信息披露質(zhì)量和現(xiàn)金流外文翻譯-全文預(yù)覽
【正文】 arly empirical studies on management earnings forecasts provide evidence consistent with this prediction. More recent empirical work, however, suggests the importance of litigation risk in affecting management earnings forecasts. Skinner[1994] and Kasznik and Lev[1995] document that management earnings forecasts are more likely to convey bad news, consistent with managers are concerned with the risk of litigation and issue preemptive earnings forecasts to adjust downward investor expectations. Earnings forecasts likely play a special role in reducing the risk of litigation, and a more important role than management cash flow forecasts. For firms with bad news and thus concerned about potential litigation, earningsrelated disclosures are likely to be more effective in conveying that bad news to investors than disclosures of other financial information such as cash flows because, in general, earnings is the most informative summary performance measure. Thus, earnings disclosure is more likely to bring about the needed adjustment to investor expectations. As a result, the propensity for earnings forecasts to reflect bad news as documented in some of the prior studies may not apply to other types of management forecasts such as cash flow forecasts. Consistent with this, using data since the 1980’s, researchers find that better performance is associated with higher overall disclosure levels. We predict that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to premit to a certain position of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our findings are consistent with these predictions. We find that the likelihood of management cash flow forecasts increases in periods when there is a large increase in operating cash flow, when analysts are forecasting an earnings loss, when management specifically reveals in their press releases that earnings will be either below or above expectations and when firm is young. In addition, we find that the likelihood of management cash flow forecasts decreases in periods with extreme positive discretionary accruals. We document that firms issuing management cash flow forecasts tend to have better cash flow information than those without a forecast and that management cash flow forecasts tend to beat existing expectations. This applies to situations where there is very bad or very good news in earnings and when the firm is young, suggesting that management uses cash flow forecasts to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings and to signal economic viability in young firms. We provide evidence on how management reports actual cash flow information in (subsequent) press releases. We document that managers use discretion in reporting realized cash flows in earnings announcementrelated press releases and adopt alternative definitions of cash flows (vis224。 Zhang [2020]。 Yu [2020]。 Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, amp。 Barone amp。 Verrecchia [1994]). However, very few papers investigate the role that disclosure plays
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鄂ICP備17016276號-1