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英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視-文庫吧

2025-04-22 14:03 本頁面


【正文】 ty of demand may cause firms increase discrimination. Three kinds of price discrimination ? Perfect price discrimination—— suppliers get all consumer surplus in condition of holding perfect information of willing payment. ? Seconddegree price discrimination——suppliers extract consumer surplus inpletely using selfselection when information of individual preference is inplete. ? Thirddegree price discrimination—— Market segmentation using direct information about demand such as age, profession and location etc. and set different price for each group. Perfect price discrimination (1) simplest case: single consumer (or some identical consumers) has one unit of demand. Monopoly make price equal to reserve price, getting all consumer surplus. ? A classical example: a doctor is a little village similar with everybody in there and their economic information. He estimates how much everyone is willing to pay for and then charge for that amount. ? Another case: airline pany pay for each aircraft in different price. (2) Complex case ? assumption: n consumers hold the same demand curve, and monopoly know about it. ? q = D(p)/n, so D(p)=nq ? T gross of consumers’ payment ? Two pricing projects: linear pricing and two part tariff ? Linear pricing: T=pq ? Two part tariff: T=A+pq Profit maximization ? In linear pricing, monopoly price: p= ? Two part tariff: set as consumer surplus in petitive price p = , set ―license fee‖ A = , so pricing project as below T(q)= ? Profit pare: Monopoly pricing: = Two part tariff: mpcScpcS /ncc Spqn?0 If q0 If q=0 m? m m mp q C (q )?c c c cS p q C ( q )? ? ? ?Profit pare m?cpCqD MC A B C =△ ABC ?Obviously, all the consumer surplus is grabbed in two part tariff. (3) Universal case ? Assumption: consumers hold different demand curves, and monopoly know about them. ? Optimal project: set p = , and ask each consumer pay its surplus as ―license fee‖ , namely ? Problem of information reveal when consumer has unit demand and supplier only know distribution of estimation among them but no about everyone’s estimation, it will set single price —— means no price discrimination. cpciiAS?cci i iT A p q??How to make Perfect price discrimination In fact it’s a question of information emerging ? Compretively use coupon or accumulated consuming volumes ? Auction or bid ? Pricing in bind ? Bargaining directly 優(yōu)惠券的使用 (Journal of Marketing Research, 1978) 就業(yè) 狀態(tài) 產(chǎn)品種類 鋁箔 蠟紙 頭痛藥 清潔液 面巾紙 就業(yè) %(62) %(62) %(76) %(92) %(116) 失業(yè) %(128) %(153) %(161) %(214) %(226) 表中條目是有使用優(yōu)惠券傾向的全職主婦購買商品的比例 括號中的數(shù)字表示所表示比例的抽取樣本中人數(shù) Thirddegree price discrimination( Multimarket) assumption: ? Monopoly can segment consumers in some groups according to some exogenous information, and know about each of their demand curves. ? No arbitrage among groups, and monopoly can’t practise price discrimination in one group. ? A special example of multiple products monopoly pricing: independent demand and interdependent cost How to prevent arbitrage ? 持卡、憑證 ? 擔(dān)保(轉(zhuǎn)售限制,尤其是對于中間商) ? 摻雜 ? 交易費(fèi)用 ? 合約 ? 垂直一體化 專欄:航空公司如何防止套利? Profit maximization ? General de
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