【正文】 ious decades, so why did so much go so wrong so recently? Unit Six The Return of Depression Economics — Paul Krugman The answer is that the world became vulnerable to its current travails not because economic policies had not been reformed, but because they had. Around the world countries responded to the very real flaws in postDepression policy regimes by moving back toward a regime with many of the virtues of preDepression freemarket capitalism. However, in bringing back the virtues of oldfashioned capitalism, we also brought back some of its vices, most notably a vulnerability both to instability and sustained economic slumps. Unit Six The Return of Depression Economics — Paul Krugman Exercise 2 Exercise 3 :c Narrowest:a :b Narrowest:a :b Narrowest:c ? Ⅳ . Answer key for Writing research papers 。 (magnify) Although devaluation will magnify exports, it can also lead to the increasing foreigncurrencydenominated debt； it can even cause the collapse of people’s confidence in the government. Therefore, the government did not dare to adopt the devaluation policy without careful consideration. Unit Six The Return of Depression Economics — Paul Krugman 4. 外債的增加并非是經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的必不可少的成本，因為外債的增加雖然會在短期內(nèi)提高經(jīng)濟增長速度，但從長期來看，它會加重國內(nèi)企業(yè)負(fù)擔(dān)，導(dǎo)致國際收支不平衡。? TEXT A Whiff of the 1930s IN THE SPRING of 1931 Austria’s largest bank, the Credit Anstalt, was on the verge of collapse. The Austrian government could not simply stand by and let it fail, but when it came to the bank’s rescue with large sums of freshly printed domestic currency, the resulting capital flight rapidly depleted Austria’s gold and foreign exchange reserves. The obvious answer would have been to abandon the gold standard and let the currency float. But this solution was unacceptable—not just because a drop in the schilling’s value would magnify the burden of foreigncurrencydenominated debt, but because a currency devaluation would deal a devastating blow to the confidence of a country whose memories of postWorld War I hyperinflation were still fresh. Austria pleaded for help from its neighbors and the thennew Bank for International Settlements, but the offered assistance was too little, too late. In the end, the desperate government resorted to capital controls. Unit Six The Return of Depression Economics — Paul Krugman It is a familiar story to economic historians. It is also astonishingly modernsounding: if the plot does not exactly fit any one of today’s crisisridden economies around the world, it does sound very much like a pastiche of recent events in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brazil. The main difference now is that financial rescue attempts from the international munity have bee routine. When a country gets in trouble today a SWAT team from the International Moary Fund and the . Treasury quickly arrives on the scene. Suppose, however, that the IMF could use a time machine to send its best money doctors back to that Vienna spring of 1931, but without the ability to offer a huge, noquestionsasked credit line on the spot. What would today’s experts say? What could they tell the Austrians that they did not already know? Unit Six The Return of Depression Economics — Paul Krugman Most modern economists—to the extent that they think about it at all—regard the Great Depression as a gratuitous, unnecessary tragedy. They believe that what might have been an ordinary, fettable recession became a nightmarish slump thanks to the stupidity (or at least the ignorance) of policymakers. If only the Federal Reserve had not been preoccupied with defending the gold standard instead of the real economy。所以，該國政府不敢貿(mào)然采取貨幣貶值政策。然而，當(dāng)我們在恢復(fù)老式資本主義的這些優(yōu)點的同時，也恢復(fù)了它的一些缺陷，最引人注目的莫過于易于遭受動蕩和經(jīng)濟持續(xù)蕭條這一點了。 for good) Major capitalist countries had been seeing gold standard as a symbol of strong economic power, but they were forced to give it up for good during the Great Depression. Unit Six The Return of Depression Economics — Paul Krugman ? Ⅲ . Put the following passage into English: 處于危機中的亞洲國家的經(jīng)濟證明，它們具有許多政策和制度上的缺陷。 a fixed rate, which purchases stability at the expense of moary independence。 or capital controls, which can reconcile a relatively stable exchange rate with some moary independence but only at the cost of other problems. Since World War