【正文】 nals they may convey to the market by altering this pattern. Therefore, we expect to find that managers of Nasdaq firms agree more strongly with statements about the asymmetric information explanation for paying dividends than with statements about other explanations. We survey managers of dividendpaying Nasdaq firms to learn their beliefs about the dividend setting process, whether dividend policy affects firm value, and four mon explanations for paying dividends. Some evidence tends to confirm what we already know from earlier surveys of NYSE firms and other empirical research. This evidence is still important because it reinforces some earlier findings while not supporting others using a new dataset and time period. First, our results show that respondents from dividendpaying Nasdaq firms strongly agree with statements supporting Lintner’ s (1956) findings. In particular, respondents stress the importance of dividend continuity. An implication of this finding is that managers generally perceive that firms today set dividend payments in a manner consistent with that described by Lintner more than four decades ago. Second, Nasdaq managers widely support statements consistent with the concept that a firm’ s dividend policy matters. They agree that an optimal dividend policy strikes a balance between current dividends and future growth that maximizes stock price, and that a firm should formulate its dividend policy to produce maximum value for shareholders. An implication of this finding is that market imperfections lead to the relevance of dividend policy. Third, managers give the strongest support to a signaling explanation for paying , this finding is not surprising because much empirical evidence is consistent with hypotheses generated by dividend signaling models. An implication of this finding is that managers who are concerned about dividend continuity should be careful of the signals conveyed to the market by changes in dividends. However, managers offer little or no support for the tax preference and agency cost explanations. The latter finding is surprising especially considering that other empirical evidence is consistent with the monitoring role of dividends. Not unexpectedly, most respondents disagree with statements supporting the birdinthehand explanation for paying dividends. Further tests show that industry classification (financial versus nonfinancial firms) has little effect on how managers view different explanations about dividend policy. This study also provides some additional insights about several dividend policy issues. For example, most responding managers are aware of historical patterns relating to dividends and earnings. Such awareness may influence their dividend policy decisions. Our study also provides some support for the concept of a dividend life cycle set forth by Damodaran (1999) and Leaseetal. (2020). Mixed support exists about issues relating to residual dividend policy, a mon concept in the dividend literature. Because we confine our examination to Nasdaq firms with established patterns of paying cash dividends, other datasets may provide new insights about dividend policy. As an avenue for future investigation, researchers may want to survey nondividendpaying Nasdaq firms or those firms with irregular patterns of cash dividends. Comparing the view of managers from firms with different dividend policies or patterns could result in substantially different responses than those contained in the current study. Source: Baker,Gary , Veit. “Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy “.Journal of Economics and Finance,2020(Fall),. ?譯文： 從管理視角下再談股利政策 我們調(diào)查 納斯達(dá)克公司的經(jīng)理， 穩(wěn)定的 現(xiàn)金股利 決定 他們 對(duì) 股利政策 、 股利政策與價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系，以及四 種一般的股利政策的觀點(diǎn) 。 為了解決這個(gè)股利之謎，金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家做出了各種解釋 —— 信號(hào)傳遞理論、稅收偏好理論、代理成本理論和一鳥 在手理論。這項(xiàng)研究及時(shí)證實(shí)了法馬和富安斯的研究，降低股利支付率，這不僅反映了納稅人的股息變化特點(diǎn) ,而且傾向于低支付股息。首先 ,之前的調(diào)查 ,實(shí)地考察僅僅聚焦于企業(yè)為數(shù)不多的行業(yè) ,我們研究的納斯達(dá)克公司股利的經(jīng)理們從事眾多的行業(yè)。例如， 1956 年林特納 , 對(duì)制定 股利 政策 進(jìn)行了開創(chuàng)性的研究， 其他研究人員包括貝克、法拉利 ,埃德爾曼 (1985 年 )和貝克和鮑威爾 (1999)調(diào)查經(jīng)理并獲得他們對(duì)股利政策的看法。 其次，作為納斯達(dá)克公司的合作管理者認(rèn)為一個(gè)公司的股利政策是否可能會(huì)影響公司的價(jià)值？ 在一個(gè)高度限制性的假設(shè)成立的基礎(chǔ)上，米勒和莫迪里阿尼（ 1961）強(qiáng)調(diào)