高級微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)publicgoodsandexternality-預(yù)覽頁
【正文】 ()t e x??Externality ? The first Coase theorem: ? The first order condition: ? It’s indifferent for or ! 1 m a x ( ) ( )x p x c x r x? ? ? ?2 m a x ( ) ( )x r x e x? ??( ) ( )p c x e x????( ) 0rx? ? ( ) 0rx? ?Externality ? The second Coase theorem: ? If there is a transaction cost: ( ) 0Tx? ?1 m a x ( ) ( ) ( )x p x c x r x T x? ? ? ? ?2 m a x ( ) ( )x r x e x? ??Externality ? A pensation mechanism: ? The firms announce a Pigovian tax ti ? Firm 1 produces x and pays t2x tax , firm 2 receives t1x pensation. And both pay penalty on the difference between their tax rate, say 212()tt?21 2 1 2m a x ( ) ( ) ( )x p x c x t x t t? ? ? ? ? ?22 1 1 2m a x ( ) ( ) ( )x t x e x t t? ? ? ? ?Externality ? For this game have a Subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if: ? Second stage: firm 1: ? First stage: firm 1 ? Firm 2: ? So we get: 12tt?22( ) ( )p c x t x x t?? ? ? ?1 1 1 2( ) 2 ( ) 0t t t? ? ? ? ? ?2 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) 2 ( ) 0t t e x x t t t? ? ??? ? ? ? ?( ) ( )p c x e x????Public goods Gp1MU2MUPublic goods Public goods Private goods Public goods Private goods g1 g2 x1 w1 g2 w1 Private cost and social cost ()cx?( ) ( )c x e x???x?x x 。
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