【正文】 tude of option awards, including criticism by investors, seems to occur regularly ( [1997]。 Matsunaga [1995]。 WSJ [2020]). Until recently, academic research has typically focused on testing the use of options within an agency theory framework, primarily examining incentive alignment aspects. Arguably, by tying executive pay to stock price outes, options encourage managers to make operating and investing decisions that maximize shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling [1976]). Though results are mixed, the empirical evidence on options as a ponent of executive pay has generally supported such agencybased predictions. However, other studies document unexpected effects on the firm as well, including surprising evidence that awarding options can induce opportunistic behavior by management. The line of research most relevant for our study is one that suggests that managers manipulate the timing of news releases or option award dates (or both) as a means of increasing the fair value of their awards. For example, Aboody and Kasznik (2020) report evidence indicating that managers time the release of voluntary disclosures, both good and bad news, around award dates in order to increase the value of the options awarded. Since the exercise price of the option is typically set equal to the share price on award date, managers can conceivably increase their option pensation by releasing bad news before the award date. Consistent with this reasoning, Chauvin and Shenoy (2020) find that stock prices tend to decrease prior to option grants, while Yermack (1997) finds that stock prices tend to increase following option grants. The former effect would typically decrease the exercise price of the option at award date. The latter would increase the option39。 Aboody and Kasznik [2020]). Awards are formally determined by a pensation mittee of the board of directors and are nearly always made once per year, typically with an exercise price equal to share price on award date. As noted in the introduction, most of the academic research on the use of stock options has used an agency theory framework, approaching the structure of executive pay as a solution to various agency problems. Early research such as DeFusco et al. (1990) and Yermack (1995) yielded mixed results, leaving significant unanswered questions about the prevalence of options. Perhaps because of better data availability, recent agencybased research has provided more consistent results. For example, studies by Core et al. (1999), Core and Guay (1999), and Bryan et al. (2020) appear to support the theory that executive pay structure in general, and the use of options in particular, reflects firms39。薪酬研究也得出了一致的結(jié)論：以公允價(jià)值為計(jì)量基礎(chǔ)的期權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)現(xiàn)已幾乎成為 CEO 報(bào)酬中最重要的組成部分（墨菲， 1999 年；貝克， 1999 年；松永，1995 年；葉麥克， 1995 年）。雖然結(jié)果比較復(fù)雜，但是已成為高管薪酬一部分的期權(quán)的實(shí)證研究結(jié)果已普遍支持這樣一種以代理為基礎(chǔ)的預(yù)測(cè)。我們對(duì)阿布迪和凱茲尼克認(rèn)為的自愿性信息披露通常暗示著管理報(bào)告盈余的動(dòng)機(jī)的實(shí)驗(yàn)證據(jù)提出爭(zhēng)議。正如預(yù)料的，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了期權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)影響財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告過(guò)程的跡象。 如引言所述，大部分關(guān)于股票期權(quán)使用的學(xué)術(shù)研究使用了代理理論框架，將高管薪酬的 結(jié)構(gòu)作為各種代理問(wèn)題的解決方法。焦耳斯（ 1996 年）提出了一個(gè)類(lèi)似的觀點(diǎn)，他發(fā)現(xiàn)隨著執(zhí)行期權(quán)持有量的增加，股票回購(gòu)傾向于代替現(xiàn)金股利。 例如，松永（ 1995 年）認(rèn)為，當(dāng)公司處于金融危機(jī)的時(shí)候，他們?cè)噲D通過(guò)用期權(quán)代替股利支付來(lái)減少報(bào)酬支出。這些結(jié)果表明，在其他條件同等的情況下，在授予日之前公布盈余的公司與那些在授予日之后公布盈余的公司相比，可能會(huì)報(bào)告相對(duì)低的盈余。然而，由于以前的研究表明管理者利用會(huì)計(jì)謹(jǐn)慎性來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)各種盈余管理的目標(biāo)，我們提出了如下一個(gè)期權(quán)的使用效果。與我們的觀點(diǎn)相一致，更多的分析結(jié)果表明，如果公司在期權(quán)授予日前發(fā)布公眾的盈余公告，那么期權(quán)與應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目之間的負(fù)面關(guān)聯(lián)就會(huì)更強(qiáng)烈。 結(jié)論 我們的研究考察了 CEO 報(bào)酬的結(jié)構(gòu)以及管理盈余的動(dòng)機(jī)。具體來(lái)說(shuō)，管理者傾 向于在有利的盈余報(bào)告之前、不利的盈余報(bào)告之后得到期權(quán)。進(jìn)而這個(gè)結(jié)果可能意味著使收入增加的可操縱應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)與期權(quán)報(bào)酬正相關(guān)。綜觀來(lái)說(shuō)，有證據(jù)表明，盡管期權(quán)報(bào)酬的 做法有可能降低一些類(lèi)型的代理成本，但是也可能滋生機(jī)會(huì)主義的其他形式。也許是因?yàn)楦玫臄?shù)據(jù)有效性，最近的以代理為基礎(chǔ)的研究提供了更一致的結(jié)果。此外，如果高管在期權(quán)授予日期前公布盈余，這種影響似乎會(huì)變得更加強(qiáng)烈。我們預(yù)測(cè)，通過(guò)期權(quán)的形式獲取相當(dāng)大部分報(bào)酬的管理者會(huì)使用可操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)來(lái)報(bào)告較低的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)，希望暫時(shí)地抑制股票價(jià)格。與我們研究最相關(guān)的一條路線表明管理者將操縱新聞發(fā) 布的時(shí)間或期權(quán)授予的日期（或兩者）作為提高他們自身獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)公允價(jià)值的一種手段。例如 ,會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則制定者們采取了一系列的準(zhǔn)則 ,極大地?cái)U(kuò)大了對(duì)期 權(quán)投資的報(bào)告要求（美國(guó)證券交易所， 1992 年和 1993 年；財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會(huì)， 1995 年）。 DeFond and Park [1997]), longterm bonus maximization (Healy [1985]), avoidance of technica