【正文】 antity of close apartments rented? ?Is any of the tax ―passed‖ to renters? 40 Taxation Policy Analysis ?Market supply is unaffected. ?Market demand is unaffected. ?So the petitive market equilibrium is unaffected by the tax. ?Price and the quantity of close apartments rented are not changed. ?Landlords pay all of the tax. 41 Imperfectly Competitive Markets ?Amongst many possibilities are: –a monopolistic landlord –a perfectly discriminatory monopolistic landlord –a petitive market subject to rent control. 42 A Monopolistic Landlord ?When the landlord sets a rental price p he rents D(p) apartments. ?Revenue = pD(p). ?Revenue is low if p ? 0 ?Revenue is low if p is so high that D(p) ? 0. ?An intermediate value for p maximizes revenue. 43 Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD Low price Low price, high quantity demanded, low revenue. 44 Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD High price High price, low quantity demanded, low revenue. 45 Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD Middle price Middle price, medium quantity demanded, larger revenue. 46 Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD,QS Middle price Middle price, medium quantity demanded, larger revenue. Monopolist does not rent all the close apartments. 100 47 Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD,QS Middle price Middle price, medium quantity demanded, larger revenue. Monopolist does not rent all the close apartments. 100 Vacant close apartments. 48 Perfectly Discriminatory Monopolistic Landlord ?Imagine the monopolist knew everyone‘s willingnesstopay. ?Charge $500 to the most willingtopay, ?charge $490 to the 2nd most willingtopay, etc. 49 Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD,QS 100 p1 =$500 1 50 Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD,QS 100 p1 =$500 p2 =$490 1 2 51 Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD,QS 100 p1 =$500 p2 =$490 1 2 p3 =$475 3 52 Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD,QS 100 p1 =$500 p2 =$490 1 2 p3 =$475 3 53 Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium p QD,QS 100 p1 =$500 p2 =$490 1 2 p3 =$475 3 pe Discriminatory monopolist charges the petitive market price to the last renter, and rents the petitive quantity of close apartments. 54 Rent Control ?Local government imposes a maximum legal price, pmax pe, the petitive price. 55 Market Equilibrium p QD,QS pe 100 56 Market Equilibrium p QD,QS pe 100 pmax 57 Market Equilibrium p QD,QS pe 100 pmax Excess demand 58 Market Equilibrium p QD,QS pe 100 pmax Excess demand The 100 close apartments are no longer allocated by willingnesstopay (lottery, lines, large families first?). 59 Which Market Outes Are Desirable? ?Which is better? –Rent control –Perfect petition –Monopoly –Discriminatory monopoly 60 Pareto Efficiency ?Vilfredo Pareto。 18481923. ?A Pareto oute allows no ―wasted welfare‖。 ?. the only way one person‘s welfare can be improved is to lower another person‘s welfare. 61 Pareto Efficiency ?Jill has an apartment。 Jack does not. ?Jill values the apartment at $200。 Jack would pay $400 for it. ?Jill could sublet the apartment to Jack for $300. ?Both gain, so it was Pareto inefficient for Jill to have the apartment. 62 Pareto Efficiency ?A Pareto inefficient oute means there remain unrealized mutual gainstotrade. ?Any market oute that achieves all possible gainstotrade must be Pareto efficient. 63 Pareto Efficiency ?Competitive equilibrium: –all close apartment renters value them at the market price pe or more –all others value close apartments at less than pe –so no mutually beneficial trades remain –so the oute is Pareto efficient. 64 Pareto Efficiency ?Discriminatory Monopoly: –assignment of apartments is the same as with the perfectly petitive market –so the discriminatory monopoly oute is also Pareto efficient. 65 Pareto Efficiency ?Monopoly: –not all apartments are occupied –so a distant apartment renter could be assigned a close apartment and have higher welfare without lowering anybody else‘s welfare. –so the monopoly oute is Pareto inefficient. 66 Pareto Efficiency ?Rent Control: –some close apartments are assigned to renters valuing them at below the petitive price pe –some renters valuing a close apartment above pe don‘t get close apartments –Pareto inefficient oute. 67 Harder Questions ?Over time, will –the supply of close apartments increase? –rent control decrease the supply of apartments? –a monopolist supply more apartments than a petitive rental market? 68 消費(fèi)者行為理論 Consumer theory 69 消費(fèi)者行為最優(yōu)化原則 ?Consumers are assumed to choose the best bundle of goods they can afford. 70 消費(fèi)者行為 ?消費(fèi)者進(jìn)行消費(fèi)的目的是什么？ ?消費(fèi)者消費(fèi)選擇的特點(diǎn)（ preference）？ ?消費(fèi)者進(jìn)行消費(fèi)受到什么條件的約束（afford)? ?在主客觀因素的影響下消費(fèi)者如何進(jìn)行選擇？ 71 Chapter Two Budgetary and Other Constraints on Choice 預(yù)算約束 72 outline ?預(yù)算約束 ?預(yù)算約束有什么特點(diǎn) ?影響預(yù)算約束的因素 ?計(jì)價(jià)物 ?政府的稅收、補(bǔ)貼和配給政策如何影響預(yù)算約束 73 Consumption Choice Sets ?What constrains consumption choice? –Budgetary, time and other resource limitations. 74 Budget Constraints ?A consumption bundle containing x1 ， x2 ……xn X (x 1, x2, … , x n). ?Commodity prices are p1, p2, … , p n. 75 Budget Constraints ?Q: When is a consumption bundle (x1, … , x n) affordable at given prices p1, … , p n? 76 Budget Constraints ?A: When p1x1 + … + p nxn ? m where m is the consumer‘s (disposable) ine. 77 Budget Constraints ?The bundles that are only just affordable form the consumer‘s budget constraint. 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