【正文】 盈 餘分配的一些重要的被投資公司 (我們很樂意與新股東或潛在股東討論這項話題 )，而 這部份的盈餘卻又完全未顯現(xiàn)在 Berkshire 的帳面之上。 However, our belief is that, in aggregate, those undistributed and, therefore, unrecorded earnings will be translated into tangible value for Berkshire shareholders just as surely as if subsidiaries we control had earned, retained and reported similar earnings. 然而，我們深信這些未分配且未被記錄的盈餘，仍將終與那些我們控制的公司所賺的 盈餘一樣轉(zhuǎn)化成 Berkshire 實質(zhì)的價值。相對地 在 Berkshire，即使是購併成功在望，其管理當(dāng)局的心跳也不會加快一下。直接 或間接的經(jīng)驗使我們深深體認(rèn)，要達(dá)到像他們那樣成就的困難性 (當(dāng)然也因為如此，近 幾年來真正成功的個案並不多，且會發(fā)現(xiàn)到頭來利用公司資金買回自家股份是最實在 的方法 )。 (2) the future economics of the business。 Over half of the large gain in Berkshire’s worth during 1981 it totaled $124 million, or about 31% resulted from the market performance of a single investment, GEICO Corporation. In aggregate, our market gain from securities during the year considerably outstripped the gain in underlying business values. Such market variations will not always be on the pleasant side. 在 1981年淨(jìng)值增加的 1億 2,000萬美元中，約有一半要歸功於 GEICO一家公司， 總的來說，今年我們投資股票市值的增加要比其背後實際代表的實質(zhì)價值增加數(shù)要大 得多，而請注意股票市值的表現(xiàn)不會永遠(yuǎn)比實質(zhì)價值好。 it achieves little and slows response time. But when change is great, yesterday’s assumptions can be retained only at great cost. And the pace of economic change has bee breathtaking. 然而這一切已成過去，但過去所得到的經(jīng)驗法則卻很難拋棄，「當(dāng)投資大眾與經(jīng)營階 層一腳踏進(jìn)未來，他們的腦子與神經(jīng)系統(tǒng)卻還深陷於過去。 It should be stressed that this depressing situation does not occur because corporations are jumping, economically, less high than previously. In fact, they are jumping somewhat higher: return on equity has improved a few points in the past decade. But the crossbar of passive return has been elevated much faster. Unhappily, most panies can do little but hope that the bar will be lowered significantly。 Inflationary experience and expectations will be major (but not the only) factors affecting the height of the crossbar in future years. If the causes of longterm inflation can be tempered, passive returns are likely to fall and the intrinsic position of American equity capital should significantly improve. Many businesses that now must be classified as economically “bad” would be restored to the “good” category under such circumstances. 過去的通膨經(jīng)驗與對未來通膨的預(yù)期將會是影響未來通膨指數(shù)的最主要 (但非惟一 )因 素，如果長期性通膨的形成原因能有效被抑制，則門檻自然會降低，美國企業(yè)的存在 價值將因此大幅改善，原本被歸類為不良的企業(yè)也能轉(zhuǎn)為優(yōu)良的企業(yè)。 During the past year, longterm taxable bond yields exceeded 16% and longterm taxexempts 14%. The total return achieved from such taxexempts, of course, goes directly into the pocket of the individual owner. Meanwhile, American business is producing earnings of only about 14% on equity. And this 14% will be substantially reduced by taxation before it can be banked by the individual owner. The extent of such shrinkage depends upon the dividend policy of the corporation and the tax rates applicable to the investor. 去年長期債券殖利率超過 16%，而免稅公債則約為 14%，而這些收入直接落入投資人 的口袋，在此同時，美國企業(yè)的股東權(quán)益報酬率卻只有 14%，而且尚未考量落入投資 人口袋前所須支付的稅負(fù) (視被投資公司的股利政策與投資人適用的所得稅率而定 )。 Despite the overriding importance of inflation in the investment equation, we will not punish you further with another full recital of our views。 We have made plenty of such mistakes both in the purchase of noncontrolling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2) miscalculations are the most mon. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion now aggregating approximately 180 degrees have since been required. 而事實上，我們不論在買進(jìn)具控制權(quán)或不具控制權(quán)的股權(quán)時，皆曾犯了許多錯誤，其 中以第二類誤判的情況最常見，當(dāng)然要翻開我們投資的歷史才能找得到這樣的案例 (可 能至少要回溯至少二、三個月以上吧 …) ，例如去年本人就曾發(fā)表看好鋁業(yè)發(fā)展的前 景，只是到後來陸續(xù)經(jīng)過些微的調(diào)整，最後的結(jié)論卻是一百八十度的轉(zhuǎn)彎。 ) We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easilyidentifiable princes at toadlike prices. 我們曾以劃算的價錢買下不少蟾蜍，過去的報告多已提及，很明顯的我們的吻表現(xiàn)平 平，我們也遇到幾個王子級的公司，但是早在我們買下時他們就已是王子了，當(dāng)然至 少我們的吻沒讓他們變回蟾蜍，而最後我們偶爾也曾成功地以蟾蜍般的價格買到部份 王子級公司的股票。 he may well not even know where his corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully piles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.) (2)大部份的公司及其經(jīng)營階層，多以「規(guī)模」而非「獲利」，作為衡量自己或他人的 標(biāo)準(zhǔn) (問問那些名列 Fortune 500 大企業(yè)的負(fù)責(zé)人，他們可能從來都不知道自己的公 司若以獲利能力來排的話，會落在第幾位 ) (3) Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget). (3)許多經(jīng)營階層很明顯地過度沉浸於小時候所聽到的，一個變成蟾蜍的王子因美麗的 公主深深一吻而獲救的童話故事，而一廂情願地認(rèn)為只要被他們優(yōu)異的管理能力一 吻，被購併的公司便能脫胎換骨 。 In aggregate, our noncontrolled business interests have more favorable underlying economic characteristics than our controlled businesses. That’s understandable。s Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1981 巴菲特致股東函 1981 年版 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. Berkshire 海瑟崴股份有限公司 February 26, 1982 1982 年 2 月 26 日 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 致 Berkshire 公司全體股東 : Operating earnings of $ million in 1981 amounted to % of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost) pared to % in 1980. Our new plan that allows stockholders to designate corporate char