【正文】 ，其最高底薪為26,500元；最低之底薪為6,250元，平均值為12,512元，就算是年資再高底薪方面亦不會(huì)有太大的差異。38 / 38個(gè)人平均獎(jiǎng)金(PS)扣除自身他人平均獎(jiǎng)金(PP)平均售車數(shù)(SQ)年資(EX)底薪(BS)性別(SEX)婚姻(MAR)平均數(shù)( Mean)中位數(shù)(Median)最大值( Maximum)最小值( Minimum)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差( Std, Dev)偏度( Skewness)峰度( Kurtosis)JB值( JarqueBera)*******《表5》國(guó)產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商樣本基本資料敘述統(tǒng)計(jì)表註：，*表拒絕常態(tài)分配之虛無(wú)假設(shè)。有正相關(guān)可視為年資與底薪有正相關(guān)之關(guān)係存在。整合此二訊息，可充分支持模型Ⅰ並設(shè)有嚴(yán)重共線性問(wèn)題。由《表7》中的模型設(shè)定錯(cuò)誤檢定(regression specification error test, RESET)，可以看出模型、均通過(guò)，適合以線性迴歸模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析；但從異質(zhì)變異檢定(heteroskedasticity test)，可以看出模型、未通過(guò)，顯示有殘差項(xiàng)變質(zhì)變異問(wèn)題。模型中，表示所設(shè)立之各項(xiàng)變數(shù)，％之解釋力?！侗?》國(guó)產(chǎn)車迴歸模型估計(jì)結(jié)果　模型模型模型常數(shù) ()()()PP (*)(*)(*)SQ (*)(*)(*)EX .()()BS . ()()SEX (*)(*)(*)MAR ()()() 註：括弧數(shù)字代表P值，*為10％判定水準(zhǔn)顯著；為調(diào)整後判定係數(shù)。另因?yàn)閲?guó)產(chǎn)車與進(jìn)口車銷售車價(jià)之差異，所給與的薪資制度亦不同，從底薪數(shù)值來(lái)看，其平均底薪為22,130元，進(jìn)口車銷售員底薪足足高了實(shí)證Ⅰ之國(guó)產(chǎn)車銷售員底薪快一倍。由性別來(lái)看，與實(shí)證Ⅰ％，偏態(tài)值為負(fù)數(shù)，為左偏分配。其原因也是與模型Ⅰ相同，其薪資結(jié)構(gòu)採(cǎi)論件計(jì)酬制。整合此二訊息，可充分支持模型Ⅱ並設(shè)有嚴(yán)重共線性問(wèn)題。《表11》模型Ⅱ適用性檢定模型模型模型模型設(shè)定錯(cuò)誤檢定()()()異質(zhì)變異檢定(*)(**)()註：模型設(shè)定錯(cuò)誤檢定為對(duì)數(shù)概似比，異質(zhì)變異檢定為觀察值*R2；括弧數(shù)字為P值，*為10％判定水準(zhǔn)顯著。個(gè)人平均績(jī)效與其平均銷售車量數(shù)呈顯著之正向關(guān)係，由迴歸係數(shù)顯示每當(dāng)多賣一臺(tái)車時(shí)，會(huì)多賺11,960元。而正式銷售員再細(xì)分A、B、C、D四級(jí)及銷售專員再細(xì)分A、B、C三級(jí)，總共10級(jí)。男女比例而言，進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商之女性銷售人員佔(zhàn)極小數(shù)，雖然國(guó)產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商之女性銷售人員較多，也可知在汽車銷售業(yè)中還是以男性銷售人員為主。銷售車輛數(shù)部分，因進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商其進(jìn)口車之價(jià)位較高，所以個(gè)人賣出之車數(shù)比國(guó)產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商少。在同儕壓力部分以國(guó)產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商為佳，以其他人多賺10,000元為例，國(guó)產(chǎn)車經(jīng)銷商之銷售人員感受到之同儕壓力較進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商高，以致於比進(jìn)口車經(jīng)銷商銷售人員多賺550元；若換算成彈性值?！侗?5》模型比較分析表國(guó)產(chǎn)車模型進(jìn)口車模型常數(shù)()()PP(*)(*)SQ(*)(*)EX.()BS()()SEX(*)()MAR()()註：括弧數(shù)字代表P值，*為10％判定水準(zhǔn)顯著；為調(diào)整後判定係數(shù)。(2)兩種汽車銷售體系亦存在顯著論件計(jì)酬效果，國(guó)產(chǎn)車銷售員每額外多賣一部車之邊際報(bào)酬約8,408元而進(jìn)口車約11,961元；換算成平均彈性值，二者論件計(jì)酬之績(jī)效彈性。(6)整合本文之實(shí)證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)在工作團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)，可以藉由其他團(tuán)隊(duì)成員的表現(xiàn)來(lái)樹立規(guī)範(fàn)，形成同儕壓力並搭配論件計(jì)酬之誘因設(shè)計(jì)，可有效提昇個(gè)別成員的績(jī)效表現(xiàn)。參考文獻(xiàn)Baland, J. M., J. Dreze and L. Leruth(1999), Daily Wages and Piece Rates in Agrarian Economies, Journal of Development Economics, 59, 445461.Booth, A. L. and F. Jeff (1999), Earnings, Productivity, and PerformanceRelated Pay, Journal of Labor Economics, 17, 447463.Che, YeonKoo and SeungWeon Yoo(2001), Optimal Incentives for Teams, American Economic Review, 91(3), 525541.Drago, Robert and Gerald T. Garvey(1998), Incentives for Helping on the Job：Theory and Evidence, Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), 125.Fitzroy, Felix R. and Kornelius Kraft(1987), Cooperation, Productivity, and Profit Sharing, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(1), 2335.Freeman, R. B. and M. M. Kleiner (1996), The Last American Shoe Manufacturers: Changing the Method of Pay to Survive Foreign Competition, NBER Working Paper Series No. 6750.Idson, T. and Leo H. Kahane(2000), Team Effects on Compensation：An Application to Salary Determination in the National Hockey League, Economic Inquiry, 38(2), 345357.Jones, Derek C. and Takao Kato(1995), The Productivity Effects of Employee StockOwnership Plans and Bonuses：Evidence from Japanese Panel Data, American Economics Review, 85(3), 391414.Kandel, E. and . Lazear(1992), Peer Pressure and Partnerships, Journal of Political Economy, 100(4), 801817.Knez, Marc and Duncan Simester(2001), FirmWide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airline, Journal of Labor Economics, 19(4),74372.Lazear, E. P.(1986), Salaries and Piece Rates, Journal of Business, 59, 405431.Lazear, E. P.(1998), Chichester and Toronto:Wiley, Personnel Economics for Managers.Lazear, E. P.(1999), Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions: Presidential Address to the Society of Labor Economists, San Francisco, May 1, 1998, Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), 199236.Lazear, E. P. (2000), Performance Pay and Productivity, American Economic Review, 5, 13461361.Paarsch, H. J. and B. S. Shearer (1999), The Responses of Worker Effort to Piece Rates, Journal of Human Resources, 4, 644667.Rubin, D. K. and J. M. Perloff (1993), Who Works for Piece Rates and Why, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75, 10361043.Seiler, E. (1984), PieceRate vs. Time Rate: The Effect of Incentives on Earnings, Review of Economics and Statistics, LXVI, 363376.Shearer, B. (1995), PieceRates, PrincipalAgent Models, and Productivity Profiles: Parametric and SemiParametric Evidence from Payroll Records, Journal of Human Resources, 2, 275303.Taylor, . (1985), A System, Being A Step Toward Partial Solution of the Labor Problem, Trans., ASME , 898.于若蓉、劉育昇(2004)，工作團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)的同儕效果：以臺(tái)灣房屋仲介經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)為例，經(jīng)濟(jì)論文叢刊，第32輯第4期，3954