【正文】 y for increased regulatory pressure, and their consequent implications for performance. Our findings shed light on the dividend payout of bank holding panies in a unique macroeconomic setting that spans a period before and during the 2020– 09 financial crisis and in which the banking industry foresaw major shifts in the regulatory landscape. The recent regulatory focus on dividend policy contrasts with the limited attention paid to the issue in past empirical studies. The regulatory reforms currently being put into place impose a capital conservation mechanism by constraining dividend payouts for banks whose capital buffers fall within a range close to the minimum requirements. The ineffectiveness of regulatory pressure in limiting dividend payouts by undercapitalized banks before the financial crisis – a period during which banks were supposed to build capital buffers – supports the Federal Reserve and the Basel Committee39。ncia e Teologia” (PTDC/EGEECO/114977/2020). The views 共 頁 ， 第 13 頁 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 裝 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 訂 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 線 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions with which the authors are affiliated. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors. References [1]Anderson, C., Campbell, T., 2020. Corporate governance of Japanese banks. J. Corp. Financ. 10 (3), 327–354. [2]Andres, C., 2020. Large shareholders and firm performance an empirical examination of foundingfamily ownership. J. Corp. Financ. 14 (4), 431–445. [3]BCBS, 2020. Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (June, Available at: [4]Bessler, W., Nohel, T., 1996. The stockmarket reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by mercial banks. J. Bank. Financ. 20 (9), 1485–1508. [5]Bhattacharya, S., 1979. Imperfect information, dividend policy, and ‘the bird in the hand’ fallacy. Bell J. Econ. 10 (1), 259–270. [6]Brook, Y., Hendershott, R., Lee, D., 2020. Corporate governance and recent consolidation in the banking industry. J. Corp. Financ. 6 (2), 141–164. [7]Brown, J., Liang, N.,Weisbenner, S., 2020. Executive financial incentives and payout policy: firm responses to the 2020 dividend tax cut. J. Financ. 62 (4), 1935。227。 Collins et al., 1994。 dividend payout bees dependent on the level of capital. We present a summary of these variables in Table 2. Eq. (1) reflects all the considered variables with their respective hypothesized signs and relationships with the dependent variable. Dividendpayout=δ0+δ1size+δ2profitabilityδ3historicalgrowth177。 prospects and increase their potential to attract debt and equity financing when required。 (ii) the signaling hypothesis, which states that dividends are used as an 共 頁 ， 第 3 頁 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 裝 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 訂 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 線 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ indicator of future prospects。 Brook et al., 2020). The financial crisis has further enhanced the interest in the application of corporate finance and governance theories due to the unique macroeconomic context and the regulatory shift which is believed to have hit financial firms the most (see, for example, Erkens et al., 2020). We contribute to this emerging strand in the literature by studying banks39。 Filipe Abreu, Mohamed Azzim Gulamhussen Abstract We study dividend payouts of 462 . bank holding panies before and during the 2020–09 financial crisis. Fama and French (2020) characteristics (size, profitability and growth opportunities) explain dividend payouts before and during the financial crisis. The agency cost hypothesis explains dividend payouts before and during (more pronouncedly) the financial crisis. The signaling hypothesis explains dividend payouts during the financial crisis. Regulatory pressure was ineffective in limiting dividend payouts by undercapitalized banks before the financial crisis. Our findings have implications for corporate finance and governance theories, and also for the regulatory reforms that are being discussed among policymakers. 1. Introduction Researchers apply corporate finance and governance theories to financial firms on the grounds of the inherent interplay of interests of a wider set of stakeholders (depositors and regulators, as well as shareholders and managers), which make their agency and governance problems more plex, and the relevance of financial firms for the good functioning and soundness of modern financial systems (see, among others, Anderson and Campbell, 2020。s (2020) characteristics of dividend payers (size, profitability and growth opportunities)。s dividend. Therefore, we use an averaging period that is longer than one year. We opt a threeyear averaging period for two main reasons. First, this choice avoids the impact of the 2020 tax cut on dividend payouts in the . (see, among others, Brown et al., 2020). Second, a threeyear period covers the time span of the entire financial crisis (2020 to 2020). The signaling hypothesis states that banks with positive future growth opportunities (expected growth) are expected to pay out higher dividends to signal their banks39。 therefore a positive relationship is expected between independence and dividend payouts. We used the monly deployed Independence Indicator (independence) developed by Bankscope to capture the effect of agency costs. This indicator classifies the degree of independence of firms from their shareholders. Based on the data for the end of the period under