【正文】 tunately, this preferable attribute would be very difficult to measure. C. Growth As we mentioned previously, equitycontrolled firms have a tendency to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firm39。s debt level. It is the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating ine (SIGOI). Since it is the only indicator of volatility, we must assume that it measures this attribute without error. H. Profitability Myers cites evidence from Donaldson and Brealey and Myers that suggests that firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from issuing new equity. He suggests that this behavior may be due to the costs of issuing new equity. These can be the costs discussed in Myers and Majluf that arise because of asymmetric information, or they can be transaction costs. In either case, the past profitability of a firm, and hence the amount of earnings available to be retained, should be an important determinant of its current capital structure. We use the ratios of operating ine over sales (OI/S) and operating ine over total assets (OI/TA) as indicators of profitability. II. Measures of Capital Structure Six measures of financial leverage are used in this study. They are longterm, shortterm, and convertible debt divided by market and by book values of Although these variables could have been bined to extract a mon debt ratio attribute, which could in turn be regressed against the independent attributes, there is good reason for not doing this. Some of the theories of capital structure have different implications for the different types of debt, and, for the reasons discussed below, the predicted coefficients in the structural model may differ according to whether debt ratios are measured in terms of book or market values. Moreover, measurement errors in the dependent variables are subsumed in the disturbance term and do not bias the regression coefficients. Data limitations force us to measure debt in terms of book values rather than market values. It would, perhaps, have been better if market value data were available for debt. However, Bowman demonstrated that the crosssectional correlation between the book value and market value of debt is very large, so the misspecification due to using book value measures is probably fairly small. Furthermore, we have no reason to suspect that the crosssectional differences between market values and book values of debt should be correlated with any of the determinants of capital structure suggested by theory, so no obvious bias will result because of this misspecification. Source: Sheridan Titman。因為債券持有人（或銀行）傾向于過度的特殊待遇， 可能 使用較少高杠桿密切監(jiān)察這類公司。與此相關(guān)的代理關(guān)系的成本很可能是在增長的行業(yè)，這對他們更對企業(yè)未來投資選擇的靈活性更高。 我們假定 RD/S 措施 ,因為公司出售產(chǎn)品獨特性以接近的替代品少可能去做研究和開發(fā)創(chuàng)新 ,因為他們可以更容易的復(fù)制 。特別是，小企業(yè)比大企業(yè)支付更多的 費用發(fā)行新 股票，也較為發(fā)行長期債務(wù)。一些資本結(jié)構(gòu)的有關(guān)理論會產(chǎn)生不同的影響對不同類型的債券 ,探討了這些問題產(chǎn)生的原因下 ,預(yù)測系數(shù)在結(jié)構(gòu)模型根據(jù)是否可能與測量的債務(wù)比例從書或的市場價值。因為公司發(fā)展機會和相對少量的抵押證券資產(chǎn)往往都有比較高的市值比率 ,賬面價值之間存在關(guān)系有可能虛假債務(wù) /市場價值和這些變量 ,創(chuàng)造統(tǒng)計學(xué)顯著性系數(shù)估計即使 賬面價值的債務(wù)比例是隨機選擇。在這兩種情況下 ,公司的總利潤可保留 ,是重要的決定了其當(dāng)前的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。華納和卬 ，蔡和 康納 提供證據(jù)表明，直接破產(chǎn)成本似乎構(gòu)成了一個公司的 價值作為該值跌幅較大的比例。顧客，工人和生產(chǎn) 公司，具 有獨特性或?qū)I(yè)化的產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商在事件可能遭受成本相對較高 。（這些變量， 作為 其他屬性的指標，在后面討論。如果債務(wù)抵押證券 , 借款人僅限于使用特定項目的資金。s total work force that voluntarily left their jobs in the sample years. It is postulated that RD/S measures uniqueness because firms that sell products with close substitutes ar39。e likely to do less research and development since their innovations can be more easily duplicated. In addition, successful research and development projects lead to