【正文】 2的濃度增加24倍。如果D是正確的話這個(gè)有意義的改變?cè)谑杖牒椭С龅淖兞恐虚g是不一樣的,我們將學(xué)校在傳統(tǒng)的形勢(shì)下,他能進(jìn)入更加有益的改變,然后整個(gè)事實(shí)在這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)學(xué)校項(xiàng)目當(dāng)中有一個(gè)大的嘗試，并且在這個(gè)嘗試當(dāng)中有一個(gè)小的改變,可能不是一個(gè)好的投資。知道“顧客”是否做是有益的，實(shí)際上，與那些被訓(xùn)練的教育家不同的是，他們收集的數(shù)據(jù)。正如H的文件，最后的結(jié)果是任何事情除了不引人注目。一些攜帶了大量的重量來(lái)解釋更多的變化比起其他。是否在一個(gè)控制變量的因素當(dāng)中，有一個(gè)改變。這個(gè)提出了一些問(wèn)題:。正如第三章，他指出，這個(gè)很長(zhǎng)的等級(jí)觀點(diǎn)是因?yàn)榫薮蟮淖兓５谌河⑽奈墨I(xiàn)翻譯（模版）在回顧D和H的文章時(shí)，我愿意第一個(gè)去單獨(dú)地討論每一篇，然后發(fā)表一些總體的觀點(diǎn)。他們?cè)谕ㄘ浥蛎浀?，?jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)強(qiáng)勁的時(shí)候推進(jìn)自由化改革。盡管中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化，但是國(guó)家將繼續(xù)以控制社會(huì)的宏觀的經(jīng)濟(jì)杠桿，允許它通過(guò)重要的途徑影響經(jīng)濟(jì)效果。雖然一些大型國(guó)有企業(yè)由于釋放出的貸款利率可能付出更高的借貸成本，銀行急于提供大量的融資額給他們，使他們向其他實(shí)體轉(zhuǎn)貸資金而賺取利潤(rùn)。導(dǎo)致2009年中國(guó)的貸款向上急速膨脹，比上年增長(zhǎng)了驚人的30％。因此，銀行仍然不能通過(guò)提供更高的存款利率互相競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。此外，銀行也可以給予儲(chǔ)戶低于存款基準(zhǔn)利率的利率。例如，由于各會(huì)計(jì)事務(wù)所所在國(guó)家或地區(qū)的不同，所需遵循的司法體系也有很大不同，如何在這樣的環(huán)境中“保持始終如一的高質(zhì)服務(wù)”對(duì)四大會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所來(lái)說(shuō)無(wú)疑是一種挑戰(zhàn)。最后一點(diǎn)，當(dāng)我們使用這兩種可互換的先進(jìn)模型來(lái)減少在瓊斯模型中對(duì)不正常收益的估計(jì)缺陷時(shí)，我們可能犯了一些很重要的計(jì)算錯(cuò)誤。此論文主要探究辦事處規(guī)模是否是除國(guó)家級(jí)審計(jì)公司規(guī)模和公司級(jí)審計(jì)行業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)外，影響審計(jì)質(zhì)量和審計(jì)費(fèi)用的一個(gè)額外的、有條件的因素。因?yàn)檫@些代價(jià)對(duì)于特定的某些公司和一些大公司來(lái)說(shuō)是不一樣的。他的分析指出高級(jí)審計(jì)師比低級(jí)審計(jì)師更傾向于提供更高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)服務(wù)給個(gè)別客戶。最后，該研究結(jié)果為調(diào)查者和從業(yè)者提供了實(shí)用的關(guān)于審計(jì)質(zhì)量和審計(jì)定價(jià)的見(jiàn)解。簡(jiǎn)單來(lái)說(shuō)，研究結(jié)果指出在美國(guó)的審計(jì)市場(chǎng)，（控制審計(jì)公司規(guī)模為國(guó)家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，行業(yè)領(lǐng)先水準(zhǔn)為國(guó)家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以及其他相關(guān)因素）審計(jì)質(zhì)量和審計(jì)費(fèi)用都與辦事處規(guī)模呈正相關(guān)。接著，我們還檢驗(yàn)了辦事處規(guī)模與審計(jì)定價(jià)之間的關(guān)系。隨后，弗朗西斯等證實(shí)如果審計(jì)師是市級(jí)行業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者或同時(shí)為國(guó)家級(jí)與市級(jí)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)水平時(shí)，非正常應(yīng)計(jì)所代理的客戶收益相對(duì)較高。這個(gè)研究隱含的假設(shè)是同一公司在不同城市的不同規(guī)模的辦事處的審計(jì)質(zhì)量是平均的。簡(jiǎn)介正如前文所說(shuō)，相對(duì)于國(guó)家級(jí)辦事處來(lái)說(shuō)，市級(jí)審計(jì)辦事處的規(guī)模對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量有著更為重要的決定作用。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)中，審計(jì)質(zhì)量是由異常應(yīng)計(jì)來(lái)衡量的，辦事處規(guī)模則有兩種衡量方法：一個(gè)是基于每個(gè)辦事處的審計(jì)客戶數(shù)量，另一個(gè)是基于每個(gè)辦事處掙得的審計(jì)費(fèi)用總額。Krishnan 2005).These studies find, in general, that large audit firms with international brand names(., Big4 auditors)or industry expertise provide higherquality audit services than small audit firms which lack such brand names or industry in this line of research is the assumptionthat audit quality is homogeneous across offices of various sizes located in different cities withinthe same audit a result, we have little evidence on crossoffice differences in audit quality,and in particular, whether and how the size of a local engagement office has an impact on auditquality and/or audit natural questiontoaskis:Istheofficesizean additionalengagementspecific factor determining audit quality and thus audit pricing over and beyond auditfirm size and industry leadership? We aim to provide direct evidence on this unexplored recent studies provide indirect evidence suggesting that audit quality may differacross different engagement offices within an audit example, in the first thatuses each engagement office as the unit of analysis, Reynolds and Francis(2000, 375)find thatwhen client size is measured at the office level using officespecific clienteles, “Big 5 auditorsreportmoreconservativelyforlarger clients.”Further,Ferguson et al.(2003)and Francis et al.(2005)find that cityspecific, officelevel industry leadership, when bined with the nationallevel leadership, generates the highest audit fee premiums and thus, by inference, higher auditquality in the Australian and markets, respectively, while nationallevel industry leadership alone has no , Francis et al.(2006)document that client earningsquality proxied by abnormal accruals is higher when auditors are citylevel industry leaders alone,or they are both citylevel and nationallevel industry differently, their results indicatethat nationallevel industry leadership alone has no significant impact on audit , Choi et al.(2007)show that the geographical proximity of the citybased engagementoffice to clients’ headquarters is positively associated with the accrual quality of clients, suggesting that the geographical location of the auditor’s office is an important engagementspecificdeterminant of audit above findings, taken together, suggest that citybased, officelevel characteristics may play an important role in determining audit quality and thus audit should be pointed out, however, that none of these studies has paid attention to the question ofwhether the size of a local engagement office is systematically associated with audit quality andfees paid to bridge this gap in our knowledge, we investigate a hitherto underresearched question ofwhether, and how, the size of a local engagement office hereafter, office sizeis associated withaudit quality and audit first hypothesize that office size is systematically associatedwith audit quality even after controlling for audit firm size at the national level and auditorindustry expertise at the office will be further elaborated in the next section, one would observe a positive association if the audits by large offices are of higher quality than the audits bysmall , we also examine the association between the office size and audit research shows that audit quality is priced in the market(Choi et 。office size。Kim et 。Shapiro 1983).Similarly, ourevidence suggests that large, Big 4 auditors should take care to maintain a similar level of auditquality across offices of different sizes because a systematically poorquality audit service performed by a local office could potentially cause damage to the reputation for the entire audit DEVELOPMENT Office Size and Audit Quality A growing body of audit research emphasizes the importance of analyzing the behavior ofauditors in citybased, local engagement , none of these studies has paid attention to the size of a local office in the context of audit does the office size matter inaudit quality over and beyond two wellknown audit firm characteristics, ., audit firm size orbrand name(Big 4 versus nonBig 4)and industry expertise? In DeAngelo’s(1981b)framework, an auditor’s incentive to promise audit quality withrespect to a particular client depends on the economic importance of the client relative to theauditor’s client analysis indicates that large auditors are likely to provide higherquality audit services to a particular client than small auditors because an auditor’s economicdependence on that client is negligible for large auditors, and large auditors have more to lose(.,bear higher reputation loss)in case of audit failures, pared with small ’s(1981b)theory can also be applied to the analysis of audit qu