【正文】 or the audit office to monitor fiscal and financial activities of the government and its CGO simply because the deputy39。政府審計中存在的問題主要源于其下的行政機(jī)構(gòu)（國務(wù)院）的直接控制之下。在審計發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題時，與審計結(jié)果公開，這些審計規(guī)劃，培訓(xùn)和審計人員的任命，對審計任務(wù)的決心具有強(qiáng)大消極影響。他們甚至要求審計機(jī)關(guān)直接刪除違反規(guī)定的審計報告大問題。 我們的受訪者有些人還提到，在預(yù)算審查，因?yàn)閷?shí)際上并沒有涉及審計的財務(wù)責(zé)任和政府及其政府總部的性能，這是不可避免的，許多大問題被忽略或忽視，特別是有關(guān)政府或 CGOs 自己。為人民服務(wù)在本質(zhì)上和人民代表大會的政府在外觀上是一種政府審計辦公室在現(xiàn)行制度下的必然選擇。因此，在目前的政治氣候下實(shí)施這一做法可能會削弱政府的經(jīng)濟(jì)管制和對政府和立法機(jī)關(guān)重大重組的要求，缺乏實(shí)用性和可行性。此外，政府的 審查意味著許多問題沒有披露，它已被證明難以擴(kuò)展的“審計風(fēng)暴”到地方審計部門。因此，審計人員面臨的不僅是財政部門，而是政府總部。如果我們在審計過程中發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題或由高級別官員作出錯誤的決定，我們寧 愿不予以披露。 CGO 政府的副市長在接10 受采訪時評論說：審計報告按照政府的安排，但這并不一定表示政府 將防止審計問題披露。因此，“審計風(fēng)暴”已加深了對政府審計改革必要性的認(rèn)識。在雙重領(lǐng)導(dǎo)體制下，為省政府審計署，審計署的審計和監(jiān)管提供指導(dǎo)和監(jiān)督，而省政府提供資源和演習(xí)人員控制。s congress, this problem of a lack of independence and transparency has aroused increased concerns. Since the Constitution (PRC, 1982) and the Audit Law (PRC, 1994a) lack clear and rigid rules on the disclosure of audit results, the content and degree of disclosure in the current auditing system are determined and censored by the government39。s Republic of China (PRC, 1982), the National Audit Office (NAO) was set up in 1983 as a department of the State Council. In addition, regional audit offices were also set up as departments of provincial, municipal and county governments. A regional government audit office is under the leadership of both the government audit office at a higher level and its supervising regional government. For example, the audit office of a provincial government is subject to the joint leadership of the NAO and the provincial government. Under the dual leadership system, for a provincial government audit office, the NAO provides auditing and regulatory guidance and monitoring while the provincial government provides resources and exercises personnel control. In addition, the NAO operates a work of branch offices in central government ministries and very large municipalities to audit various government departments, agencies, state owned enterprises under the control of the central government, and their associated institutions. These branch audit offices located in ministries and very large municipalities are under the direct leadership of the NAO. Although this government audit system has made significant contributions toward China39。s unwillingness to expose a CGO. This is reflected in the remarks made by one interviewee, a deputy directorgeneral at a provincial government audit office: The difficulty that the audit office faces in performing budget auditing is truly enormous, because fiscal and 6 financial powers rest in the hands of the CGO. Important fiscal and financial issues and the annual fiscal and financial budget must be decided by the CGO. Once the budget is set, any budget adjustment must also be approved by the government and its CGO. Under such conditions, auditing fiscal and financial budgets would be equivalent to the audit of the government and it39。在這個制度下，各政府部門和官員可以在理論和實(shí)踐中干擾政府審計，從而削弱了審計的客觀性和公正性。因此，審計署也很難執(zhí)行任何獨(dú)立審計。 在對審計署的官方采訪中也了解到，一些地方政府和相關(guān)部門的審計結(jié)果披露和審計結(jié)果決議，以推卸責(zé)任，避免過多的披露，可能掩蓋其政治生涯的干涉?？紤]到許多問題，從政府活動的結(jié)果上看，審計11 署可以什么也不做，可能會出現(xiàn)的問題一遍又一遍。 因此，立法機(jī)關(guān)不能直接行使審計監(jiān)督和監(jiān)測只能間接地通過審計財政預(yù)算。 為了順利完成這一提議的過渡，我們提出了作為實(shí)現(xiàn)向一個完全成熟的立法主導(dǎo)國家審計體制的過渡措施是“雙軌制”。然而，僅僅提請注意的問題，卻不能防止他們再次發(fā)生。在這種情況下，審計財政財務(wù)預(yù)算將等同于政府的審計，它的中區(qū)政府合署。從法律的角度來看，不會有任何更高級別的官員作出審計決定的約束，但實(shí)際上，你不能真正問他們。 （ 2）限制披露審計結(jié)果 受訪者普遍認(rèn)為，審計結(jié)果的披露可能會受到限制。此外，即使問題暴露出來，這并不能確保不會再發(fā)生同樣的問題 。例如，一個省級政府審計辦公室是受審計署和省級政府共同領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。s Congress. They even directly demand the audit office to remove big issues that violate regulations from the audit report. An official from the NAO also admitted in the interview that some local governments and related authorities interfere with the disclosure of audit findings and the resolution of audit results in order to shirk responsibilities and avoid excessive disclosure that might overshadow their political career. The interview data thus suggests that the audit office is not only constrained by the government in terms of audit planning and the determination of audit tasks, but also the disclosure of audit results. That is, the audit office cannot make its own decisions on what to disclose, how to disclose, and when to disclose. Consequently, there is no