外文翻譯---高新科技領(lǐng)域和納米技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力(已修改)
2025-06-01 08:28 本頁(yè)面
【正文】 1 本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯 外文題目： Competitiveness in HighTech Fields and Nanotechnology 出 處： 2020 NRI Papers 作 者： Naoki IKEZAWA 原 文： Competitiveness in HighTech Fields and Nanotechnology Naoki IKEZAWA During the socalled “l(fā)ost decade” of the 1990s, Japan’s petitiveness sharply declined in such representative hightech areas as semiconductors and liquid crystal applications, accelerating a hollowingout of core technologies. Despite various measures taken in recent years to remedy this situation, there is still a long ways to go before we will see any fruitful results in terms of industrial petitiveness. Accordingly, the realization of a new paradigm towards the acquisition of petitiveness is required among both panies and the government. This means the establishment of new business models in the case of panies, and a thorough overhaul of the vertically divided administrative structure in the case of the government. Towards the Basics Began in the 1980s (1) Criticizing Japan’s alleged free ride in basic research Japan began to rapidly improve its technological petitiveness in the 1970s and started to pose a major threat to leading panies in the United States and Europe, which had long been the targets of Japan’s efforts to catch up. Indeed, the exact situation that Japan is facing, ., declining petitiveness and the hollowingout of domestic industries, was taking place in Europe and, particularly, in the United States. The domestic measures mounted in the United States to reverse these trends included a strengthening of research and development investment in such leadingedge fields as information and biotechnology, where the prospects for industrialization were unclear at the time. Such measures also included the vitalization of universities and the implementation of various steps to link the results of academic research to industry. In terms of external measures, a survey organization known as the Japanese Technology Evaluation Center (JTEC) was established in 1983 and exclusively charged with monitoring developments and analyzing the background of Japan’s efforts to improve its petitiveness. This represented the classic approach of knowing one39。s enemy and learning what should be learned. 2 At the same time, the developing trade friction between Japan and the United States over television sets and semiconductors led to an increase in criticism since the 1970s about what the United States saw as Japan39。s industrial development policies. In other words, the United States regarded Japan39。s policies as using the full efforts of the nation to support selected industries, or socalled targeting policies, and increased its criticism by using the term Japan Inc. This criticism became especially acrimonious over the issue of basic research, with many Western observers claiming that Japan was taking a free ride in basic technology. As the results of basic research are seen as the public domain of the world at large, it is a widely accepted notion that every nation should make appropriate contributions to its formation. Accordingly, the crux of the argument was that Japan was enjoying industrial success by utilizing the results of basic research (acquired from the United States and Europe), but was doing little to fulfill its international responsibilities with respect to creating basic research re
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