【正文】 在這個(gè)集成的解決方案里，方正也為每一個(gè)領(lǐng)域提供個(gè)性化的解決方案。噴墨印刷技術(shù)近年來(lái)已經(jīng)在迅速發(fā)展，并且將成為數(shù)碼印刷的主流。在印刷企業(yè)里，對(duì)于公司的管理，緊密結(jié)合ERP系統(tǒng)的數(shù)字化工作流程將變成基本的平臺(tái)。在中國(guó)接下來(lái)的三年里，CTF的就職人員數(shù)量每年將約100人。印刷數(shù)字化的這三個(gè)方面是我的觀點(diǎn)。我們提供商業(yè)印刷公司印刷過(guò)程的一個(gè)完整的解決方案和印前，印刷，印后的管理，并提供政府機(jī)關(guān)完整和可靠的系統(tǒng)制作和發(fā)送官方文件。第四篇：英文文獻(xiàn)翻譯 影響SO3濃度的過(guò)程因素一直減少的體積流量和引入的富氧燃燒過(guò)程的煙氣循環(huán)增加了煙氣中SO3的濃度。我懷疑，盡管“客戶”需要來(lái)自美洲的去被招聘，來(lái)自這個(gè)國(guó)家的學(xué)校與美國(guó)的不同。最后，我建議Dawson的文章需要另外一章。每一個(gè)個(gè)體的支出都與確定的協(xié)變量緊密相關(guān)。這加劇了全球的產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩，并導(dǎo)致中國(guó)某些行業(yè)的商品，特別是鋼材，在世界市場(chǎng)上引起傾銷(xiāo)。在城市里，許多規(guī)模較小的國(guó)有企業(yè)被私有化或關(guān)閉了，而私營(yíng)部門(mén)被允許自由成長(zhǎng)（諾頓1996）。移除貸款利率的上限，銀行通過(guò)貸款賺更多的錢(qián)。此外,中國(guó)在2003終于擺脫通貨緊縮的威脅并恢復(fù)相對(duì)高速的增長(zhǎng)，只有在2004年有中等程度的通脹（圖3）。該理論認(rèn)為大型辦事處的優(yōu)勢(shì)在于提供與小型辦事處相似的服務(wù)卻有更高的收費(fèi)，因而計(jì)費(fèi)費(fèi)率也較低。更進(jìn)一步的說(shuō)，本地審計(jì)公司，不管是大的還是小的，都不想因?yàn)閷徲?jì)失誤而承受全部名譽(yù)的損失因?yàn)閷?duì)于國(guó)家級(jí)別的公司來(lái)說(shuō)它們只是更可能只是損失了一部分的名譽(yù)。其次，本文最先提出辦事處規(guī)模是影響審計(jì)定價(jià)的關(guān)鍵因素。首先我們假設(shè)辦事處規(guī)模與審計(jì)質(zhì)量有系統(tǒng)性關(guān)聯(lián)，即使控制了國(guó)家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的審計(jì)公司規(guī)模和行業(yè)專(zhuān)長(zhǎng)這兩個(gè)變量。然而，現(xiàn)在許多審計(jì)研究都把焦點(diǎn)集中于國(guó)家級(jí)審計(jì)公司的特點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為兩個(gè)審計(jì)質(zhì)量基本的決定性因素是審計(jì)公司規(guī)模和審計(jì)行業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。Francis et 。第一篇：Audit Office Size, Audit Quality, and AuditPricing JongHag Choi, Chansog(Francis)Kim, JeongBon Kim, and YoonseokZang SUMMARY: Using a large sample of client firms over the period 2000–2005,this paper investigates whether and how the size of a local practice office within anaudit firmhereafter, office size is a significant, engagementspecific factor determiningaudit quality and audit fees over and beyond audit firm size at the national level andauditor industry leadership at the city or office our empirical tests, audit qualityis measured by unsigned abnormal accruals, and the office size is measured in twodifferent ways: one based on the number of audit clients in each office and the otherbased on a total of audit fees earned by each results show that the officesize has significantly positive relations with both audit quality and audit fees, even aftercontrolling for nationallevel audit firm size and officelevel industry relations support the view that large local offices provide higherquality auditspared with small local offices, and that such quality differences are priced in themarket for audit :audit office。Wallman 1996).Large local offices are less likely to depend ona particular client than small local offices because the former have deeper officelevel clientelesand thus are less economically dependent on a particular other words, large offices areless likely to acquiesce to client pressure for substandard reporting than small , local offices, whether small or large, may not bear the full amount of reputationlosses associated with an audit failure because a substantial portion of the reputation losses arelikely borne by the nationallevel audit firm the reputation losses in the event of auditfailures are likely to be greater for large audit firms(DeAngelo1981b), the losses are not necessarily greater for large local offices than for small local offices, because these costs are morefirmwide in nature rather than means that local offices may be more concerned with the economic importance of a particular client than a potential litigation risk fromaudit failures, in particular, when the offices are small in above arguments lead us topredict that large local offices with relatively deep local clienteles are less likely to promise audit quality with respect to a particular client, and thus that they are likely to provide higherquality audit services, ceteris paribus, pared with small local offices with relatively thin such a case, one would observe a positive association between office size and call this prediction the economic dependence AND CONCLUDING REMARKS While previous auditing research has examined whether and how audit fees and audit qualityare influenced by audit firm size at the national level and auditor industry leadership at both thenational level and the city level, this line of research has paid little attention to the effect of thesize of a local engagement office within an audit firm(., office size)in the context of auditquality and audit previous research, the focus of this paper is on whether the officesize is an additional, engagementspecific factor determining audit quality and audit pricing overand beyond nationallevel audit firm size and officelevel industry results can besummarized as , we find that the office size is positively associated with audit quality proxied by unsigned abnormal finding is consistent with what we call the economic dependenceperspective: large(small)local offices with deep officelevel clienteles are less(more)likely to depend on a particular client, and thus are better(less)able to resist client pressure on substandardor biased , we find that large local offices are able to charge higher audit fees totheir clients than small ones, which is consistent with the view that large offices provide higherquality audits than small offices, and this quality differential is priced as a fee premium in themarket for audit , the above finding is at odds with the view that large officeshave a cost advantage in producing audit services of similar quality and thus are able to chargelower billing rates pared with small together, our results highlight that officesize is one of the most important engagementspecific determinants of audit quality and , while we use two alternative, advanced accrual models to alleviate a concern overthe limitations inherent in the Jones(1991)model estimates of abnormal accruals, our measures ofaudit quality, namely unsigned abnormal accruals, may suffer from nontrivial measurement therefore cannot pletely rule out the possibility that the estimated coefficients on our testvariables are , given that a contemporaneous study of Francis and Yu(2009)documents the same positive association between audit quality and audit office size using twoadditional proxies for audit quality, ., auditors’ tendency to issue goingconcern opinion andclient firms’ likelihood to meet earnings benchmarks, we believe that our results are unlikelydriven by possible measurement , our results sugges