【正文】 from other authorities. Some interviewees acknowledged the lack of independence of government auditing, but at the same time they did not want to exaggerate the problem. Being a department directed by the government, how can the audit officework independently free from the interference of the government or the chief government officers (CGO)? Is the result of interference inevitably detrimental? The interviewees found it hard to answer these questions. Besides, the audit office and the government are at different administrative levels and may not always have consistent perceptions on auditing. Under this circumstance, as was revealed in the interviews, the audit office, being at the lower level, would normally follow the government39。s congresses at various levels have begun to attach significant importance to, and make increasing use of, the audit report. At the same time, more and more taxpayers have begun to pay attention to how their money is used by the government. While the NAO39。s Republic of China (PRC, 1982), the National Audit Office (NAO) was set up in 1983 as a department of the State Council. In addition, regional audit offices were also set up as departments of provincial, municipal and county governments. A regional government audit office is under the leadership of both the government audit office at a higher level and its supervising regional government. For example, the audit office of a provincial government is subject to the joint leadership of the NAO and the provincial government. Under the dual leadership system, for a provincial government audit office, the NAO provides auditing and regulatory guidance and monitoring while the provincial government provides resources and exercises personnel control. In addition, the NAO operates a work of branch offices in central government ministries and very large municipalities to audit various government departments, agencies, state owned enterprises under the control of the central government, and their associated institutions. These branch audit offices located in ministries and very large municipalities are under the direct leadership of the NAO. Although this government audit system has made significant contributions toward China39。 中文 4010 字 本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計） 外 文 翻 譯 題 目 政府審計公告制度的現(xiàn)狀分析及其對策 專 業(yè) 會 計 學(xué) 外文題目 Government auditing in China: Problems and reform 外文出處 《 Government auditing in China: Problems and reform》 [N]. incorporating Advances in International Accounting 2021， (24)： 119127 外文作者 楊 壽昌，賈森澤忠孝，莫里斯彭德爾伯里 1 原文 ： Government auditing in China: Problems and reform 1. Introduction For 30 years after its foundation in 1949, the People39。s Republic of China went through a series of major mass political movements which left it extremely isolated from the rest of the world, especially capitalist countries. At the brink of a total economic collapse, China shifted its focus to economic development, began marketoriented economic reforms, and adopted an opendoor policy in These changes revived both government auditing and independent auditing , which had been replaced by other monitoring mechanisms in the 1950s. As required by the 1982 Constitution of the People39。s economic reform and opening up to the world in the past 20 years (Chinese Auditing System Research Group, 1999), it also suffers from the lack of audit independence. The existing problems of government auditing mainly stem from 2 it being under the direct control of the executive body (the State Council). Under this system, various government departments and officials can, both theoretically and practically, interfere with government auditing, thus weakening the objectivity and fairness of the audit. However, the people39。s lack of independence has always been a problem ever since its establishment, this problem is creating increasing tensions in the current political setting because of the accountability needs of the legislature and taxpayers. The accountability relationship between the government and the legislature is promised by the fact that the aud