【正文】 ①早期一些相關(guān)研究中，有學(xué)者認為公司高管持股（董事、監(jiān)事和高層經(jīng)理）與公司績效基本不相關(guān)。③還有一些學(xué)者研究支持上市公司高管持股對公司績效有正面影響效果?？偟膩碚f，在中國國企改制和經(jīng)理人市場不斷完善的過程中,管理者持股水平逐漸增大的同時,高管持股的股權(quán)激勵機制設(shè)計是否能夠緩和公司高管并購決策中的激勵不相容問題值得進一步關(guān)注。根據(jù)協(xié)同效應(yīng)理論，Singh和Montgomery(1987)認為，相關(guān)并購能夠同時獲取營運、財務(wù)和共謀三種協(xié)同效應(yīng)，無關(guān)多元化并購一般僅能獲取財務(wù)協(xié)同效應(yīng)，因此相關(guān)并購比多元化并購能創(chuàng)造更多的價值。Lau .(2008)指出企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略導(dǎo)向的基礎(chǔ)在于高層管理人員收集、分析與環(huán)境及企業(yè)所擁有的資源相關(guān)內(nèi)外部信息,而企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略會影響其并購行為選擇和并購績效，因此高管層持股會對戰(zhàn)略導(dǎo)向產(chǎn)生不可忽視的影響。第二，從前期學(xué)者的研究中，發(fā)現(xiàn)對高管持股與企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效的研究文獻較多，內(nèi)容主要集中在高管持股和公司業(yè)績是否相關(guān)，對與高管持股效應(yīng)也形成了一些研究結(jié)論（基本認為高管持股與經(jīng)營績效呈倒U型關(guān)系）?；谡撐乃婕暗难芯勘尘埃ㄟ^對公司并購、企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略和高管持股的相關(guān)理論的梳理，對代理理論在企業(yè)并購中的應(yīng)用和相關(guān)問題進行了理論回顧和分析。H2a：戰(zhàn)略多元化程度越高，企業(yè)越傾向于選擇相關(guān)性并購。，對已有的高管持股效應(yīng)理論假說予以驗證，檢驗高管持股激勵能否提高企業(yè)長期并購績效。第二，從研究內(nèi)容來看，本文嘗試將高管持股、企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略與企業(yè)并購聯(lián)系起來，對20102013年中國上市公司的并購事件分析，研究在不同的高管持股比例對戰(zhàn)略多元化程度的影響，進而對公司并購產(chǎn)生影響，并運用多年度區(qū)間研究不同并購方式下的并購長期績效表現(xiàn)。主要參考文獻[1] Michael C. Jensen and William H. of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(10):305360. [2] Young B. H. and Pagan，Executive Compensation and Corporate Production Efficiency [J].Journal of Business and Economics, 2003,(41).[3] Berle, A. A. Jr, Means . The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M]. New York: MacMillan. 1932.[4] Denis .,Denis D K, Sarin A. Agency problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversification [J]. The Journal of Finance,1997, 52(1):135160.[5] Jensen M C. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers[J]. The American Economic Review, 1986, 76(2):323329.[6] Jensen M C, Murphy K J. Performance pay and topmanagement incentives[J]. The Journal of Political Economy. 1990,98(2):225264.[7] Shleifer A, Vishny R. Managerial entrenchment: The case of manager specific investments[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1989(25):123139.[8] Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976(3):305360.[9] Demsetz. H, Lehn. K. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1985,(3):11551177.[10] Tosi H, Katz J, GomezMejia L. Disaggregating the agency contract: The effects of monitoring, incentive alignment and term in office on agent decisionmaking[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1997,40(3):584602. [11] Markowitz H M. Foundations of Portfolio Theory[J]. Journal of Finance, 1991(XLVI):469477.[12] Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny R. Management ownership and corporate performance: an empirical analysis(working paper).1986,10. [13] Fama E F, Jensen M C. Separation of ownership and control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):301325[14] Palepu, K. Diversification Strategy, Profit Performance, and the Entropy Measure of Diversification[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1985(6):239255.[15] Donaldson，G. Managing Corporate Wealth [M].New York: Praeger,1984.[16] James and Rebel and James W Lin. Agency Cost and Ownership Structure [J].Journal of Finance,2000(55).[17]李善民,毛雅娟,[J].管理科學(xué),2009,12(6):212.[18]馮根福,[J].經(jīng)濟研究,2001(1): 5468[19]劉淑蓮,楊超,[J].經(jīng)濟問題探索,2013(1