【正文】 e stages SYSUminghai 36 Categorizing governance structures of transactions Nonspecific investment Mixed investment Idiosyncratic investment Occasional transaction Market governance (Classical contracting) Trilateral governance (Neoclassical contracting) Trilateral governance (Neoclassical contracting) Recurrent transaction Market governance (Classical contracting) Bilateral governance (Relational contracting) Unified governance (Vertical integration。 ? 然而，在研究設(shè)計(jì)中往往難以單獨(dú)區(qū)分出這一渠道的作用機(jī)制，與其他渠道的作用相分離，因此，相關(guān)的實(shí)證研究并不多見（ Biddle和 Hilary， 2022）。 ROE targets) ? State banks – related lending ? Government not market plays a big role ? Majority ownership by the state ? partial privatization (minority shares) of SOEs ? direct (SAMB) and indirect (parent SOE) government majority ownership ? Government shares cannot to be sold easily ? Incentive issues: soft budget constraints。 ? Bushman和 Smith（ 2022）在綜述相關(guān)的會計(jì)實(shí)證研究時，詳細(xì)分析了會計(jì)信息提高經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績的三條渠道。 SYSUminghai 19 ? 財務(wù)會計(jì)信息是公司財務(wù)會計(jì)過程和外部報告系統(tǒng)的產(chǎn)品，并按要求公開披露，反映公司財務(wù)狀況和業(yè)績。 Demsetz, 1964, 1967) ? Entrepreneurs’ superior management skills, creativity, secret formula, reputation, business/political connections, etc. ? Specialized assets, as well as family ownership, facilitate relationshipbased contracting in place of arm’s length contracting 72 SYSUminghai 73 2. Relationshipbased contracting and accounting properties ? Relationshipbased contracting ? Arising from possession of specialized ? Indicated by family control ? To protect rent of specialized assets ? Accounting properties ? Opaque accounting to protect specialized assets ? Specialized assets is difficult to be measured by accounting ? Less external demand for accounting information 73 SYSUminghai 74 3. Specialized assets around succession ? Many of these specialized assets are not fully transferable, not even to one’s children ? This disruption during family succession allows us to examine if the reduction in asset specificity is associated with increase in accounting quality around succession ? Succession will lead to improvement in accounting quality ? Founder succession will lead to even higher improvement in accounting quality because founder tends to possess more specific assets An example of specialized asset… 74 SYSUminghai 75 75 SYSUminghai 76 Li Kashing （ 77） was sent to hospital on Sep. 6th , 2022. 76 Cumulated Daily Stock Return SYSUminghai 77 Measuring Accounting Quality ? How to measure quality in literature? ? Accruals (unsigned discretionary accruals) [Leuz et al.] ? Timely loss recognition ? Marketbased Model (Basu, 1997) ? Ine persistence (Ball and Shivakumar, 2022) 77 SYSUminghai 78 Table 1 Sample 78 SYSUminghai 79 Question 1 ?Whether succession lead to improvement in accounting quality? 79 SYSUminghai 80 Table 2 Discretionary Accruals 80 SYSUminghai 81 Table 3 Timely Loss Recognition 81 SYSUminghai 82 Question 2 ? Whether founder succession leads to more pronounced improvement in accounting quality? ? Whether foundercontrolled firms are associated more opaque accounting prior to succession? 82 SYSUminghai 83 Table 4 Founder Effect on discretionary accruals 83 SYSUminghai 84 Table 5 Panel A: Founder effect on timely loss recognition 84 SYSUminghai 85 Table 5 Panel B: Founder effect in presuccession period 85 SYSUminghai 86 In addition… ? Founder’s age and education matter for accounting quality in presuccession period SYSUminghai 87 Table 6 Effect of Founder’s age and Education on discretionary accruals in presuccession period 87 SYSUminghai 88 Table 6 Effect of Founder’s age and Education on timely loss recognition in presuccession period 88 SYSUminghai 89 Conclusion ?Accounting system shifts from more insiderbased to outsiderbased around succession ?Level of specific assets matter for the shift 89 SYSUminghai 90 第三部分 運(yùn)用產(chǎn)權(quán)理論 研究財務(wù)與會計(jì)問題： 關(guān)系資產(chǎn)與腐敗 對財務(wù)和會計(jì)問題的解釋 Public Governance and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Corruption Cases Joseph . Fan Oliver M. Rui Mengxin Zhao SYSUminghai 92 Corporate Financing Patterns in Emerging Markets ? Companies in emerging markets rely on debt much more than equity to finance their investment ? Moreover, they rely on shortterm debt, even when they engage in longterm investment ? Banks, not capital markets, are the primary sources of funds for firms in developing countries SYSUminghai 93 Crosscountry pattern of financial leverage 0 . 0 00 . 1 00 . 2 00 . 3 00 . 4 00 . 5 00 . 6 0KoreaI ndonesi aBrazi lPortugalPaki stanThai landI ndi aNorwayI tal yAustri aJapanDenmarkFi nl andSwi tzerl andPeruFranceMexi coBel giumSpai nMal aysi aTai wanPhi li ppi neNetherl andsNew Zeal andHong KongChi naSi ngaporeGreeceChi leI sraelI rel andGermanySwedenUKTurkeyUSACanadaSouth Afri caAustral iaSYSUminghai 94 Crosscountry pattern of debt maturity 0 . 0 00 . 1 00 . 2 00 . 3 00 . 4 00 . 5 00 . 6 00 . 7 00 . 8 00 . 9 01 . 0 0New Zeal andNorwaySwedenUSACanadaSwi tzerl andFi nl andI rel andAustral ia。 SYSUminghai 21 SYSUminghai 22 SYSUminghai 23 SYSUmingh