【正文】 新品種的相關(guān)的行為是用于實(shí)驗(yàn)?zāi)康幕蛩较吕镞M(jìn)行的并且非商用，那么此時(shí)是不受到育種者權(quán)利約束的。 1991 年的法案明確說(shuō)倘若將新品種的本質(zhì)衍生品種用于商業(yè)，包括育種者授權(quán)在內(nèi)的其他東西還是必要的。當(dāng)協(xié)議在 1991 年修訂的時(shí)候，一條具體的用來(lái)檢驗(yàn)育種者權(quán)利之應(yīng)用的規(guī)定引入到協(xié)議中，從而為育種者權(quán)利實(shí)施的檢驗(yàn)方法提供了廣泛的選擇，比如讓育種者與其他的權(quán)威機(jī)構(gòu)在國(guó)家的和國(guó)際的層面上開(kāi)展合作。 考慮到未來(lái)還有新的成員加入到協(xié)議中來(lái)，一些新的方便政府間組織也加入到協(xié)議中來(lái)的條例也被提了出來(lái)。在這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)論中一個(gè)顯著的問(wèn)題是目前對(duì) PBR 會(huì)產(chǎn)生的影響還缺乏觀察得來(lái)的證據(jù)。雖然許多國(guó)家均在考慮 PBR，但是其社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)方面帶來(lái)的影響仍未可知。哥倫比亞則在 1994 年頒布了 PBR 法律，當(dāng)時(shí)墨西哥快要引入 PBR。比如墨西哥，要加入北美自由貿(mào)易體系就必須先引入 PBR。然而還是有一些暗示信號(hào)，顯示我們可以如何找到在 PBR 保護(hù)之下的贏家和輸家。許多其他宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)因素將發(fā)揮舉足輕重的作用。然而打著知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的旗號(hào)方便人們動(dòng)不動(dòng)打官司來(lái)解決問(wèn)題。但是這些好處有可能被育種者向拉美牌照持有者提出的的限制條款所抵消，因?yàn)橛糜诔隹诘幕ü麑?duì)于出口市場(chǎng)的生產(chǎn)來(lái)說(shuō)是個(gè)打壓。其影響對(duì)公共和私人育種者的影響尚未可知。在引入 PBR 之后，原本的留存種子的權(quán)利變成非法行為，被視為特權(quán)，這種留存種子的行為最終要留待行政力量 裁決，并且還是會(huì)遭到限制。 ? minimum scope of protection。 Rights Create Winners and Losers The plant breeders39。 and (4) the diffusion of seed among farmers. PBR in Latin America Argentina, Chile and Uruguay established PBR protection some 15 to 20 years ago. Colombia promulgated a PBR law in 1994, while Mexico is on the verge of introducing it. In all of these five countries a variety of interests groups have been advocating PBR: (1) domestic seed panies which want to protect their new plant varieties in order to obtain royalty ine。 and (5) foreign governments which aim at an overall strengthening of intellectual property protection in Latin America. Foreign political pressure has been especially important in the case of Colombia and Mexico. Mexico, for example, is obliged to introduce PBR under NAFTA. Opposition to PBR protection has e from the direction of public sector researchers and some NGOs which work with small scale farmers, but is generally weak. The general public in most countries is little informed about the plans and potential effects of intellectual property protection in the seed industry. Winners and losers The period that PBR has been enforced in the Latin American countries is too short to draw farreaching conclusions about the impact of PBR in these countries. There are enough indications, however, that give a clue about where the winners and losers of PBR protection can be found. Firstly, the seed industry will presumably be among the winners. PBR protection enables the panies to control the exploitation of their varieties and to obtain additional ine. Whether this will stimulate them to invest more in plant breeding is difficult to answer. Many other macroeconomic factors will play a crucial role here. An overall improved profitability of plant breeding may encourage more private actors to enter the seed sector. Those breeders who have access to germplasm available at public international research centres may reap most benefits, as their input remains relatively unaffected by PBR, while their output enjoys protection. Based on the Argentinean experience there is no indication that, as yet, foreign multinational seed panies have benefited more from PBR than domestic panies. However, issuing intellectual property titles opens the door for conflicts that have to be resolved in court. When it es to law suits between local and the far larger foreign panies, it is obvious that the latter is in a better position. The strength of an intellectual property right title is generally a reflection of the financial capacity of the holder. Secondly, cultivators of export crops, such as cut flowers and fruit, may initially benefit from PBR because of better access to foreign varieties. These benefits, however, may be counterbalanced by restrictions the breeder is enabled to impose on the Latin American licensees, especially because cut flower and fruit are grown for export, which may pose a threat for the local production in the export markets. Whether cultivators will win or lose from PBR depends on their opportunities to collaborate with licensees within the export markets. Thirdly, public institutes may benefit from royalty ine, which may provide new and badly needed additional capital to survive deregulation policies. The cost is that access to traditional public germplasm bees restricted. The consequences of this development for other public and private breeders are as yet unclear. Fourthly, it may well be that farmers will finally pay the bill for PBR protection, although not necessarily. PBR will make seed more expensive, because unofficial seed trade, which is an important channel for seed diffusion, is the main target of PBR. This may encourage farmers to save more seed on their own farm. This practice is still allowed under the legislations in the Latin American countries. By introducing PBR, however, this natural right of seed saving bees a legal right, actually a privilege, which makes seed saving subject to political decision making and consequently prone to restrictions. Farmers may also be affected by shifts in the research agenda of public institutes. Are these institutes following the mercial route only with some crops in order to keep breeding capacity in nonmercial crops? Or does reduction of their budgets result in a shift in breeding objectives away from mercially unattractive crops?