while defer recognition of expense, or early recognize revenues can manage earnings upward. Another form is real action, it is a way to alter the timing of pany’s financial transactions, such as understate earnings by delaying consumer purchases, or overstate earnings by delaying advertising expenditures. Besides, changing the accounting policy also can be a method for earnings management, panies can use FIFO method rather than FILO method to increase profit, or use fare value instead of historical cost to decrease profit. With the existence of these earnings management forms, researchers can make a use of Jones’ model to calculate the difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary accruals, which is expected total accruals to detect whether panies did manage earnings. Reference Lists: Adiel, R. 1996. Reinsurance and the management of regulatory ratios and taxes in the property—Casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22 (13), p. 207–240. Retrieved 4 Sep, 2021, from ScienceDirect. Atrill, P., Mclaney, E., Harvey, D., amp。 Jenner, M. (2021). Accounting: an introduction. Australia, Pearson Edu