【正文】 該獎勵的范圍可以預(yù)料，取決于影響者和特定影響事物計劃內(nèi)的目標。如果 A 和 B 在 B 的一個特定的行為完全一致，那么就沒有必要去改變 B 的行為。 預(yù)計費用 費用分為直接和間接的。間接成本包括機會成本。機會成本可能會出現(xiàn)一段時間。一旦專家已發(fā)出建議，權(quán)力之源可能會消失。間接成本的第二種形式是，可以通過對權(quán)力的產(chǎn)生沖突。 出處： [美 ] : 分銷渠道管理：效率因素 [J] 國際 物流管理期刊 、 1996年第 26 期 。沖突的程度會產(chǎn)生，部分依賴于使用的方法的影響。例如，如果 A 公司在法律上有權(quán)要求 B 公司保持其價格在一定范圍內(nèi)，沒有合法的權(quán)力通過這種損失。當然，這將取決于從早期使用權(quán)力獲得的獎勵。因此，試圖改變一個企業(yè)的行為 可能要對利益權(quán)衡。直接成本將涉及的影響者溝通，這個問題有太多成本和保持主體通知的費用。關(guān)鍵的 因素就是 A 相信 B 將做在 A 的干預(yù)的情況下。如果 A 和 B 是一個制造商一個非常重要的客戶，那么 B 的行為很可能對 A的銷售利潤，因此，條件不變的重要后果是可以預(yù)料的，比其他制造商該客戶將是更大的影響力主體。然而，回報和成本，將取決于許多因素（如在下面討論）和完善的知識。一個公司可能預(yù)見別人的意愿，調(diào)整自己的行為。正如貝爾認為，雖然情況可能會很重要，面對面情況并非總是存 在一個企業(yè)的影響時，另說法說：“一個更廣泛的方法是有用的，因此這通常是通過討論在控制方面所提供的感知力替代品或其他元素 ...因此不存在環(huán)境的具體談判的框架的必要性。這樣，公司可能會限定另 一家公司的行為考慮的范圍，從而影響其行為。如果一個公司的權(quán)力是建立在合法的基礎(chǔ)上，無論是正式或非正式的，這可以被看作是一種權(quán)力的消極制裁。一個例子是零售銷售廠家對銷售人員的課程。積極的獎勵或制裁可能為公司的一個主題，包括社會價值觀方面的任何資源價值。但是，首先，各種方法對權(quán)力的使用似乎是適當?shù)亩唐谄x。這兩種力量增加對權(quán)力研究的重要性，因為合作和協(xié)調(diào)需要某種形式的權(quán) 力結(jié)構(gòu)。一個方面是由一個分銷渠道的組織情況。首先，隨著今天技術(shù)的變革，新產(chǎn)品不斷推出，市場營銷的任務(wù)變得更加復(fù)雜，奧爾德森 [8]認為：“越是復(fù)雜的營銷工作更需要它有一個通道作為一個整體運作，以實現(xiàn)效率“。權(quán)力承諾可以對社會團體維持其結(jié)構(gòu)。這并不意味著一定要暗示組織設(shè)置刻意安排的渠道，但這一渠道組織產(chǎn)生于個別機構(gòu)有關(guān)彼此的權(quán)力調(diào)整自己的行為，他們都在使用。這種合作和協(xié)調(diào)是必要的，以確保成員之間的可預(yù)測性和可靠性，這將使個別組織計劃有效。Distribution channel management: power considerations 原文： The role of power in distribution channels Channels of distribution can be viewed as social systems prising a set of interdependent anizations, which perform all the activities (functions), utilized to move a product and its title from production to consumption. Because of this interdependency there arises a need for some form of cooperation between channel members and coordination of activities. This cooperation and coordination is necessary in order to ensure predictability and dependability between members which will allow individual anizations to plan effectively. Also, conflict arises in channels, because members sometimes have inpatible goals, differing ideas as to the functions each should perform, and differing perceptions of reality. This conflict needs to be controlled so that it does not disrupt channel functioning. Power or, rather, the use of power by individual channel members to affect the decision making and/or behavior of one another (whether deliberate or not), is the mechanism by which the channel is anized and orderly behavior preserved. This is not meant to imply that anizations necessarily set out deliberately to anize the channel, but that this anization of the channel arises out of individual anizations adjusting their behavior to one another in relation to the power they each have and use. However, in some channels, firm(s) may assume a leadership role and make deliberate attempts to anize the channel, making use of their power. Power is the means by which cooperation between individual channel members’ activities are coordinate and the means by which any conflict between firms is controlled. Bierstadt [7], in a general context, has aptly summarized the role of power in any system: “Power supports the fundamental order of society and the social anizations within it, whenever there is order. Power stands behind every association and sustains its structure. Without power there is no order”. The study of power must be, therefore, an important part of the study of distribution channel behavior and will have important implications for the study of physical distribution management. Moreover, the study of power is of increasing importance today as the need for effective cooperation and coordination of activities between channel members grows. Two basic, though not necessarily unrelate