【正文】 evelopment model worked well, as long as major export markets kept growing rapidly. As we will see in the following sections, this is no longer the case today. The result is overcapacity and price wars, as well as a dramatic increase in the country’s exposure to debt. After three decades of rapid growth, Korea is now facing a major crisis. External factors, caused by the volatility of international financial markets, have acted as a catalyst。D expenditures of US$ (in 1993) lag well behind those of Japan ( in 1992) and the . (US$ ) (Lall 1997, Table 8). In order to reach a ‘critical mass’ for industrial upgrading, Ramp。D programs of different ministries which has wasted Korea’s scarce resources. The current mechanism for priority setting is highly imperfect: each ministry sets up its own program and basically feels free to pursue its own goals without much coordination among these different programs. As long as the goal was catchingup, Korea almost exclusively relied on one set of actors: the government research institutes (GRIs). Their main purpose was to pensate for the then still very weak Ramp。 受國(guó)際金融市場(chǎng)的波動(dòng)引起的 外部因素猶如催化劑：他們的影響被國(guó)內(nèi)的主要因素所放大。 1976 年到 1990 年，韓國(guó)的 R＆ D 開(kāi)銷占總銷售額的比例從 %上升到了%。組織的保守主義依舊占上風(fēng)。這導(dǎo)致了 阻斷產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)研發(fā)所需的一個(gè)浪費(fèi)的惡性循環(huán)：財(cái)閥已經(jīng)擁有研究經(jīng)費(fèi)，卻忽視了它，而寧愿去把重點(diǎn)放在了發(fā)展活動(dòng)上。高等教育一直是韓國(guó)技術(shù)學(xué)習(xí)上的明顯瓶頸。 這尤其適用于大型電子制造企業(yè)和零部件供應(yīng)商之間的聯(lián)系 。專利的數(shù)字顯示了韓國(guó)存在一個(gè)問(wèn)題：雖然他的 Ramp。 ”(OECD 1995b, )如今，又有了一個(gè)更重要的理由去轉(zhuǎn)變韓國(guó)的發(fā)展模式：國(guó)家已經(jīng)沒(méi)有足夠的外匯去購(gòu)買國(guó)外技術(shù)。 這已經(jīng)形成在產(chǎn)品專業(yè)化，生產(chǎn)型，承諾和進(jìn)入策略，垂直整合，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的焦點(diǎn)和技術(shù)管理規(guī)模的企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略的關(guān)鍵特征 。 Kim S. G. 1995。 gross inefficiencies of corporate technology management。D personnel in Korean industry. Korea’s Ramp。D: Korean engineers and technicians are more inclined to work on their own and are much less willing to contribute to a team than their Japanese counterparts (Oki 1993). A bias in Korea for centralized Ramp。正如我們將要在下面的部分看到的，如今的情況已經(jīng)不再是那樣的了。 這迫使韓國(guó)電子產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展自己的研發(fā)能力 (Kim 1997a, chapters 6 and 7)。 Kim L. 1992, 1993。 他們的主要目的是為了彌補(bǔ)當(dāng)時(shí)還很薄弱的私營(yíng)公司的 R＆ D 活動(dòng)，并協(xié)助和支持他們 去 吸收和 適應(yīng) 引進(jìn) 的 外國(guó)技術(shù) 。然而，由于以往成功所造成的慣性和權(quán)利結(jié)構(gòu)的建立，削弱了韓國(guó)適應(yīng)新的產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)要求的能力。雖然政府的研發(fā)比例已經(jīng)下降到不足 20％，但依舊足夠大，足夠去發(fā)揮了重要作用。 財(cái)閥的創(chuàng)新管理的有效性方面已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)存在嚴(yán)重的問(wèn)題 (Bloom 1992。 臨界值不足 直到大約 80 年代中期， 韓國(guó)電子企業(yè)都缺乏共同投資研發(fā)的動(dòng)機(jī)， 原因如下 : 第一 ， 如果以進(jìn)口生產(chǎn)設(shè)備和技術(shù)作為基礎(chǔ)， 市場(chǎng)份額 的快速 擴(kuò)張要容易得多 ；第二，價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)主要取決于一種低勞動(dòng)力成本和政府選擇性支持和保護(hù)功能的組合： 政府資源和合同的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)一直是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的本質(zhì) ；第三，不斷持續(xù)的高通貨膨脹率和高投資率一直是阻礙 Ramp。 通過(guò) 以優(yōu)惠條件 引導(dǎo)資金 的少數(shù) 財(cái)閥 ，國(guó)家已建立強(qiáng)大的國(guó)內(nèi)寡頭壟斷 。 Kim L. 1992, 1993。D expenditures: they have driven investment into real estate speculation rather than into highrisk Ramp。D. Fourth, industrial promotion policies were biased towards quantitative goals and neglected industrial upgrading: firms received support ‘…on the basis of their export volumes… irrespective of their achievements in capital and labor productivities, valueadded, and technologies (Sun G. Kim 1995, ). In the 1980s Korea’s parative labor cost advantages eroded, product life cycles shortened and petition intensified in the electronics industry. This has forced the Korean electronics industry to develop its own Ramp。 and Kim S. R. 1996). While external technology sourcing strategies ate highly sophisticated, the organization of innovation wi