【正文】 ust imply the presence of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equitylike securities. Conflictsofinterest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upsidesharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equitylike securities. Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of publicly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by petitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an informationsensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders’ incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and Lukin study a similar environment but split the firm’s claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition. Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public trading. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial finance markets since the assumption that drives their results—losses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelastic demand—has no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting. The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1 with probability π τ , where τ ∈ {G, B} is an indicator of project quality, and λ 1 otherwise. Funded projects have expected value Vi = π τ 1 + (1 ? π τ )λ . It is assumed thatλ K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem. Entrepreneurs have reservation value V。本科畢業(yè)論文（設計） 外 文 翻 譯 題 目 大學生創(chuàng)業(yè)融資渠道研究 專 業(yè) 財 務 管 理 Entrepreneurial Financing The financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacerbating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly. Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup financing niche: At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can selffinance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem.. This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse select