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irms’ capital structure and dividend policy decisions, the three contrasting tax regimes would be the ideal environment to observe the fit between the model’s predictions and the empirical observations. Years 1979–1981 The application of the model using the tax rates from the period 1979–1981 reveals a subtle effect. The table and the figure depict normalized firm value, VD,Π/V0,0, as a function of the leverage D and the dividend payout π . The gain from leverage is positive only when the firm is at a relatively high payout ratio (above approximately 40%), with the maximum gain occurring at full (100%) payout. Interestingly, at a dividend payout level lower than 40%, increasing leverage lowers firm value. The reversal of the leverage effect at lower payout ratios is driven by the relative levels of tax rates. During the years 1979–1981, the top marginal tax rate for personal ine was very high in parison to the tax rate for corporate ine (70% and 46% respectively). In a tax rate environment such as this, high taxes paid by the bondholders for their interest ine proceeds exceed the benefit from the tax deductibility of interest payments at the firm level. Since debt financing can be assumed to have zero NPV, this additional burden is borne by the shareholders. At high levels of dividend payout on the other hand, the taxation of the dividend ine makes dividend payout even more disadvantageous pared to paying interest. In other words, now it would be more beneficial for the firm to borrow and pay interest rather than dividends. The benefit reaped from the tax deductibility of interest payments tilts the balance in favor of debt financing, and makes leverage more attractive. Another noteworthy observation about the 1979–1981 tax rate environment is the steep loss in firm value at very low debt levels in response to increasing dividend payout. According to our model, it was possible for an allequity firm to experience losses in value up to 58%. The firm could mitigate this loss by maintaining a higher debt level. The tax regime that made the interesting features discussed above possible is not a shortterm anomaly confined to the years 1979–1981. Indeed, the entire period between the Great Depression and the late 1970s was characterized by a similar tax rate environment. Our model indicates that optimal policies to maximize firm value under such tax regimes required zero debt and zero dividend payout. This prescription interestingly ports with the observed leverage policies of the time, when numerous prominent panies such as IBM and Coca Cola had little, if any, debt before the 1980s. However, if a firm would need to maintain high dividend payout levels, it would be better off by carrying a relatively high debt level at the same time. Traditional electric utility panies are examples that appear to fit this mold. Years 1988–1990 (and 1991–1992) The situation during the years 1988–1990 is unique because during that time the top marginal tax rates on ordinary ine (thus on dividend and interest ine) were nominally the same as the tax rate on capital gains at 28%. In the following 2 years (1991–1992), the two tax rates remained very close (at % and % respectively). The result of the convergence in tax rates is visible in Fig. 2 for the1988–1990 and 1991–1992 panels. There is litt