公共管理者在公共政策中的作用-免費(fèi)閱讀
【正文】 我們期待看到 進(jìn)一步的 政策理論研究。但是，這些差異影響了我們對(duì)信息的使用和價(jià)值觀，在決策 過(guò)程 影響的認(rèn)識(shí)？ 我們預(yù)期的性能信息的使用將產(chǎn)生白宮對(duì)總統(tǒng)的喜好偏見(jiàn) 和 決策？使用績(jī)效信息產(chǎn)生的機(jī)構(gòu) 會(huì) 有不同的 效果 ？如果信息是重要的， 那么 消息來(lái)源也應(yīng)該有所作為。 我們也知道，公共管理者在政策設(shè)計(jì)過(guò)程中會(huì)有重大的變化。我們的政策手段有許多 方面 需要公共管理者與其他組織進(jìn)行合作。事實(shí)上，它很可能是更不尋常的案件。他們?cè)诘驴?薩斯的學(xué)校， Meier 和奧圖爾（ 2020）建立了一個(gè)用結(jié)合工資、教育、經(jīng)驗(yàn)已經(jīng)其他相關(guān)的一些指標(biāo)的質(zhì)量管理和衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 同樣，我們認(rèn)為，政策學(xué)者可能不愿意納入管理質(zhì)量，因?yàn)樗坪?很 古怪。 研究表明，在許多情況下，相同政策手段的執(zhí)行對(duì)于不同的組織會(huì)有很大不同的結(jié)果。一些模 型如預(yù)測(cè)國(guó)會(huì) 是否將采用“警察巡邏”或“火災(zāi)報(bào)警器”（麥卡賓斯與施瓦茨， 1984），以控制機(jī)構(gòu)以及無(wú)法解釋為何該機(jī)構(gòu)的一些部門執(zhí)行國(guó)會(huì)的意圖比其他人更忠實(shí)地。從政策看街道級(jí)別官僚的優(yōu)勢(shì)（例如，利普斯基， 1980） ， 完全是不一樣的視覺(jué)效果。 那么問(wèn)題就變成政治制度如何啟用或限制這種復(fù)合官僚龐然大物以獲得政策 成果 。 Meier amp。 Doerfler, 2020). So many of the hardfought policy ―solutions‖ to educational problems—differentiated teaching for special education students or English language learners, performanceassessment policy, school choice interventions—are found to be extremely successful at one institution and utterly unsuccessful in others. Role of Managerial Quality In discussions of policy outes and government performance, issues of ―bureaucratic inpetence‖ or ―bureaucratic failure‖ often bee central to identifying why certain policies failed. We regularly see case studies that point to administrative failures, poor decision making, or unqualified leadership as the explanation for why things went wrong. Both in scholarly and popular discourse, there seem to be at least two universally accepted truths: that there is substantial variation in the managerial abilities (or quality) of those who are appointed to head public agencies and that this variation in quality has a systematic effect on policy outes. If this is the case, why do aspects of managerial quality rarely seem to factor into our work on explaining and predicting when policies succeed and when they fail? Again, we believe that policy scholars may be hesitant to incorporate managerial quality, because it seems idiosyncratic. And to be fair, managerial quality is not the easiest concept to measure. However, our casual discussions of ―poor management‖ or ―leadership failures‖ can uncover some basic themes that can be (and have been) useful to identifying what factors would likely lead to higher quality management. Maybe the best way to identify these qualities would be to consider the indicators that are referenced when making allegations of poor management. For example, a number of critiques of presidential appointments often point to agency heads who were hired for their political affiliations, not their expertise. While ―managerial quality‖ may be difficult to measure, ―expertise‖ (which should be closely linked to quality) can offer more traction. A number of public management scholars have made considerable progress in studying managerial quality by measuring certain aspects of expertise. Avellaneda’s (forthing) study of local government officials incorporated levels of formal education and years of experience in similar jobs to measure quality of management. In their work on Texas schools, Meier and O’Toole (2020) construct a managerial quality measure using a model that incorporates salary, education, experience, and a number of other related indicators. Their subsequent work has found this measure of quality to have a substantial and systematic impact on anizational performance. Other studies have included different aspects of managerial expertise, such as whether the manager had served in that particular agency before assuming the leadership role (Hamidullah, Wilkins, amp。 Shipan, 2020。 Schwartz, 1984) to control an agency are unable to explain why some divisions of that agency implement congressional intent more faithfully than do others. These institutionallevel models are simply illequipped to deal with behavioral variance that occurs at the programmatic level—the same variance that
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