外文翻譯---股利政策和組織的資本市場(chǎng)-文庫(kù)吧資料
2025-05-22 08:51本頁(yè)面
【正文】 Information asymmetries have also given rise to agency cost explanations for paying dividends. With the increased separation of ownership from control, managers frequently face very little supervision. In this context, a mitment to a high dividend policy attenuates managerial opportunism and forces the firm to frequently interact with the capital market. A central message of asymmetric information models is that dividend payments are important both as a premitment device to reduce agency costs and as a signal of management’s expectations of future earnings. Both models have been used to justify Lintner’s observation (1956) that actual dividend policies tend to follow a slowly adaptive process. However, the viability of both of these mechanisms depends on other aspects of the institutional and contracting environment. For example, if the firm is closely held there might be easier and less costly ways of municating information than by paying a dividend. Similarly, managerial control issues may be less severe in a bank centric market characterized by constant monitoring of corporate activities by lending officers. There are a variety of ways of characterizing institutional differences, but Mayer(1990) hit on one key difference: the ‘‘AngloSaxon’’ capital markets model pared to the ‘‘ContinentalGermanJapanese’’ banking model. The critical difference as Rajan (1992) pointed out is that the capital markets perspective relies on arms length contracting by ‘‘uninformed’’ investors, whereas bank debt is a contract between an informed investor frequently privy to confidential information not available in the capital market. We would expect these marked differences in the organization of the financial system to impact corporate financial policy, particularly the use of dividends as both a signaling and premitment device. In this paper, we take advantage of the recent development of an international database by the World Bank that allows for crosscountry parisons of dividend policy. Financial data is available for the largest firms from eight emerging market countries: Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1990. We analyze the dividend policies of firms from these countries, as well as the key institutional features of each country, and pare them with a control sample of US firms. Dividend signaling models offer valuable insights about the role of dividends. In particular they explain why dividends are more stable than earnings and why firms are reluctant to cut dividends. In the former case, as long as underlying permanent earnings are more stable than actual earnings, the dividend will also be more stable, since management is signaling its view as to the underlying permanent earnings. In the later case, a dividend cut indicates that the corresponding earnings decline is permanent, not temporary and cyclical. Informational asymmetries and contracting costs can also generate agency costs. Consider, for example, a firm that is financed with 100% equity with insiders or management as a control group and a widely dispersed group of outside stockholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrate that with little external control, managers and insiders will indulge in excessive perquisite consumption either through outright consumption of corporate resources or through inefficient management and inappropriate investment policies. In such a framework outsiders may prefer a high dividend policy: better a dividend today than a highly uncertain capital gain from questionable future investment. In the absence of a strong contractual and legal framework to discipline insiders, for example by elections of outside directors, a premitment to pay significant dividends may be the only way that insiders can raise capital. In the extreme case, a 100% dividend payout forces the firm to b
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