【正文】 hat the protector—the “public watchdog (United States v. Arthur Young amp。 Poor’s and Fitch/IBC—who all received substantial fees from Enron— also did nothing to alert investors of pending problems. Amazingly, just weeks prior to Enron’s bankruptcy filing—after most of the negative news was out and Enron’s stock was trading for $3 per share—all three agencies still gave investment grade ratings to Enron’s debt. Finally, the ninth element of the perfect storm was three types of educator failures. First, educators had not provided sufficient ethics training to students. By not forcing students to face realistic ethical dilemmas in the classroom, graduates were illequipped to deal with the real ethical dilemmas they faced in the business world. In one allegedly fraudulent scheme, for example, participants included virtually the entire senior management of the pany, including but not limited to its former chairman and chief executive officer, its former president, two former chief financial officers, and various other senior accounting and business personnel. In total, there were more than 20 individuals involved in the earnings overstatement schemes. Such a large number of participants points to a generally failed ethical pass for the group. Consider another case of a chief accountant. A chief financial officer instructed the chief accountant to increase earnings by an amount somewhat over $100 million. The chief accountant was skeptical about the purpose of these instructions but did not challenge them. Instead, the chief accountant followed directions and allegedly created a spreadsheet containing seven pages of improper journal entries—105 in total—that he determined were necessary to carry out the CFO’s instructions. Such fraud was not unusual. In many of the cases, the individuals involved had no prior records of dishonesty—and yet when they were asked to participate in fraudulent accounting, they did so quietly of their own free will. A second educator failure was not teaching students about fraud. One author of this paper has taught a fraud course to business students for several years. It is his experience that most business school graduates would not recognize a fraud if it hit them between the eyes. The large majority of business students don’t understand the elements of fraud, perceived pressures and opportunities, the process of rationalization, or red flags that indicate the possible presence of dishonest behavior. 8 When they do see something that doesn’t look right, their first reaction is to deny a colleague could be mitting dishonest acts. The third educator failure has been to neglect exploration of possible relationships between various theories of management behavior and fraudulent activity. Stewardship theory and agency theory are among many theoretical models that have implications in fraud acts. Source： Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective， 2021， (17)： 212. 9 譯文 ： 會計造假及其監(jiān)測的當前趨勢研究 引言 大多數(shù)公司的高管和雇員是誠信經(jīng)營的。雖然看起來似乎欺詐行為集中在某些行業(yè)，事實上這些少數(shù)的不誠實的人存在于每個專業(yè)及產(chǎn)業(yè)。在大多數(shù)的事件當中，審計師應(yīng)該可以察覺到舞弊行為，最后由于審計師的過失審計而被起訴。我們回顧了在這方面的會計準則及條例，包括紐約證券交易所和全美證券交易商自動報價系統(tǒng)協(xié)會對一些條例的修改，以及薩班斯 奧克斯法案的新準則。無論是員工盜用公款，或者管理層 舞弊，這些欺詐行為中，這三個要素永遠存在。董事會10 的形同虛設(shè)或者內(nèi)部控制的薄弱，都給公司管理層舞弊提供了機會。機會越有利或者壓力越大 ，欺詐行為就更合理化。這些元素導致了近幾年大量的造假事件像完美風暴一樣發(fā)生。在這個能感覺到的成功下，人們開始做一些沒有意義的投資和其他的決策。還有研究表明，經(jīng)濟增長的持續(xù)時間過長會模糊一個企業(yè)對成功的理解，同時會增長錯誤決策的可能性。有人可能會說在歷史上榜樣本來就不都是誠實和道德的，可是近幾十年來他們的行為通過媒體報道、網(wǎng)絡(luò)傳播，傳播更加廣泛，影響了生產(chǎn)人員，同時也給年輕人帶來不良的影響。許多造假公司的首席執(zhí)行官持有數(shù)億美元的股票期權(quán)或者限制股票，所以股票價格的不斷 上漲就比財務(wù)報告的準確性來得重11 要了。 第四個因素是短期通常無法完成的華爾街分析師的預(yù)期目 標。這種預(yù)期將股票價格的變動變成公司期望達到的股票價格。例如，安然公司的與衍生品相關(guān)的債務(wù)僅 2021 年就從 18 億美元增加至 105 億。相對于其他國家的會計實務(wù)，如英國和澳大利亞，美國一般公認會計準則（ GAAP）是更加有章可循的。其結(jié)果是，與遵從舊的準則相比，建立新的一般準則，或者特殊準則更值得考慮。在某些情況下，會計師事12 務(wù)所審計的領(lǐng)導人用豐厚的咨詢服務(wù)建立與公司的關(guān)系，使他們能賣出更多的利潤。這在安達信公司是真實存在的，它花了相當多的精力來經(jīng)營咨詢業(yè)務(wù)，從而分成一個獨立的公司（現(xiàn)稱埃森哲）。沒有人想要接受壞消息。同樣在 2021 年 10 月，當公眾收到了有關(guān)一些高管已經(jīng)放棄了安然并且有關(guān)安然的負面消息之后， 17 個證券分析師中仍有 16 個掩蓋安然公司的負面消息將其評為“強勢買入”和“買入”的等級。令人驚訝的是，在安然申請破產(chǎn)日的前幾周，也就是當大量的負面新聞已經(jīng)曝光，安然的股票價格跌至了每股 3 美元的時候，這三家機構(gòu)仍然評定安然債權(quán)的投資級別。在一個涉嫌欺詐的事件里，參加者幾乎包括公司所有的高級管理人員，包括前任董事長兼首席 執(zhí)行官、其前總統(tǒng)、兩名前首席財13 務(wù)官和各種各樣的其他高級會計業(yè)務(wù)人員，總的來說，有超過 20 個個體參與這個方案。總會計師對這個指令表示懷疑，可是沒有反抗。 第二種教育者的失敗是沒有教授學生關(guān)于會計造假的行為。當他們確實見到一些看上去不正確的事情時，他們的第一反應(yīng)是不承認他們的同事會做出不誠實的