【正文】 uture pilots and operatives (the socalled ‘‘muscle men’’) that was available at different places had been shared, and used among other things to tighten border controls, the plan could have been disrupted. In the view of the mission, the crucial reason that this did not happen is insufficient information sharing: within agencies, between agencies, and upward to the political leadership. With respect to the ability to act upon threat information, the mission mentions repeatedly a shortage of funds for organizational units specialized in antiterrorism work, or for certain preventive measures that were considered. The fault, however, was in the allocation of funds rather than their objective availability, from the responsible 濟(jì)南大學(xué)畢業(yè) 論文外文資料翻譯 5 congressional mittees down to the individual agencies. Nor was it technically impossible to devise an integrated electronic database of visa, law enforcement, and watch list information or a monitoring system for foreigners entering the . on a student visa. Aside from funds, it was the lack of intra and interagency cooperation that delayed or blocked these measures. Whether judges refused a needed warrant, the military hesitated to deploy a drone, important files w ere seized but not passed on to a unit or agency that might use them, or CIA field offices insisted on keeping a case to themselves: in all such cases lack of cooperation prevented timely action. The mission therefore finds the main cause of insufficient action capability in coordination deficits, a concept covering directive authority as well as horizontal cooperation. 濟(jì)南大學(xué)畢業(yè) 論文外文資料翻譯 6 International Public Management Journal, 9(3), pages 295–311 恐怖網(wǎng)絡(luò)的控制 :借鑒 9 聚焦于 防止攻擊機(jī)會的失去 ， 該報(bào)告間接指出了有效控制 以 “ 基地 ” 組織代表的那種恐怖組織的條件。在那里 ，在 這些看似明確的類別 中 都是一種 流動 的邊界。該委員會認(rèn)為 ,如果這兩點(diǎn)都做得到， 是可以避免的。關(guān)于信息 ， 在 委員會 看來 主要原因 不 是缺乏 信息 ,而 是 有沒有信息的獲得方法 。它 也不是技術(shù)上不可能設(shè)計(jì)出這樣一種集成電子數(shù)據(jù)庫群的簽證、執(zhí)法和待觀察風(fēng)險清單信息 ， 或者進(jìn)入美國的學(xué)生簽證一個監(jiān)測系統(tǒng)。在美國安全 部門 有個人 ， 在 幾個月前 “ 系統(tǒng) ” 閃爍紅色的時候 (同上， 254)警告說 ， 攻擊已經(jīng)迫在眉睫 ， 是針對具有里程碑意義的 目標(biāo) ， 飛機(jī)可以參與 ， 那它可能發(fā)生在美國 。公眾 沒有 被 警告。如果沒有可靠結(jié)束的 策劃，如 地 點(diǎn)， 時間 ， 威脅 的方式， 潛在恐怖分子的身份 ， 只有一般的防御措施 (如嚴(yán)格控制人、車輛和貨物的 流 動人 是可行的 。執(zhí)法是最后選擇 ， 如果預(yù)防已經(jīng)失敗了。 in authoritarian regimes, potential troublemakers may be detained (or even murdered), but in a constitutional state with a legalistic culture, the actions of public authorities are constrained by law. The first condition of successful control is therefore to recognize the existence of, and identity of, a potential enemy. Such recognition may not permit us to anticipate specific terrorist acts, but it does permit us to develop a more pointed offensive strategy, ., to incapacitate the person, group, or organization presumably planning unspecified terrorist acts. This could either be done directly by physical destruction, or indirectly by cutting off their supplies and narrowing their action space. WHY PREVENTION FAILED: THE CHARGE The Report deals mainly with two basic prerequisites of successful prevention: information and the ability to act on it. The mission argues that, but for the deficits existing on both counts, could have been prevented. Describing the organization and the operation of Al Qaeda, and reconstructing step by step what in the end led to the attacks, the mission has identified a numbe