第10章_寡頭壟斷和壟斷競爭-免費(fèi)閱讀
【正文】 70 壟斷引起的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失 100 200 MC=AC D D Output Price, MC, AC 6 150 E B 若壟斷，定價(jià) 150，有 P MC，表示社會(huì)生產(chǎn)某物品付出的邊際成本小于消費(fèi)該物品所得到的邊際效用，導(dǎo)致社會(huì)損失 △ ABE面積的利益（消費(fèi)者剩余）。 ? 市場結(jié)構(gòu)與創(chuàng)新之間的關(guān)系也不是簡單對(duì)應(yīng)的。 ? 如何將復(fù)雜的問題簡單化或規(guī)則化，是管理的一種技巧。所有其他主要生產(chǎn)者很快跟上，行業(yè)紀(jì)律得到了恢復(fù)。因此，它秘密地對(duì)大顧客降價(jià)。 與此同時(shí) 24 ? 更嚴(yán)重的問題不是來自石油供求方面的變化，而是 OPEC成員內(nèi)部大范圍的欺騙行為，象伊朗、伊拉克、利比亞等國。 17 ? 每個(gè)合謀的公司按預(yù)先約定的月亮盈虧狀況輪流輪流“坐莊”，誰坐莊就輪到誰中標(biāo)。寡頭和壟斷競爭 第 10章 1 不完全競爭者的行為 2 市場勢力 ? Market power signifies (表示 ) the degree of control that a firm or a small number of firms has over the price and production decisions in an industry. ? The most mon measure of market power is the fourfirm concentration ratio. 3 Firm Output Firm 1 25 Firm 2 20 Firm 3 15 Firm 4 10 Firm 5 8 Firm 6 7 Firm 7 5 Firm 8 5 Firm 9 3 Firm 10 2 =70 4企業(yè)集中度 Concentration Ratios: c4 = q1 + q2 + q3 +q4 25+20+15+10 100 Q = = 70% 4 Cigarettes Household refrigerators Electric light bulbs Motor vehicles Greeting cards Blast furnaces Screw products 5%_4% Tools, dies, and jigs 3%_2% 93% 82% 86% 84% 84% 37% 7% 16% 8% 7% 4% 21% 4 largest panies Next 4 largest panies 5 集中度測定時(shí)要注意的 ? Conventional concentration measures include only domestic production and exclude imports. ? Conventional concentration measures also ignore the growing impact of petition from other industries. 6 不完全競爭的性質(zhì) ? Economists have found that three major factors are present in imperfectly petitive markets: 1. Costs 2. Barriers to petition 3. Strategic interaction (策略互動(dòng) ) 7 不完全競爭的結(jié)果 ? Inefficient allocation of resources: P MC ? High levels of RD spending per dollar of sales. 8 不完全競爭的理論 ? Three of the most important cases of imperfect petition: ?Collusive oligopoly (合謀寡頭 ) ?Monopolistic petition ?Smallnumber oligopoly 9 策略互動(dòng) ? Strategic interaction is a term that describes how each firm’ s business strategy depends on their rivals’ strategies. ? As the number of firms in an industry shrink (減少 ), each firm is more likely to base pricing and output decisions on how other firms are likely to respond. 10 寡頭的合作與非合作選擇 ? When there are only a small number of firms in a market, they have a choice between cooperative (合作 ) and noncooperative (非合作 ) behavior. 11 合謀 ? Collusion occurs when one or more firms jointly (共同地 ) set prices or outputs, divide the market among themselves, or make other business decisions jointly. ? Such collusion can be either explicit or tacit (公開的或默許的 ). 12 公開合謀 ? One example of explicit (清楚的，公開的 ) collusion would be that of the Gilded
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