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eployment. NeverEnding Flow of Scandal One of the most troubling lessons from the journalism sector was the unending stream of scandals. There were at least six distinct varieties. First and foremost were the intentional misrepresentations of financial statements, as exemplified in the Jusen (housing finance pany) scandals. Asset values were at times inflated, and nonrecoverable assets were ignored, in an attempt to prevent revelation of negative capital positions. At other times, deceptive transactions were used to create false profits. Some of these scandals were abetted by auditors, who knowingly signed false accounts, and were subsequently sued and jailed. The second variety of scandal was political contribution scandals, either related to the false accounting incidents or simple misuse of funds. Bribery scandals started the 1990s with the involvement of a construction minister, Kishiro Nakamura, and continued in the new century with the cases of Koichi Kato and Muneo Suzuki. The third type of scandal involved the collusion of corporate management with organized crime, which provided the service of quashing unwanted questions at annual stockholders meetings in return for large payments. The fourth type of scandal concerned abuse of management in order to quash stockholder inquiries, such as cases when management had employee stockholders rehearse the shouting down of unfavorable questions at stockholder meetings. The fifth type of scandal concerned regulatory collusion in the suppression of damaging information. Examples include the Ministry of Health helping to suppress information about AIDStainted blood, and METI suppressing information about failed inspections at nuclear power plants. The sixth type of scandal was largely governmental, in cases such as the BoJ and the MoF accepting excessive entertainment from firms that they regulated, local government showering lavish entertainment on central government bureaucrats in order to secure funding, police leaking investigation data because of internal squabbling, and Post Office employees illegally providing election support for national Diet candidates. In reaction to these scandals, there was a huge amount of effort aimed at improving governance, disclosure, accountability, and pliance. Some of these efforts have borne fruit, while others have not. The Commercial Code has been amended to allow corporate governance structures similar to those used abroad, but so far Japanese management has been very reluctant to change. The number of firms with outside directors, while growing, remains small, and the independence of these directors in some cases remains questionable. Disclosure has improved tremendously, in our view, but many issues, such as the details of pension accounting, remain. An important aspect of disclosure is investor relations, which were virtually nonexistent at the start of the 1990s, but now are mon (although of varying quality) at major firms. Accountability is making some progress as well, with the tendency for top management to resign and to take financial penalty for errors. Finally, pliance is also being stricter, as auditors are being held responsible when frauds are permitted. For investors, the lesson from Japan is to focus on these four areas governance, disclosure, accountability, and pliance when evaluating the potential for a pany to generate a negative surprise. There is no substitute for visiting the pany, studying its history, understanding its management, and rating its implementation. Political Fragmentation Finally, political fragmentation was a key part of the political environment that determined policies. Fragmentation was visible in several forms. First was the fragmentation among political parties, which resulted in the necessity for coalition governments throughout the 1990s, and continuing today. Policy decisions were harder and slower because of this fragmentation. The second type of fragmentation was within political parties. In the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, there emerged a small group of marketoriented reformers in the Diet. The antireform group was much larger, but also very split along regional, factional, and interest group lines. One of the severe difficulties faced by the Koizumi government is the amorphous character of the antireform group. The third type of fragmentation involves political style. One group of politicians has e to emphasize confrontation politics as a way to clarify issues and to force decisions. This style contrasts with the traditional consensus politics that spawned Japan’s postwar political culture. For investors, political fragmentation has been costly. The consequence of political fragmentation has been slower, more plex, less transparent policy making. And the result has been that important policy issues are postponed or watered down in the process of decisions. At worst, the policy outlook bees opaque. One result for markets is a thinning of trading, so that prices bee more volatile. Another is that the direction of policy bees less predictable, and thus macrobased investment bees more hazardous. Labor Intensive Investment Analysis These lessons from the journalism quadrant imply that laborintensive efforts in following events, related to specific panies or to the policy environment, are an important part of success for investing in a deflationary world. The final quadrant, the theory quadrant, has yet more lessons, which will be considered in the final part of this series.失去的十年20世紀(jì)90年代日本經(jīng)濟(jì)反思之四(經(jīng)濟(jì)理論篇)[摘要] 本文為90年代日本經(jīng)濟(jì)反思四部曲的第四篇?! 。êM庹搲旅嫖覀兎謩e討論這兩個(gè)問(wèn)題。它所做的不僅是把利率降為零。從上面的比較可以看出,問(wèn)題并不在基礎(chǔ)貨幣增長(zhǎng)率本身。打個(gè)比方說(shuō):掛倒檔時(shí)踩油門(mén),汽車(chē)可不會(huì)前進(jìn)。首先,放松銀根造成的通貨膨脹將掩蓋他們的錯(cuò)誤和腐敗行為。龍對(duì)于貨幣主義的劃分現(xiàn)已得到了大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的認(rèn)可。不僅如此,日本的教訓(xùn)還告誡我們,貨幣流通速度的穩(wěn)定性與銀行體系的健全性密切相關(guān)。CRIC周期把日本宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)與政府決策之間的互動(dòng)歸納為一個(gè)固定的周期性模式:危機(jī)(crisis),應(yīng)對(duì)(response),好轉(zhuǎn)(improvement),自滿(mǎn)(placency)?! ∮嘘P(guān)十幾年來(lái)日本經(jīng)濟(jì)歷程的信息浩若煙海,卻又矛盾叢生,要厘清這些信息,CRIC周期模式是一個(gè)極具價(jià)