獨(dú)立董事制度：我國公司治理發(fā)展的新篇章--外文翻譯-展示頁
2025-05-26 21:17本頁面
【正文】 anism and inefficient internal monitoring system in China, management tends to have stronger autonomy in business operation and decisionmaking. As agency theory argues that individual is driven by opportunistic behaviour, thus, managers would engage in selfinterest serving instead of maximising shareholders’ returns. In the case of Chinese joint stock panies, it is found that over 1,200 listed panies in China to date, about 80% to 90% came from the restructuring of SOEs, and the state still owns about 50% shares of the listed panies. Under the “socialist market economy” background, central and local government agencies tend to carry out shareholder functions, appoint directors to the board and give direction to firm management. Many researchers argue that the interest of the state shareholders might not be the same as that of other institutional or individual shareholders. Because government might be more interested in pursuing social and political goals instead of profit maximisation. Obviously, a firm is either controlled by insiders or the state shareholder, without proper monitoring from outsiders is not healthy for the development of country’s economy. In August 2020, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released the “Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies” (CSRC, 2020。 hereafter referred to as the “Code”) was introduced to further speed up the development process, and hence improve individual pany’s corporate governance practice. After introducing the independent director system, the remaining question is, “Will firm have better performance by having independent directors on the board?” Studies from the West show that there are some controversial views on the effectiveness of board independence in relation to firm performance. On the one hand, some researchers agree that independent directors do have a positive relationship on firm’s corporate performance. Early work by Fama and Jensen contends that independent directors provide a means to monitor management activities through an increased focus on firm financial performance. Lee, Rosenstein and Rangan support this view, provide evidence that boards dominated by outside directors are associated with higher returns than those domi nated by insiders. Similarly, Pearce and Zahra point out that there is a positive correlation between the proportion of independent directors and firm financial performance. Baysinger and Butler report that changes in board position over a tenyear period from 1970s to 1980s appear have a causal relationship with accounting performance. In addition, Millstein and MacAvoy find a statistically significant relationship between active, independent boards and superior firm performance. On the other hand, Furthermore, Rosenstein and Wyatt argue that insiders are more effective because they have superior knowledge of the firm and its industry than outside directors, and they are just as diligent as outside directors, given their legal responsibilities and their own interests in the firm. Similarly, Bhagat and Black also state there is no convincing evidence suggesting that greater independ
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