【正文】 nces of high uncertainty and risk, which are pounded by demanding time constraints. Flanagan and Nor man (1993) explained that every construction project is unique in its features and risk. However, risk is not unique to the construction sector, as explained in the textbook about subjective probability by Wright and Ayton (1994). In the definitive guidance on economic theory and the construction industry, the writers observed that it is more often the way a set of factors bine to affect construction work that makes the industry unique (Hillebrandt 1985). In a historical overview of the construction industry, Hughes and Hillebrandt (2020, p. 508–510) showed that these factors relate to the economic, contractual, political, and physical environments in which construction projects take place, and they tend to affect the way construction work is described, awarded, and documented. These factors include the necessity to price the product before production, petitive tendering, low fixedcapital requirements, preliminary expenses, delays to cash inflow, the tendency to operate with too little working capital, seasonal effects, price fluctuations, government intervention, the activity related to development, uncertain ground conditions, unpredictable weather, and no performance liability or longterm guarantees. These factors are 4 also explained in Calvert et al. (1995) and Kwakye (1997) who also show that construction projects are mostly plex, have a long production cycle, and involve the input of many participants. In some aspects of construction management (., Baloi and Price 2020, p. 262, and Ahmed et al. 2020, p. 4), researchers have argued that contractors are poor at managing risk, simply because the experientialbased mechanisms they are reported to use in approaching risk are not systematic in nature. However, this assertion does not ring true, in the light of other descriptions of the construction sector. A historical overview of the construction industry by Hughes and Hillebrandt (2020, p. 511) shows that from the early part of th nieenth century, contractors have responded to risks in the construction industry by using various means. Most contractors have resorted to the construction of speculative housing in the nieenth and twentieth centuries to sustain the labor force and business costs through the peaks and troughs of contracted work. A growing tendency exists for contractors to use their positive cash flow to invest in public/private partnerships (PPP) and private finance initiative (PFI) projects in which governments encourage the use of privatesector capital to procure public services. More recently, successful contractors are diversifying into businesses whose cycles counteract those of the construction industry. Contractors are mitigating risk by declining work perceived as too risky, subcontracting large portions of their work to others, and apportioning risk in wage structures. In essence, they are passing risk on to others in the supply chain. These contractors do seem adept at managing risk. However, by its very nature, risk is difficult to mitigate fully in all business sectors not just in the construction industry. Construction practitioners are often trained to account for risk in projects, particularly, for example, with the pilation of a risk register, as outlined by the Project Management Institute (PMI) (2020, pp. 237–268). This demonstrates that the importance of risk analysis is understood by practitioners. However, a detailed description of how contractors get from their understanding of risk to setting a price is not typically explained in the literature. The construction management literature articulates experience and intuition as the primary mechanisms that contractors use for pricing risks. For example, a survey of 400 . contractors by Mochtar and Arditi (2020) showed that In setting their bid offer, most contractors rely on their intuition after subjectively assessing the petition。 Liu and Ling 2020) have also proposed analytical models that contractors can use to assess risk in the bidding process. Citing the lack of significant work in construction risk analysis by fuzzy sets, Kangari and Riggs (1989) proposed a fuzzy set risk assessment methodology that can give contractors “…a more rational basis on which to make decisions.” The writers showed how a risk value, calculated by using fuzzy set principles, may be included as a risk premium in bids. However, no reference was made to any empirical research about what contractors actually do. By using the same fuzzy set theory, Paek et al. (1993) proposed a riskpricing method that contractors can use for analyzing and pricing risk when “…faced with the problem of deciding the bidding price of a construction project when the likelihood of the occurrence of risk events and the risk associated consequences are uncertain.” The model prescribed how an optimum risk premium should be included in construction bids. Here too, no reference was made to any empirical research a