【正文】 β10ln(AINCOMEi,t) + β11ln(OUTFLOWt) + ui + ei,t ln(CLNFDIt) == γ0 + δ1ln(AFDIi,t) + ρ1ln(CGROWTHt) + ρ2ln(CCORUPTt) ρ3ln(CDUTYt) + ρ4ln(CGOVt) + ρ5ln(CWAGEt) + ρ6ln(COPEN t) + ρ7ln(CINCOMEt) + vi + wi,t The above simultaneous equation system is estimated by the two stage least squares. Another possible determinant of FDI is the level of exchange rates. However, as highlighted by Russ (2021), there are many conflicting empirical studies concerning the significance and even the sign of the exchange rate variable. 翻譯：中國和東亞的外商直接投資 最近 的政策問題 我們不難發(fā)現(xiàn) ,很多亞洲的分析師 ,評論家和決策者都已經(jīng)表示關注中國 ,中國的出現(xiàn)相反地會影響直接投資流入經(jīng)濟中 .2021年 11月 ,新家坡副總理 Lee Hsien Loong(之后為新家坡總理 )提議 東南亞國家在激烈的競爭壓力下 ,正如 他們 之前的商業(yè)活動 ，特別是勞動密集型制造業(yè)，已逐漸轉移到中國。據(jù)振興公社，韓國的國營貿(mào)易和投資促進機構，在大多數(shù)亞洲國家中，由于 全球投資者正在越來越傾向于投資中國，導致韓國的外國直接投資日趨下降。 布雷納德（ 1997）按行業(yè)實證考察美國的出口銷售比例對國外銷售總額（國外分支機構的銷售出口總額）中的決定性因素。經(jīng)濟增長的預期率，企業(yè)稅率，腐敗程度和外國直接投資的開放程度都是導致外國直接投資流入這些經(jīng)濟體的重要因素。 這 些 策略是為 了控 制 所有亞洲經(jīng)濟體的外國直接投資的 標準系數(shù) 。 首先，研究將公司設在哪個低工資國家，跨國公司可能會選 擇在中國投資或者亞洲其他國家如泰國。然后部件和零件 在 中國和其他亞洲經(jīng)濟體之間的交易 。因此，它是重要的實證研究問題， 正如文中所論述的那樣 。但是，通過勞動力成本上的投資激勵效應的實證結果。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)發(fā)達的地區(qū)利用一個優(yōu)質的基礎設施相對于其他擁有 1000人的電話線通道的代理水平 更能吸引外國公司的投資。偉表明這種類型的不確定性會誘發(fā)腐敗并導致外國直接投資減少。反過來的半成品出口到其他子公司作需要進一步處理。這種“關稅跳躍”理論意味著原裝進口和 FDI之間的正相關關系。 國外直接投資的另一個影響因素是匯率水平。跨國公司作為全球利潤最大化，可以認為是敏感的稅收因素，因為他們的稅率對他們的利潤有直接影響。這也是從事低水平的外國直接投資或進行出口貿(mào)易之間的選擇，將涉及計算貿(mào)易成本和規(guī)模經(jīng)濟之間的權衡?；羲固兀?1971）通過數(shù)據(jù)證明跨國企業(yè)（ MNEs）的招商引資行為而對關稅產(chǎn)生了影響。偉（ 1997）提出了對外國直接投資的另一種解釋。 人們已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn) ,在各項研究中表明這主要敘述的是東道國國家。這是因為他們可以利用規(guī)模經(jīng)濟進行運作，只有在市場達到一定的大小。同一時間 ,其他的跨國公司也會投資亞洲其他地區(qū)的礦物質和資源提取，出口給需要大量原材料的中國。我們稱之為 “ 投資轉移效應 ” 。 為了占領中國的 外國直接投資 流入以及亞洲其他經(jīng)濟體的 外國直接投資 流入的 互惠 關系，中國以及亞洲其他經(jīng)濟體的 外國直接投資 流入公式是可同時評估的。 Wei的估測是具有代表性的。在她的隨機效應估測中，幾乎所有的 系數(shù) 都有正確且顯著的跡象。 里克特表示，如果亞洲國家不采取審慎和務實的步驟，變得和中國一樣具有競爭力，這些流入本國經(jīng)濟的外國直接投資將受到不利影響（新海峽時報 管理時報 3月 9日， 2021）。s FDI policy a friend or an enemy to its Asian neighbors? What determines foreign direct investment flows into the Asian and other economies? Is there a “China Effect”? To get some insights as to what methodology we should pursue, we now look at selectively some relevant academic literature. Brainard (1997) empirically examines the determinants of the ratio of . export sales to total foreign sales (the sum of export sales by sales by foreign affiliates) by industry. She uses a framework of focusing on factors that favor concentration of production (. favoring exports) vs. proximity to overseas customers (. favoring sales by foreign affiliates). The explanatory variables include freight costs to the export market, tariffs of the host country, per capita gross domestic product, corporate tax rates, measures of trade and foreign direct investment openness, measures of plant scale economies and corporate scale economies. She also adds a dummy representing whether a country has a political coup in the last decade. In her random effects estimation, almost all the variables have the right signs and are significant. The major exception is the corporate tax rates, which has the opposite sign as predicted. Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998) focus on policy reforms in developing countries as determinants of foreign direct investment inflows. They employ both ordinary least squares as well as panel estimations. The expected rates of growth, the corporate tax rates, the degree of corruption and the degree of openness to foreign direct investment are all important determinants of foreign direct investment flows into these economies. Hines (1995) and Wei (1997) both examine the impact of institutional factors on foreign direct investment. By employing a corruption index, Hines shows that after 1977, . foreign direct investment grew faster in less corrupt countries. Wei (1997) uses OECD direct investment data and shows that both corruption and tax rates have negative effects on foreign direct investment flows. Wei’s estimations are crosssectional. The Empirical Model In this section we provide an empirical model to estimate the impact of China on the inward direct investment of various Asian economies. The economies we examine include Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia.3 The years examined in this analysis are from 1985 to 2021. The strategy here is to control for all the standard explanatory variables of foreign direct investment in the Asian economies. But we add an additional variable representing the China factor. To proxy for the China Effect, we choose the level of the inflow of China’s foreign direct investment. Obviously Chinese inward foreign direct investment can also be dependent on the inward direct investment of these Asian economies as well as the standard explanatory variables. In orde