【正文】 首先， 確定和審查 的分析方法提出了文獻(xiàn)中的承包商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析，需要一個(gè)全面的方法捕獲的分析模型和學(xué)習(xí)他們的主張和基本假設(shè) 。然而，在解釋承包商在整個(gè)招投標(biāo)過程中如何了解風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并沒有全面的研究存在 。 TAH 等人， 1993 年制定了“分配突發(fā)覆蓋風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的目的在招標(biāo)準(zhǔn)備承包商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估”的概念模型，利用模糊集理論的原則。然而，在大多數(shù)的審查研究，沒有提及任何全面的實(shí)證研究，解釋承包商實(shí)際上 在 整個(gè)招標(biāo)過程中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這些承包商似乎 善于管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 在施工管理的某些方面，研究人員認(rèn)為，承包風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理差，只是因?yàn)樗麄兊慕?jīng)驗(yàn)為基礎(chǔ)的機(jī)制是報(bào)告使用在接近風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不系統(tǒng)的性質(zhì)。然而，這是不容易預(yù)測(cè)或價(jià)格風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，在調(diào)查的前 400 名美國承包商，這表明，定價(jià)是一個(gè)復(fù)雜而艱巨的任務(wù)，企業(yè)家（李文和 Arditi 2020 年 ）所示。菲舍爾和約旦 1996 年 ）。 （見 2020 年默多克和休斯的解釋，第138139 頁。 價(jià)格客戶愿意支付的建設(shè)工作，不僅取決于其現(xiàn)有資源，但也愿意提供相同的產(chǎn)品在市場(chǎng)上的其他賣家（即承包商）。本 文將證明，次承建商用于計(jì)算施工投標(biāo)過程中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和價(jià)格之間的關(guān)系是不充分，雖然它在 拉里亞 和休斯（ 2020）總結(jié)闡述文獻(xiàn)。然而，為了提高競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，價(jià)格確定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能被排除。 and ? to pare the theory with practice to show how the findings can guide future developments to support contractors in their pricing of work. General Research Approach To achieve the research objectives, three things are necessary. The first, identifying and examining analytical approaches proposed in the literature for contractor’s risk analysis, requires a prehensive method for capturing the analytical models and learning about their propositions and underlying assumptions. The second, ascertaining what contractors actually do about risks during the entire bidpricing process, requires a prehensive method for capturing pricing activities, observing what contractors do when they put together a price, and learning about what features they account for, including the extent to which they apportion risk and the mechanisms that they use for building up their contingencies. The third, paring results from the first two objectives to identify potential areas of significant difference, allows for remendations that will guide future developments. 8 承包商在投標(biāo)過程中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和 價(jià)格 塞繆爾 Smith 1986。 most contractors do not use special pricing software. However, most 5 analytical approaches appear to argue that experience and intuition do not form an adequate professional and objective basis for serious project management decisions (AlBahar and Crandall 1990). More than 60 systematic and rational approaches have been proposed as logical substitutes for the traditional, intuitive, unsystematic approach used by most contractors for assessing and pricing risk (Laryea and Hughes 2020). However, in most of the studies reviewed, no reference was made to any prehensive empirical work that explains how contractors actually account for risk in the whole tender process. Several writers (Kangari and Riggs 1989。 a fuzzy set model by Tah et al. (1993)。 畢業(yè)論文外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯 Risk and Price in the Bidding Process of Contractors Samuel Laryea1 and Will Hughes2 【 Abstract】 Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated into construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree to price is plex and not clearly articulated in the literature. With participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading . construction firms. This was pared with propositions in analytical models, and significant differences were found. A total of 670 h of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents (13%), offdays (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%), and travel (1%). Risk allowances of 1–2% were priced in some bids, and three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may be excluded from the final bid to enhance petitiveness. Although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other plex microeconomic factors also affect price. Instead of including pricing contingencies, risk was priced primarily through contractual rather than price mechanisms to reflect mercial imperatives. These findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids. 【 Keywords 】 Bidding。 and an influence diagrammingbased technique by AlBahar and Crandall (1990)]. However, several empirical studies of contractors have shown that they are rarely used in practice [seven contractors in the United Kingdom studied by Tah et al. (1994)。 Paek et al. 1993。 Geddes 1985。 拉里亞 休斯 【摘要】 ：正式的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析模型規(guī)定風(fēng)險(xiǎn)應(yīng)如何考慮進(jìn)施工投標(biāo)。雖然風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的分?jǐn)傆绊懗邪虄r(jià)格的確定，但是其他復(fù)雜的微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)因素也會(huì)影響價(jià)格的確定。 大多數(shù)分析的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型，學(xué)術(shù)研究者提出要求，訂立 如何應(yīng) 對(duì) 在投標(biāo)價(jià)格中包含的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 （見“，利普西 1979 年，個(gè)別 競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈的市場(chǎng)行為的微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)理論 93。） 承辦商在推銷他們的投標(biāo)價(jià)格，以應(yīng)對(duì)這些因素的過程中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估的方法 在文學(xué) 上并沒有很清楚的解釋 ，如附錄 I 所示然而，一些分析方法已經(jīng)被提出來幫助承包商交易，并考慮在現(xiàn)實(shí)中 對(duì) 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有足夠的了解，這將是難以概念化 的 分析模型，實(shí)際上做什么承包商 都是 一致 的 。投資組合理論和資本市場(chǎng)理論的規(guī)定，總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)包括兩種類型的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)（菲舍爾和約旦 1996年 ）。 馬爾霍蘭（ 1999 年）由概念研究，在分析方法在施工進(jìn)度風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 評(píng)估的建議，啟動(dòng)建設(shè)項(xiàng)目在復(fù)雜和動(dòng)態(tài)的環(huán)境中，造成高的不確定性 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，這是要求 在 復(fù)合的情況下， 進(jìn)行 時(shí)間限制。然而，這種說法 并不是最正確的，在建造業(yè)中令有 其他說明。然而，其性質(zhì)而言， 風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 不僅在建筑行業(yè) ，在所有業(yè)務(wù)部門都難以 充分 減輕。 幾位作家（白南舜 1993 年； TAH 1993 年； Kangari 和里格斯 1989 年； 劉靈 2020年 ）也提出了分析模型，承包商可以使用在投標(biāo)過程中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估。 2020 年劉靈介紹了一個(gè)模糊 logicbased 人工神經(jīng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)模型，以幫助在承辦“ ......估計(jì)的標(biāo)記在一個(gè)多變和不確定的施工環(huán)境。 沒有一個(gè)準(zhǔn)確的理解承包商 在 實(shí)際計(jì)算施工投標(biāo) 中的