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Supply Chain Contract Design Under the Condition of Sharing Stock Level Information Chen Changbin, Yang zhong (Business School, Nanjing University, Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210093) Abstract: In the traditional supply chain, the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain determine the stock level independently, and each bears the risk of stock level。給定 *VGq? ， **VG Vqq? ，在信息共享的供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作模式下具有最小購(gòu)買量水平 G 的供應(yīng)商 V 的期望利潤(rùn)為： * * * * *1 ( ) m in , m a x ( , ) m a x ( , )V G V V V V V V V Vq p E q x G c q h q r E q x G? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? （ 26） 因此也可得零售商 R 的期望利潤(rùn)為： * * * *1 ( ) m i n , m i n , m a x ( , ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 2 7 )R G V R V R V V Rq p E q x c E q x G h q r E G x? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? 可以把 （ 25）式和（ 26）式轉(zhuǎn)化為如下形式： **11 0(