【正文】 Laeven, 2020。 Vives, 1996。Kunt, and Levine (2020), hereafter BDL, represents a rare study that applies pooled data to the relationship between bank crisis and bank concentration. Their empirical results support the concentrationstability hypothesis that, controlling for macroeconomic, financial, and regulatory characteristics of sample countries, bank concentration is inversely related with bank fragility. This paper uses the BDL data and contributes to the discussion in two ways. First, as opposed to the BDL study that uses discriminant analysis, this paper employs survival analysis. Based on Cox and Oakes (1984) and Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999), there are four issues to consider with respect to BDL39。, Batholomew, Zaman, and Zephirin (2020), Beck, Demirg252。 Yeyati, 2020). Clearly, the bank concentration–financial crisis relationship has a relevant policy ponent. Additionally, banking crises may coincide with balance of payments crises in developing countries and increase the fragility of the banking system even further (Kaminsky amp。 risktaking behavior under different assumptions regarding the deposit insurance scheme and the dissemination of information. While bank petition increases banks39。Hara amp。 Gale, 2020a). Some studies cite a positive relationship between bank concentration and financial crisis mainly for two reasons. First, concentration promotes market power and raises interest rates, which would increase the probability of a bank crisis. Second, more concentration and less petition may be associated with less credit rationing, larger loans, and higher probability of bank failure. The mon element in these studies is the presence and the form of the deposit insurance scheme in that improperlypriced deposit insurance produces an incentive for banks to take excessive risk. Stiglitz39。 Stiglitz, 2020). Although these studies recognize the possibility that financial consolidation can lead to larger financial institutions and thereby introducing systemic risk, it has been suggested that these adverse effects can be mitigated by vigilant supervision (Mishkin, 1999). Therefore, increasing petition in the banking sector may not be welfareenhancing. In fact, there may be efficient levels of petition and financial stability。 Thakor, 1992). Although petition among banks provides greater freedom in allocating assets, it can undermine prudent bank behavior by taking excessive risk or ―gambling.‖ While regulations such as capital requirements may reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk, they also can harm banks39。s fragility have been investigated in many studies, which have produced contradictory results. Some studies find an inverse relationship between the degree of bank concentration, excessive risk taking, and banking crisis in that higher degrees of concentration are associated with lower probability of bank crisis. Two explanations can be provided. First, if concentration promotes market power and therefore enhance bank profits, bank managers may be less willing to take excessive risk, which would reduce the probability of a bank crisis. Second, in a more concentrated banking system, the costs associated with monitoring and supervising banks may be lower, which is also expected to reduce the likelihood of systemic banking crises. Empirical studies on this issue emphasize the adverse effects of petition in the banking sector. It has been suggested that increases in petition caused bank charter values to decline in the early 1980s, which increased default risk through the increase in asset risk (Keeley, 1990). It has also been argued that there is a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced, risksensitive deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard。 Bank regulations。 accepted 1 July 2020 Available online 17 July 2020 Abstract This paper applies nonparametric and parametric methods of survival analysis to the international bank crisis data. The empirical results suggest that concentration in the banking sector increases the survival time. Additionally, the results associated with survival functions indicate that the G10 and nonG10 countries constitute two distinct groups of countries, where the non G10 countries have a higher incidence of failure (bank crisis). The parametric survival time regressions (Weibull) confirm the possibility that the effects of the covariates on bank crises may have different dynamics in the G10 and nonG10 countries. Subsequent analysis on bank concentration reveals the sources of the different dynamics associated with bank crises in developed and developing countries. The results suggest that higher bank concentration in developing countries may be related to the absence of 17 petitive forces in the economic and political structure. Keywords: Bank crisis。 t) in oneparticle phase space, where x and p are position and momentum, respectively. In analogy to this we have obtained for 15 the financial data a Fokker– Planck equation for the scale t evolution of conditional probabilities, p(yi, τi│yi+1, τi+1). In our cascade picture the conditional probabilities cannot be reduced further to single probability densities, p(yi, τi), without loss of information, as it is done for the kiic gas theory. As a last point, we would like to draw attention to the fact that based on the information obtained by the Fokker– Planck equation it is possible to generate artificial data sets. The knowledge of conditional probabilities can be used to generate time series. One important point is that increments y(τ) with mon right end points should be used. By the knowledge of the nscale conditional probability density of all y(τi) the stochastically correct next point can be selected. We could show that time series for turbulent data generated by this