哈佛博弈論課件section(完整版)
【正文】 h any beliefs, because these strategies are not consistent with Bayes‘ Rule (and occur with probability zero.) ? Two major types of equilibria: – Pooling: the types behave the same—updated beliefs=old beliefs – Separating: the types of behave differently ? Useful for sequential games of inplete information Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ? 2 players, each contemplating nuclear war ? Neither knows if the other is about to strike ? Each can attack (A, a) or delay (D, d) ? If war, there‘s a 1st strike advantage ? Outes: – No war results in (0, 0) – The oute of being the firststriker in war is –a – The oute of NOT being the firststriker in war is –r ? Assume 0 a r Nuclear Deterrence Example A A 189。, 189。*q) This is Bayes‘ rule! a = r*(1q) / (1+q), q* = (r–a)/(r+a) = p*, m* = (r–a)/2*(r+a) = n*: PBE: (p*, q*, m*, n*) Bayes Rule P( |at info set) = P(at info set | )*P( ) / P(at info set) 。 189。 N 1 D a 1 d 2 2 a d D (a, r) (r, a) (0, 0) (0, 0) (a, r) (a, r) Such that 0 a r Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Nuclear Deterrence Example Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Nuclear Deterrence Example A A 189。+189。). Another: (D, d, 189。Section 9: Redux Alexis Diamond
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