【正文】 2的濃度增加24倍。如果D是正確的話這個有意義的改變在收入和支出的變量中間是不一樣的,我們將學校在傳統(tǒng)的形勢下,他能進入更加有益的改變,然后整個事實在這個實驗學校項目當中有一個大的嘗試，并且在這個嘗試當中有一個小的改變,可能不是一個好的投資。知道“顧客”是否做是有益的，實際上，與那些被訓練的教育家不同的是，他們收集的數(shù)據(jù)。正如H的文件，最后的結果是任何事情除了不引人注目。一些攜帶了大量的重量來解釋更多的變化比起其他。是否在一個控制變量的因素當中，有一個改變。這個提出了一些問題:。正如第三章，他指出，這個很長的等級觀點是因為巨大的變化。第三篇：英文文獻翻譯（模版）在回顧D和H的文章時，我愿意第一個去單獨地討論每一篇，然后發(fā)表一些總體的觀點。他們在通貨膨脹低，經濟增長強勁的時候推進自由化改革。盡管中國經濟發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化，但是國家將繼續(xù)以控制社會的宏觀的經濟杠桿，允許它通過重要的途徑影響經濟效果。雖然一些大型國有企業(yè)由于釋放出的貸款利率可能付出更高的借貸成本，銀行急于提供大量的融資額給他們，使他們向其他實體轉貸資金而賺取利潤。導致2009年中國的貸款向上急速膨脹，比上年增長了驚人的30％。因此，銀行仍然不能通過提供更高的存款利率互相競爭。此外，銀行也可以給予儲戶低于存款基準利率的利率。例如，由于各會計事務所所在國家或地區(qū)的不同，所需遵循的司法體系也有很大不同，如何在這樣的環(huán)境中“保持始終如一的高質服務”對四大會計師事務所來說無疑是一種挑戰(zhàn)。最后一點，當我們使用這兩種可互換的先進模型來減少在瓊斯模型中對不正常收益的估計缺陷時，我們可能犯了一些很重要的計算錯誤。此論文主要探究辦事處規(guī)模是否是除國家級審計公司規(guī)模和公司級審計行業(yè)標準外，影響審計質量和審計費用的一個額外的、有條件的因素。因為這些代價對于特定的某些公司和一些大公司來說是不一樣的。他的分析指出高級審計師比低級審計師更傾向于提供更高質量的審計服務給個別客戶。最后，該研究結果為調查者和從業(yè)者提供了實用的關于審計質量和審計定價的見解。簡單來說，研究結果指出在美國的審計市場，（控制審計公司規(guī)模為國家標準，行業(yè)領先水準為國家標準以及其他相關因素）審計質量和審計費用都與辦事處規(guī)模呈正相關。接著，我們還檢驗了辦事處規(guī)模與審計定價之間的關系。隨后，弗朗西斯等證實如果審計師是市級行業(yè)領導者或同時為國家級與市級領導水平時，非正常應計所代理的客戶收益相對較高。這個研究隱含的假設是同一公司在不同城市的不同規(guī)模的辦事處的審計質量是平均的。簡介正如前文所說，相對于國家級辦事處來說，市級審計辦事處的規(guī)模對審計質量有著更為重要的決定作用。實證檢驗中，審計質量是由異常應計來衡量的，辦事處規(guī)模則有兩種衡量方法：一個是基于每個辦事處的審計客戶數(shù)量，另一個是基于每個辦事處掙得的審計費用總額。Krishnan 2005).These studies find, in general, that large audit firms with international brand names(., Big4 auditors)or industry expertise provide higherquality audit services than small audit firms which lack such brand names or industry in this line of research is the assumptionthat audit quality is homogeneous across offices of various sizes located in different cities withinthe same audit a result, we have little evidence on crossoffice differences in audit quality,and in particular, whether and how the size of a local engagement office has an impact on auditquality and/or audit natural questiontoaskis:Istheofficesizean additionalengagementspecific factor determining audit quality and thus audit pricing over and beyond auditfirm size and industry leadership? We aim to provide direct evidence on this unexplored recent studies provide indirect evidence suggesting that audit quality may differacross different engagement offices within an audit example, in the first thatuses each engagement office as the unit of analysis, Reynolds and Francis(2000, 375)find thatwhen client size is measured at the office level using officespecific clienteles, “Big 5 auditorsreportmoreconservativelyforlarger clients.”Further,Ferguson et al.(2003)and Francis et al.(2005)find that cityspecific, officelevel industry leadership, when bined with the nationallevel leadership, generates the highest audit fee premiums and thus, by inference, higher auditquality in the Australian and markets, respectively, while nationallevel industry leadership alone has no , Francis et al.(2006)document that client earningsquality proxied by abnormal accruals is higher when auditors are citylevel industry leaders alone,or they are both citylevel and nationallevel industry differently, their results indicatethat nationallevel industry leadership alone has no significant impact on audit , Choi et al.(2007)show that the geographical proximity of the citybased engagementoffice to clients’ headquarters is positively associated with the accrual quality of clients, suggesting that the geographical location of the auditor’s office is an important engagementspecificdeterminant of audit above findings, taken together, suggest that citybased, officelevel characteristics may play an important role in determining audit quality and thus audit should be pointed out, however, that none of these studies has paid attention to the question ofwhether the size of a local engagement office is systematically associated with audit quality andfees paid to bridge this gap in our knowledge, we investigate a hitherto underresearched question ofwhether, and how, the size of a local engagement office hereafter, office sizeis associated withaudit quality and audit first hypothesize that office size is systematically associatedwith audit quality even after controlling for audit firm size at the national level and auditorindustry expertise at the office will be further elaborated in the next section, one would observe a positive association if the audits by large offices are of higher quality than the audits bysmall , we also examine the association between the office size and audit research shows that audit quality is priced in the market(Choi et 。office size。Kim et 。Shapiro 1983).Similarly, ourevidence suggests that large, Big 4 auditors should take care to maintain a similar level of auditquality across offices of different sizes because a systematically poorquality audit service performed by a local office could potentially cause damage to the reputation for the entire audit DEVELOPMENT Office Size and Audit Quality A growing body of audit research emphasizes the importance of analyzing the behavior ofauditors in citybased, local engagement , none of these studies has paid attention to the size of a local office in the context of audit does the office size matter inaudit quality over and beyond two wellknown audit firm characteristics, ., audit firm size orbrand name(Big 4 versus nonBig 4)and industry expertise? In DeAngelo’s(1981b)framework, an auditor’s incentive to promise audit quality withrespect to a particular client depends on the economic importance of the client relative to theauditor’s client analysis indicates that large auditors are likely to provide higherquality audit services to a particular client than small auditors because an auditor’s economicdependence on that client is negligible for large auditors, and large auditors have more to lose(.,bear higher reputation loss)in case of audit failures, pared with small ’s(1981b)theory can also be applied to the analysis of audit qu