【正文】 tance placed on ‘financial expertise’ in SOX and also that expertise requirements should be viewed more broadly than the simple nomination of one member to satisfy the requirements of stock exchanges. With respect to the auditor variables (size and tenure), the results are not significant with the exception of auditor changes. Companies that report material weaknesses report more auditor changes than panies that do not report such weaknesses. Our study is subject to the following limitations. First, we examine a small sample during a short time period in the postSOX era when the focus and attention on internal control reporting have been enormous. Second, as noted in the introduction, our design is subject to the assumption that our sample firms have internal control weaknesses and report them while our control firms do not have weaknesses and as such do not report any weaknesses. A longer time period and a larger sample may be needed to tease out the effects of auditrelated variables such as audit tenure. As noted in the introduction, the causes and consequences of reporting and remedying internal control weaknesses may be more plex than the governance mechanisms considered in this study. In particular, the number of audit mittee meetings and the proportions of experts in audit mittees may have been undergoing significant changes during the time period studied because of heightened awareness of financial reporting issues. Our interpretation of results on the association between internal control weaknesses and governance mechanisms has to be viewed in this context. Future research can examine whether the causes and consequences of control weaknesses are identifiable with specific changes in governance mechanisms such as changes in proportion of accounting experts. A longer time series data would enable researchers to study whether, for example, a decrease in the proportion of experts leads to increased likelihood of reporting internal control weaknesses. We view our findings as preliminary in nature and future research could extend our study by examining a larger and a multiperiod sample. Source:Gopal V. Krishnan and Gnanakumar Internal Control Deficiencies in the PostSarbanesOxley Era:The Role of Auditors and Corporate Governance[J].International Journal of Auditing,2020, :7390. 譯文： 后薩班斯時(shí)代的內(nèi)部控制缺陷報(bào)告：審計(jì)人員與公司治理的作用 本研究解決了在通過薩班斯法案（ SOX）之后審計(jì)委員會及審計(jì)師在內(nèi)部控制缺陷報(bào)告中的作用。我們的研究結(jié)果強(qiáng)調(diào)，公司的治理比一般公司在內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告方面弱點(diǎn)的審查更重要。根據(jù)薩班斯法案 404 條款，我們研究公司的內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告的缺陷和這些公司的審計(jì)委員會及審計(jì)師的特點(diǎn)。 介紹 薩班斯 奧克斯利法案（ SOX） (美國國會 2020)的一個(gè)重要的特征是第 404條款，要求管理層披露公司的內(nèi)部控制財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告和審計(jì)員對管理層的評估意見。雖然在這次研究當(dāng)中，我們已經(jīng)證實(shí)了有些公司在內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告中根本沒有發(fā)布任何弱點(diǎn)，而有一些公司出具內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告之后，又在報(bào)告中補(bǔ)充披露了控制方面的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，那些很少金融專家對內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告有嚴(yán)格定義的企業(yè)表明，具有扎實(shí)專業(yè)知識能夠更好地對內(nèi)部控制進(jìn)行定義，而不只是作為一個(gè)虛擬的變量在許多審計(jì)中進(jìn)行研究?？死锼辜{（ 2020）推測企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告缺陷在薩班斯法案頒布之前時(shí)期，與報(bào)告缺陷不同的公司相比，審計(jì)委員會越小，就不具獨(dú)立性，更不具專業(yè)性。在美國紐約的納斯達(dá)克證券交易所已經(jīng)采用了新的規(guī)章制度，采取了至少需要三名董事及審計(jì)委員會至少有一名委員會成員以金融專家的資格參與，公司才能上市（紐約證券交易所和納斯達(dá)克規(guī)則第 303A 章 4350 新規(guī)則（ d）（ 2）） 10 個(gè)這樣的法規(guī)變化，意味著公司有可能已經(jīng)與組成的審計(jì)委員會有很大的相似性。此前的審計(jì)文獻(xiàn)（例如阿博特等 2020）發(fā)現(xiàn)，審計(jì)委員會的效率與委員會的規(guī)模是正相關(guān)的。 審計(jì)委員會的工作效率并不是由規(guī)模本身決定的而是取決于在該委員會的各成員的專業(yè)技能。克里斯納和福斯那瑟（ 2020 年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，有財(cái)務(wù)專家的審計(jì)委員會，事務(wù)所對其財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告會更保守。因此，報(bào)告暗示， 專家的專業(yè)水平也可能與內(nèi)部控制缺陷正有關(guān)系。因 為有關(guān)規(guī)定在指定一個(gè)人作為大多數(shù)公司審計(jì)委員會專家的結(jié)果時(shí)，各公司之間對專業(yè)知識來說只有非常小的變化 .然而，如果專業(yè)知識真正重要，則必須考慮到專家人數(shù)和審計(jì)委員會的規(guī)模來獲取審計(jì)委員會財(cái)務(wù)方面的專業(yè)知識在企業(yè)之間的變化。不同于以往，薩班斯法案要求披露缺陷，重要的變化是薩班斯法案規(guī)定了審計(jì)委員會的組成，以及審計(jì)人員的作用是要求監(jiān)督管理層披露內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告以及對內(nèi)部控制的評估。無論如何，這并不意味著這是無關(guān)緊要的成分。報(bào)告中具有重大缺陷的公司要與那些報(bào)告中沒有缺陷的公司相比，其審計(jì)員的變化頻率要大。需要花更長的時(shí)間和找更多的樣本才能梳理出審計(jì)效果和審計(jì)相關(guān)的變量的影響。未來的研究可以檢查出控制是否真的存在著弱點(diǎn)，如對會計(jì)專家的比例變化與治理機(jī)制具體變化的辨