【正文】 gets) ? State banks – related lending ? Government not market plays a big role ? Majority ownership by the state ? partial privatization (minority shares) of SOEs ? direct (SAMB) and indirect (parent SOE) government majority ownership ? Government shares cannot to be sold easily ? Incentive issues: soft budget constraints。 Klein and Leffer, 1982) ? One way of market enforcement is by offering to the potential cheater a future premium (., repeated business opportunities), a price sufficiently greater than average variable cost to assure a quasirent stream that will exceed the potential gain from cheating ? The present discounted value of this future premium stream must be greater than any increase in wealth that could be obtained by the potential cheater if he in fact cheated and were terminated ? The offer of such a longterm relationship with the potential cheater will eliminate systematic opportunistic behavior SYSUminghai 35 Categorizing transactions Nonspecific investment Mixed investment Idiosyncratic investment Occasional transaction Purchasing standard equipment Purchasing customized equipment Constructing a plant Recurrent transaction Purchasing standard material Purchasing customized material Sitespecific transfer of intermediate product across successive stages SYSUminghai 36 Categorizing governance structures of transactions Nonspecific investment Mixed investment Idiosyncratic investment Occasional transaction Market governance (Classical contracting) Trilateral governance (Neoclassical contracting) Trilateral governance (Neoclassical contracting) Recurrent transaction Market governance (Classical contracting) Bilateral governance (Relational contracting) Unified governance (Vertical integration。 ? 這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的研究大都伴隨著對資本市場有效性的檢驗(yàn)和討論。 SOE pursuing noneconomic goals SYSUminghai 12 ? Control (mgmt vs. state) ? 1992, central govt granted SOEs 14 rights, mainly operating rights ? Rights not given: Mamp。 Relational contracting) SYSUminghai 37 第二部分 運(yùn)用產(chǎn)權(quán)理論 研究財(cái)務(wù)與會計(jì)問題： 專用資產(chǎn)與繼承 對財(cái)務(wù)和會計(jì)問題的解釋 Succession: The Roles of Specialized Assets and Transfer Costs Joseph . Fan Ming Jian YinHua Yeh SYSUminghai 39 Some Observations about Family Business ? Persistent concentration of ownership ? Family (heir or close relative) succession ? Mixed performance in succession, especially in family succession ? PerezGonzales (2022), Bennedsen et al. (2022), Villalonga and Amit (2022) SYSUminghai 40 Research Questions ? use succession as an event to address the following questions: ? Why family succession, hence the emergence of family firms? ? Why persistent concentration of ownership? ? What are the fundamental determinants of succession performance? ? How do firm governance structures evolve around succession? SYSUminghai 41 Explanations of Mixed Performance of Family Ownership and Heir Succession ? Outsider expropriation ? Though a professional manager is more productive, his interest is not necessarily aligned with the family (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2022). ? Serious in weak institutional environments (Burkart, Panuzi, and Shleifer, 2022) ? Insider expropriation ? Family firms are petitive, but insiders capture most of the gain, leaving little to outside investors (Villalonga and Amit, 2022) ? Transfer costs of specialized assets (this focus) SYSUminghai 43 Key hypothesis ? Go back to the old property right literature (Alchian, 1965, 1969。 SYSUminghai 18 ? 由于公司內(nèi)部人與外部投資者（包括潛在投資者）之間存在著信息不對稱，會計(jì)信息有助于緩解這種信息不對稱，幫助外部投資者對公司資產(chǎn)進(jìn)行合理定價(jià)，減少可能發(fā)生的逆向選擇現(xiàn)象（如圖中渠道 3所示）。A, disposal of assets, appointment of chairman and CEO ? Boards and management filled with govt bureaucrats。 Klen, Crawford, Alchian, 1979。 ? 這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的研究隨著公司治理相關(guān)研究的擴(kuò)展得到了迅速的發(fā)展。 not professional ? Incentives issue: government interventions。 Williamson, 1978), testing the possibility that Family ownership and family succession are arrangements to protect specialized assets that are difficult to partition, value, and transfer across individuals or anizational boundaries SYSUminghai 44 Specialized assets in entrepreneurial activities ? 1. Entrepreneurial activities are special ? Entrepreneurs’ superior management skills, creativity, leadership charisma, secret formula, reputation, business/political connections, etc. ? These assets are specific to the entrepreneurs because they cannot be quickly learned or easily bought and sold in marketplace SYSUminghai 45 Specialized assets in entrepreneurial activities ? 2. There exist strong ideologies (personal interests) in entrepreneurial activities ? Entrepreneurial activities often consume a large amount of entrepreneurs’ time, effort, and financial capital, dictating an ideology (strong personal interest) to take on these activities and associate risks ? Because of their extraordinary interests and efforts, entrepreneurs attach a high value of their firms that are not parably priced by the market SYSUminghai 46 Specialized assets in entrepreneurial activities ? 3. Entrepreneurial activities often have strong team spirit ? When the required labor, financial and human capital inputs are large and beyond what an individual entrepreneur can supply, friends and/or family members often join to bee both highly motivated and disciplined labor force and contributors of financial capital. ? Bonded and enforced by friendship or blood tie, contracts with cofounders or family members are often short of details ? These implicit contracts can be hard to enforce upon succession SYSUminghai 47 High transfer costs of specialized assets ? Specialized assets