【正文】 ai 24 SYSUminghai 25 SYSUminghai 26 Property rights and transaction costs as useful analytical tools for understanding how governance works SYSUminghai 27 Economics of Property Rights Economics of Transaction Costs Agency Theory SYSUminghai 28 The property rights theory – overview ? Any asset is attached with a bundle of property rights ? The property rights of the asset are assigned (partitioned) among economic agents through laws/rules and exchanges ? The property rights theory analyzes what determine the partition of the property rights, and their economic consequences ? Property rights theory addresses optimal allocation of rights that maximize enforcement (public or private) ? Transaction costs are important determinants of the property rights assignments, because they affect the exchange/transfer of property rights ? We can apply the property right theory to study how the property rules and transaction costs of a market affect the form and governance of economic anizations (contracts, ownership) SYSUminghai 29 Basic concepts ? Costs of transferring property rights ? Specialized assets ? Relationshipbased contracting SYSUminghai 30 The cost of transferring property rights (Alchian, 1965) ? Exchange (transfer) cost, a type of transaction cost, critically determine the allocation of property rights ? Transfer cost often occur due to government regulation, or even prohibition, of trade ? The differences between public and private ownership arise from the inability of a public owner to sell his share of public ownership. The inability to sell one’s share of public ownership remains a potent factor in the costsreward system impinging on all members of the public and on the employees of the public owned institution. SYSUminghai 31 The cost of transferring property rights ? Soon, we will learn how transfer cost importantly determines governance structure ? Let’s review the concept of asset specificity and how it affects governance structure of transaction SYSUminghai 32 Types of asset specificity ? Physical capital specificity ? Human capital specificity ? Reputation and personal trust may develop through transactions ? Site (proximity) specificity ? Temporal specificity ? Examples? SYSUminghai 33 How can the risk of appropriation be avoid? ? Longterm contracts ? An explicitly stated contractual guarantee legally enforced by the government or some other outside institution ? An implicit contractual guarantee enforced by the market mechanism of withdrawing future business if opportunistic behavior occurs SYSUminghai 34 Market mechanism in implicit longterm contracts ? (Klein, Crawford, Alchian, 1978。會(huì)計(jì)信息能夠幫助公司高管人員和投資者辨別投資項(xiàng)目的優(yōu)劣，提高投資的效率，發(fā)揮項(xiàng)目辨識(shí)的作用（如圖中渠道 1所示）。產(chǎn)權(quán)理論與財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)研究 魏明海 教授 Phone: 02084114179 Email: SYSUminghai 2 內(nèi)容提要 ?為什么選擇產(chǎn)權(quán)理論？ ?如何運(yùn)用產(chǎn)權(quán)理論研究財(cái)務(wù)與會(huì)計(jì)問題？ ?專用資產(chǎn)與繼承對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)問題的解釋 ?關(guān)系資產(chǎn)與腐敗對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)問題的解釋 ?股權(quán)分置改革后的相關(guān)問題（股權(quán)可交易性對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)問題的解釋） SYSUminghai 3 第一部分 為什么選擇產(chǎn)權(quán)理論？ SYSUminghai 4 先看 Topdown research approach SYSUminghai 5 Institutions Government Firm anization system Corporate governance Role of accounting and corporate policies Topdown Research Framework SYSUminghai 6 Country Institutions The legal system (the court and the law) The government (regulations, public sector governance) The society (religion, ideology, custom, social norm) Markets Product, labor, manager, raw material, financial capital Firms Firm boundary (vertical integration, diversification) Ownership and control structures Governance structures (accounting, boards of directors, executive pensation, reputation mechanisms) SYSUminghai 7 Topdown research approach (FAN 2022) ? Observe ? Identify a key institutional factor ? Develop a series of research issues ? Analyze how incentives and behaviors of economic agents (governments or firms) are affected when we impose the institutional constraint ? Analyze how the governance structures of contracts and anizations are chosen subject to the institutional constraint ? Data collection and empirical tests SYSUminghai 8 key institutional factors ? Ownership ?Concentration, transferability ?Government ownership ?Family ownership ? Organization ?Vertical integration, diversification, group affiliation ?Allocation of decision rights within a firm SYSUminghai 9 Topdown Approach的程序是（ T. J. Wong, 2022 ） ? Identify key institutional factors that shape anization and incentives ? These factors include property rules, government’s role in economy, market and legal development ? These factors also shape the corporate governance, accounting and corporate policies ? Apply mon theories or analytical frameworks only institutions are different SYSUminghai 10 可以從哪些方面理解 Institutional Setting ? Institutions of East Asia （ T. J. Wong, 2022 ） ? Political economy ? Close ties between government and business ? Rent seeking society ? Legal systems ? Poor protection of property rights ? Private enforcement of contracts ? Weak protection of outside shareholders ? Culture and social norm ? Low trust society ? Relationshipbased transactions ? Family firms SYSUminghai 11 ? China’s Institutional Setting （ Economic in transition ? Govt vs. Market） （ T. J. Wong, 2022 ） ? Capital markets (state vs. market) ? IPO, rights offerings and delisting controlled by govt (quota system。 SYSUminghai 16 ? 在不考慮逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的情況下，公司高管人員和投資者仍然可能由于缺乏相關(guān)、可靠的信息對(duì)投資項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行錯(cuò)誤的判斷，從而導(dǎo)致無效投資。 ? 在投資者保護(hù)中，財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息主要有定價(jià)和治理兩個(gè)方面的作用機(jī)制： SYSUminghai 20 ? 一方面，財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息能夠降低公司內(nèi)部人與外部投資者之間的信息不對(duì)稱程度，促進(jìn)投資者事前準(zhǔn)確定價(jià)和形成正確的投資決策； ? 另一方面，財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息進(jìn)入治理過程，約束和限制公司內(nèi)部人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為或利益侵占行為，減少事后可能的代理成本，保護(hù)投資者獲取投資回報(bào)（ Healy和Palepu， 20