【正文】 Wright 2021). This literature identifies a number of stages in the development of the firm and links them with changes in the extent and nature of agency conflicts that require governance remedies, including incentive alignment. Corporate governance is viewed here as a dynamic system whereby governance practices may address changing sets of environmental interdependencies throughout the different stages of the OLC, such as startup, growth, maturity, and decline. Figure 1illustrates this theoretical framework. Over the OLC stages, firms may evolve from having a very narrow resource base to having a more extensive and heterogeneous resource base. This transition may require at least temporary reliance on external resources. Providers of these external resources create new corporate governance demands to ensure that wealth is not only created but also distributed fairly in terms of each factor provider, whether these are shareholders or other stakeholders. This is reflected in changes in accountability of the firm’s management to external resource providers (Filatotchev et al., 2021). In the early stages of the OLC (Quadrant 1 of Figure 1), the entrepreneurial firm has a narrow resource base. It is usually owned and controlled by a tightly knit group of foundermanagers and/or family investors, with the level of managerial accountability to external shareholders generally low. In this context, a substantial portion of the foundermanagers’ wealth is linked to the firm, which questions the appropriateness or may even undermine the effectiveness of equitybased incentive schemes, in line with arguments developed by Core and Guay (2021). As the firm grows, it requires access to external resources and expertise that may fuel and support this growth, and it opens up its governance system to external invest。 Salancik, 1978). For example, the degree and nature of external finance is likely to influence the demands placed on corporate governance to ensure accountability and incentive alignment. Organizational context considerations thus imply that the role and effects of incentive schemes are likely to differ in ways contingent upon both the external and internal resources that are critical within the context of the firms’ anizational, market, sectoral, or regulatory contexts. In other words, the effectiveness of executive incentives may depend on the firm’s size or age, the phases of growth or decline in the pany’s development, and the character of innovation in different markets and sectors, among many other factors (Aguilera et al., 2021). While an anizational perspective rejects the notion of universal best practices (Donaldson, 2021), it also suggests that policy will be more effective if it takes into account the potential diversity of anizational contexts. In short, a onesizefitsall approach is undesirable. There is an increasing recognition in management research that the anizational resource base and its interdependence with external environments are not static, but an integral part of anizational dynamics. The application of a contingencybased concept of corporate governance has been developed within an emerging body of research on the life cycle of corporate governance (Filatotchev et al., 2021。 Filatotchev, Toms, amp。 Wright, 2021)。 Van der Elst, 2021)。 Mullainathan, 2021). The extent to which shareholders’ agency problems are resolved and skimming prevented is typically assessed by associating executive pay with the performance of the firm (Buck amp。 Bruce at al., 2021). Thus, an important task in corporate governance research is to uncover the diversity of arrangements and to understand how the effectiveness of executive remuneration is mediated by its alignment with situational variables (―context‖) arising in diverse anizational contexts and institutional environments (Aguilera et al., 2021). We suggest a novel contingencybased framework for understanding the governance roles of executive pensation, which we conceptualize in terms of anizational context, plementarity/ substitution between governance factors, and the impact of institutional environments. Organizational context refers to variations in firms’ internal and external strategic resources and specific stages in their anizational life cycle (OLC). For example, older firms in the mature phases of their business life cycle may have a more diversified resource pool and ―professionalized‖ management team. As a result, they may be in greater need of formal incentive alignment mechanisms pared to younger, founderowned firms in their startup phase, which may have narrower resource bases and thus higher focus on reputational, capabilityrelated aspects of governance. Organizational context may affect not only potential benefits of executive pensation schemes, but also their costs, such as the direct costs of equitybased incentives and their indirect effects on managerial behavior and risk taking. These costs will vary for different firms operating in different sorts of environments, so that costbenefit analyses are rarely universal. Complementarity/substitution refers to the overall ―bundles‖ of corporate governance practices that are aligned with one another and mutually enhance the ability of those practices to achieve effective corporate governance. Here we argue that the effectiveness of executive pensation may depend on the presence of other governance factors, such as high shareholder involvement and board independence. Finally, institutions put a strong emphasis on social embeddedness and path dependence of executive pensation as a governance factor. Executive pay packages must be socially legitimate in relation to prevailing regulatory, normative, and cognitive impacts on anizations. As a result, these societal effects must be reconciled with anizational efficiency (Bruce et