第10章_寡頭壟斷和壟斷競(jìng)爭(zhēng)-展示頁(yè)
2025-03-14 01:06本頁(yè)面
【正文】 10 2 =70 4企業(yè)集中度 Concentration Ratios: c4 = q1 + q2 + q3 +q4 25+20+15+10 100 Q = = 70% 4 Cigarettes Household refrigerators Electric light bulbs Motor vehicles Greeting cards Blast furnaces Screw products 5%_4% Tools, dies, and jigs 3%_2% 93% 82% 86% 84% 84% 37% 7% 16% 8% 7% 4% 21% 4 largest panies Next 4 largest panies 5 集中度測(cè)定時(shí)要注意的 ? Conventional concentration measures include only domestic production and exclude imports. ? Conventional concentration measures also ignore the growing impact of petition from other industries. 6 不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的性質(zhì) ? Economists have found that three major factors are present in imperfectly petitive markets: 1. Costs 2. Barriers to petition 3. Strategic interaction (策略互動(dòng) ) 7 不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)果 ? Inefficient allocation of resources: P MC ? High levels of RD spending per dollar of sales. 8 不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的理論 ? Three of the most important cases of imperfect petition: ?Collusive oligopoly (合謀寡頭 ) ?Monopolistic petition ?Smallnumber oligopoly 9 策略互動(dòng) ? Strategic interaction is a term that describes how each firm’ s business strategy depends on their rivals’ strategies. ? As the number of firms in an industry shrink (減少 ), each firm is more likely to base pricing and output decisions on how other firms are likely to respond. 10 寡頭的合作與非合作選擇 ? When there are only a small number of firms in a market, they have a choice between cooperative (合作 ) and noncooperative (非合作 ) behavior. 11 合謀 ? Collusion occurs when one or more firms jointly (共同地 ) set prices or outputs, divide the market among themselves, or make other business decisions jointly. ? Such collusion can be either explicit or tacit (公開(kāi)的或默許的 ). 12 公開(kāi)合謀 ? One example of explicit (清楚的，公開(kāi)的 ) collusion would be that of the Gilded Age oligopolists (市場(chǎng)供應(yīng)壟斷者 ) in the early years of American capitalism. ? These oligopolists formed trusts or cartels (托拉斯或卡特爾 ) to set prices. 13 美國(guó)的反托拉斯法 ? 《謝爾曼法》是在 1890年通過(guò)的， 100多年來(lái)基本未變。它有兩條主要條款： ? 第 1條 ，任何限制州際或與外國(guó)的貿(mào)易和商業(yè)的合同、托拉斯或其他形式的合并或陰謀，都是非法的。 14 以后的變化 ? 1974年，對(duì)謝爾曼法進(jìn)行了修正，判違法以重罪而不是輕罪。 ? 另外，在民事訴訟中，企業(yè)和個(gè)人還可能被處以三倍于因?yàn)榉赐欣狗ǘ斐傻膿p失的賠償。 17 ? 每個(gè)合謀的公司按預(yù)先約定的月亮盈虧狀況輪流輪流“坐莊”，誰(shuí)坐莊就輪到誰(shuí)中標(biāo)。 如何運(yùn)作 18 最后的結(jié)局 ? 后來(lái)，陰謀敗露，有7名被告坐牢 30天，企業(yè)罰款 200萬(wàn)元。 19 默許合謀 ? The broader problem is with implicit or tacit collusion that arises precisely because explicit collusion is illegal. Price Leader 20 有效合謀的障礙 ? First, collusion is illegal. ? Second, firms may “ cheat” on the agreement by cutting their price to selected customers. ? Third, many panies face intensive petition from foreign
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