【正文】 Banfield,1955). Without strong executive leadership, an uncooperative alderman or bloc of aldermencould derail plans for new the past, the office of the mayor was strengthened informally through the fusion of politicaland administrative power (Chicago Home Rule Commission, 1972). Previous mayors such asEdward Kelly had dominated city council by forming alliances with party leaders or by servingjointly as mayor and machine boss. Mayor Kennelly, however, distanced himself from machineleaders and made no effort to bring city council under his control. As he put it early in his term,―Chicago is a councilgoverned city . . . . I don‘t think it‘s a function of the mayor to boss thealdermen‖ (quoted in Simpson, 2020, p. 107). With control over urban renewal policy lodged, bydefault, in city council, coordinated action was extremely difficult to these conditions, questions of ―fit‖ between the city‘s governing institutions and the goalsof urban renewal stakeholders became paramount, as illustrated by the following two ‘s first urban renewal project, announced by Governor Green in July 1948, was a proposed100acre development in a black neighborhood on the city‘s South Side (Hirsch, 1998). Planscalled for the construction of 1,400 new housing units on the site. While the project received the endorsement of Mayor Kennelly and strong backing from the city‘s business leadership, it wascontroversial. More than 2,000 families currently living in the area would have to be relocated(Buck, 1949). In addition, the developer, New York Life Insurance Co., insisted on the closureof a fourblock stretch of Cottage Grove Avenue, a major South Side arterial that bisected 山東建筑大學畢業(yè)設計外文文獻 及譯文 8 theproject project quickly encountered organized opposition. Residents of the area perceived thedevelopment as an effort to remove blacks from the South Side (Neil, 1952). A group of 23property owners filed suit in federal court to prevent the Chicago Land Clearance Commission,the agency charged with land assembly for urban renewal, from taking their homes (ChicagoDefender, 1950). When that effort failed, the Property Conservation and Human Rights Committeeof Chicago petitioned the federal government to withhold funding for the project (ChicagoDefender, 1951).5Residents of nearby white neighborhoods, fearing an influx of displaced blacks, also opposed the project (Hirsch, 1998). Finally, the Chicago Motor Club organized acampaign against the closing of Cottage Grove Avenue, arguing that the street was essential tomaintaining an adequate flow of traffic on the South Side (Neil, 1952).To the dismay of New York Life officials, the various city agencies and governing bodies witha stake in the project could not e to an agreement on how to proceed. The Land ClearanceCommission initiated efforts to gain control over the 100acre site. However, the Chicago PlanCommission was ―unceasingly difficult,‖ debating the closure of Cottage Grove Avenue for more than a year before finally making a weak remendation that the street be vacated (MHPC,1949。 but none at which it [could] be assured‖ (MHPC, 1956a, p. 3). A second and related problem was posed by the weakness of the executive branch of citygovernment. Formally speaking, Chicago was a councilgoverned city. City council held thepower of approval over mayoral appointments, it prescribed the duties and powers of most city officers, and it could create new city departments and agencies at will. It also exercised 山東建筑大學畢業(yè)設計外文文獻 及譯文 7 variousadministrative powers, including preparation of the city budget, awarding of city contracts, andapproval of zoning variances. For urban renewal projects, council approval was required fordesignation of project areas, site plans, the terms of sale of cityowned land to developers,rezonings, and street closings (Chicago City Council, 1953). A council majority could blockvirtually any action by the mayor (Banfield, 1961。 Banfield, 1955). The organization‘s president, Ferd Kramer, was also presidentof one of Chicago‘s largest real estate firms. Other prominent board members included MiltonMumford, an assistant vicepresident of Marshall Field and Company, and Holman Pettibone,president of Chicago Title and Trust Company. In 1946, MHPC released a report containing a strategy for urban renewal that would ultimatelybe embraced by both city and state policymakers (MHPC, 1946a).2According to the report,Chicago‘s problems stemmed, above all, from the unchecked growth of blight. To reverse the tide,government would have to take steps to make innercity locations attractive once again to privatenvestors. MHPC proposed that a public agency with eminent domain powers be charged withassembling parcels of land in innercity locations and demolishing existing structures (Hirsch,1998). The cleared land would be sold to private developers at a reduced cost, while residentsdisplaced through ―slum clearance‖ would be rehoused in new public housing announced its plans at an October 1946 luncheon whose guests included the publishersof the city‘s major newspapers, the presidents of the city‘s largest banks, and top real estateexecutives (Neil, 1952). During the following months, Milton Mumford, Holman Pettibone, and other members ofMHPC‘s inner circle worked with Republican Governor Dwight Green and Democratic MayorMartin Kennelly to secure bipartisan support for state urban renewal legislation (Hirsch, 1998). These efforts culminated in the passage of two bills, the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Actand the Relocation Act, in July 1947. The bills, which extended eminent domain powers toslum clearance projects and provided state funding for slum clearance and public housing,substantially embodied the program for urban renewal unveiled by MHPC less than a ‘s efforts received a boost with the election of Martin Kennelly