【正文】 ade policy actions against them. Big conversions by China or another large holder, or even market fears thereof, could trigger a massive run on the dollar.Mr Zhou proposes to alleviate this problem by creating “an openended SDRdenominated fund” at the IMF into which dollar balances could be exchanged for SDRs. This is essentially the substitution account ideanegotiated in the IMF in the late 1970s and for which detailed blueprints were developed. Similar anxieties about the dollar at that time prompted its sharpest plunge in the postwar period, intensifying the doubledigit inflation and soaring interest rates that brought on the deepest US slowdown since the 1930s, until now.I set out how the idea would work in an article on these pages in December 2007, in which Chinese officials displayed considerable interest. Instead of converting unwanted dollars through the market, official holders would deposit them in a separate IMF account for SDR. Their new asset would be liquid and pay a market rate of return. It would offer the desired diversification as the SDR is denominated in a basket of currencies – 44 per cent dollars, 34 per cent euro and 11 per cent each of yen and sterling.The substitution account would be a winning proposition for all concerned. The dollar holders would obtain instant diversification. The US would avoid the risk of a free fall of the dollar. Europe would prevent a sharp rise in the euro. The global system would eliminate a potential source of great instability. These benefits call for the use of a global asset to make up any losses to the account from future falls in the dollar, such as creation of additional SDR or the IMF39。s gold holdings (including the sizeable US share of them).The main argument against such an account is that China has accumulated its dollar hoard of more than $1,000bn by keeping its currency substantially undervalued, through massive intervention in the foreign exchange markets, and thus deserves no sympathy if it takes losses on those dollars. One might even suspect that the Chinese have mentally booked such losses as the implicit cost of the subsidy to exports and jobs achieved through their currency manipulation. But there is no sign that China will stop intervening, or that its surpluses will abate, even though the US external deficit has declined sharply, and its reserve buildup is thus likely to bee even more threatening.Moreover, this is an ideal issue for China and the US to develop the informal “G2” partnership that is needed to provide global economic leadership to pass needed reforms at the existing multilateral institutions. Since China advocates currency consolidation, the US could insist that it contribute substantially to the IMF39。s new lending facilities as a quid pro quo. The Europeans would have to concur, since the agreement would include a large increase in China39。s voting rights at the IMF, where Europe is so heavily overrepresented, but ChinaUS agreement would go far to seal the deal. 中文翻譯為什么我們要聽中國的貨幣提議弗雷德?伯格斯滕(Fred Bergsten) 英國《金融時報》中國央行行長周小川提議創(chuàng)造一種“超主權(quán)儲備貨幣”，以在長期內(nèi)逐漸取代美元。他主張大大提升特別提款權(quán)(SDR)的全球作用，SDR是國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)于上世紀(jì)60年代末創(chuàng)造的一種國際資產(chǎn)，20國集團(tuán)(G20)增發(fā)2500億美元SDR的決定大大提振了這項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)。這是中國乃至任何新興市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體提出的首批關(guān)于國際貨幣體系改革的重要提議，單是這一理由就使其值得認(rèn)真對待。亞洲其它幾個國家、巴西以及俄羅斯已對周小川的提議表示支持。然而，美國和其它幾個國家迅速表示拒絕，并重申了其對美元關(guān)鍵全球角色的信心。很明顯，它們擔(dān)心，針對這一問題的嚴(yán)肅討論，可能會動搖外界對美元的信心，從而推低美元價值并引發(fā)歐元及其它貨幣大幅升值。這種不穩(wěn)定以及伴隨而來的全球利率上升，將令美國、歐洲乃至全球擺脫此次金融危機(jī)、實(shí)現(xiàn)復(fù)蘇的過程變得非常復(fù)雜。但美元的全球角色對金融穩(wěn)定有一種更為直接的威脅，而這種威脅可能會通過采納周小川提出的一個更為有限的提議而得到大幅降低。風(fēng)險是，由于美國面臨巨額且持續(xù)的預(yù)算赤字，中國以及其它貨幣當(dāng)局將喪失對美元的信心。它們持有總計(jì)超過5萬億美元的美元儲備。中國總理溫家寶最近在一份極不尋常的公開聲明中表達(dá)了這種擔(dān)憂，他要求美國“保證”中國的美元儲備。這讓人回憶起英國曾在1971年要求得到保證，導(dǎo)致美國做出美元與黃金脫鉤的決定。這些憂心忡忡的美元持有者迄今之所以沒有拋售美國國債，只是因?yàn)檫^去一年美元有所升值（這幾乎肯定是一種暫時現(xiàn)象），還源于負(fù)面的全球影響。忽視這樣一種可能性將讓我們倒霉，即它們可能認(rèn)為不得不拋售美元，尤其是在美國采取針對中國的咄咄逼人的貿(mào)易政策行動，從而激怒中國的情況下。中國或其它大持有者的大規(guī)模變節(jié)（或者市場對此的擔(dān)憂），可能引發(fā)投資者大規(guī)模逃離美元資產(chǎn)。周小川提議，通過在IMF創(chuàng)建“以SDR計(jì)值的開放式基金”，來緩解這一問題，美元余額可以兌換成SDR。這基本上是上世紀(jì)70年代末IMF曾商議過的替代賬戶的理念，當(dāng)時還為此制定了詳細(xì)計(jì)劃。當(dāng)時對美元的類似擔(dān)憂，造成二戰(zhàn)后美元最嚴(yán)重下挫，加劇了兩位數(shù)通脹和飆升的利率，并造成了上世紀(jì)30年代以來最嚴(yán)重的美國經(jīng)濟(jì)滑坡（除了現(xiàn)在這次）。2007年12月，我曾在英國《金融時報》的一篇文章中列出了這一理念如何實(shí)施，中國官員對此表現(xiàn)出極大興趣。官方持有者不會通過市場兌換多余的美元，而會將其存放在IMF的獨(dú)立SDR賬戶中。它們的新資產(chǎn)將具有流動性，并支付市場水平的收益率。這將帶來令人滿意的多樣化，因?yàn)镾DR以一籃子貨幣計(jì)值——美元占44%，歐元占34%，日元和英鎊各占11%。替代賬戶將是一個各方都會贏的提議。美元持有者將獲得即時的多樣化。美國將避免美元“自由落體”的風(fēng)險。歐洲將不會出現(xiàn)歐元大幅升值的情況。全球體系將消除大規(guī)模不穩(wěn)定的一個潛在來源。這些好處需要利用一項(xiàng)全球資產(chǎn)，來彌補(bǔ)由于美元未來下跌給替代賬戶帶來的損失，例如創(chuàng)造更多SDR或IMF持有的黃金（包括美國在其中持有的可觀份額）。反對設(shè)立替代賬戶的主要理由是，通過大規(guī)模干預(yù)外匯市場，使人民幣被大幅低估，中國累積了超過1萬億美元的美元儲備，因此如果中國的這部分美元儲備出現(xiàn)虧損，根本就不值得同情。人們甚至可能猜測，中國其實(shí)已經(jīng)在心理上接受這些虧損，將其視為通過匯率操縱來補(bǔ)貼出口和就業(yè)的隱含成本。但目前沒有跡象表明，中國將停止干預(yù)，或者其盈余將減少（盡管美國對外赤字已大幅下滑），因此中國外匯儲備的繼續(xù)累積可能會變得更具威脅性。另外，這是中美開展非正式“G2”合作的理想議題。要發(fā)揮全球經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用，在現(xiàn)有的多邊機(jī)構(gòu)中通過所需的改革，需要中美的這種合作。由于中國贊成貨幣整合，因此美國可以堅(jiān)稱，作為交換，中國應(yīng)向IMF新的放貸安排做出大筆貢獻(xiàn)。這將需要?dú)W洲的首肯，因?yàn)檫@一協(xié)議將包括大幅提高中國在IMF的投票權(quán)，而現(xiàn)在歐洲在IMF的份量太大。但要確保做到這一點(diǎn)，中美之間的協(xié)議必須走得夠遠(yuǎn)