【正文】 re likely to provide higherquality audit services, ceteris paribus, pared with small local offices with relatively thin such a case, one would observe a positive association between office size and call this prediction the economic dependence AND CONCLUDING REMARKS While previous auditing research has examined whether and how audit fees and audit qualityare influenced by audit firm size at the national level and auditor industry leadership at both thenational level and the city level, this line of research has paid little attention to the effect of thesize of a local engagement office within an audit firm(., office size)in the context of auditquality and audit previous research, the focus of this paper is on whether the officesize is an additional, engagementspecific factor determining audit quality and audit pricing overand beyond nationallevel audit firm size and officelevel industry results can besummarized as , we find that the office size is positively associated with audit quality proxied by unsigned abnormal finding is consistent with what we call the economic dependenceperspective: large(small)local offices with deep officelevel clienteles are less(more)likely to depend on a particular client, and thus are better(less)able to resist client pressure on substandardor biased , we find that large local offices are able to charge higher audit fees totheir clients than small ones, which is consistent with the view that large offices provide higherquality audits than small offices, and this quality differential is priced as a fee premium in themarket for audit , the above finding is at odds with the view that large officeshave a cost advantage in producing audit services of similar quality and thus are able to chargelower billing rates pared with small together, our results highlight that officesize is one of the most important engagementspecific determinants of audit quality and , while we use two alternative, advanced accrual models to alleviate a concern overthe limitations inherent in the Jones(1991)model estimates of abnormal accruals, our measures ofaudit quality, namely unsigned abnormal accruals, may suffer from nontrivial measurement therefore cannot pletely rule out the possibility that the estimated coefficients on our testvariables are , given that a contemporaneous study of Francis and Yu(2009)documents the same positive association between audit quality and audit office size using twoadditional proxies for audit quality, ., auditors’ tendency to issue goingconcern opinion andclient firms’ likelihood to meet earnings benchmarks, we believe that our results are unlikelydriven by possible measurement , our results suggest that both regulators and audit firms should pay more attention tothe behavior of small offices because they are more likely to be economically dependent on aparticular client, and thus to promise audit particular, Big 4 audit firms may need toimplement strategies for providing a more homogenous level of audit services across offices ofdifferent sizes because a poorquality audit by a small office could significantly damage thereputation of the entire today’s global business environment, the issue of maintaining“uniform quality” should be an even more important concern to reputable auditors because theirbusiness bees increasingly internationalized in terms of locations and client , it may be more difficult for Big 4 audit firms to maintain uniform quality of service atthe office level across different jurisdictions around the , local offices in differentjurisdictions(., European Union and China)have their own client bases and are likely to bemore autonomous in making auditrelated decisions than those within the is thereforepossible that the size of a local practicing office plays a more significant role in determining thequality of audit services in other than in the the scarcity ofinternational evidence regarding the effect of audit office size on audit quality and audit pricing,we rem。Shapiro 1983).Similarly, ourevidence suggests that large, Big 4 auditors should take care to maintain a similar level of auditquality across offices of different sizes because a systematically poorquality audit service performed by a local office could potentially cause damage to the reputation for the entire audit DEVELOPMENT Office Size and Audit Quality A growing body of audit research emphasizes the importance of analyzing the behavior ofauditors in citybased, local engagement , none of these studies has paid attention to the size of a local office in the context of audit does the office size matter inaudit quality over and beyond two wellknown audit firm characteristics, ., audit firm size orbrand name(Big 4 versus nonBig 4)and industry expertise? In DeAngelo’s(1981b)framework, an auditor’s incentive to promise audit quality withrespect to a particular client depends on the economic importance of the client relative to theauditor’s client analysis indicates that large auditors are likely to provide higherquality audit services to a particular client than small auditors because an auditor’s economicdependence on that client is negligible for large auditors, and large auditors have more to lose(.,bear higher reputation loss)in case of audit failures, pared with small ’s(1981b)theory can also be applied to the analysis of audit quality differentiationbetween large versus small offices, because a local engagement office can be viewed as a semiautonomous unit in terms of its audit decisions, client base, revenue sources, and other factors(Francis 2004。Craswell et 。Kim et 。audit quality。這加劇了全球的產(chǎn)能過剩，并導(dǎo)致中國(guó)某些行業(yè)的商品，特別是鋼材，在世界市場(chǎng)上引起傾銷。只要銀行爭(zhēng)奪存款被禁止，數(shù)以百萬的儲(chǔ)戶將繼續(xù)被人為壓低存款利率，來補(bǔ)貼國(guó)有銀行的盈利能力。即使在20世紀(jì)80年代，非正式的銀行也提供著很高的存款利率。同時(shí)，這些手段也允許他們購買被其他政治局成員保護(hù)的利益支持，包括當(dāng)?shù)毓賳T和國(guó)有企業(yè)管理人員，特別是在經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯的時(shí)候。在城市里，許多規(guī)模較小的國(guó)有企業(yè)被私有化或關(guān)閉了，而私營(yíng)部門被允許自由成長(zhǎng)（諾頓1996）。2011年初，通貨膨脹調(diào)轉(zhuǎn)進(jìn)入危險(xiǎn)的境況。銀行仍然防止“毀滅性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”，并繼續(xù)享有穩(wěn)健的貸款利率傳導(dǎo)。到今年年底，銀行已經(jīng)做出了歷史上最大量的新增貸款，總額近10萬億人民幣（潘克赫斯特,鄭,和王 2009）。移除貸款利率的上限，銀行通過貸款賺更多的錢。中國(guó)人民銀行的一份報(bào)告顯示