【正文】 f a Treaty as a Consequence of Its Breach Bilateral treaty ? Cyprus could terminate Multilateral treaty o Affected party may invoke it to suspend treaty vizaviz itself and the breacher Def‘n of ―material breach‖ o A repudiation of the treaty o The violation of a provision essential to the acplishment of the object ? States enter into private, contractual treaties that look like private K, not really ―law.‖ But Vienna Convention (accepted as CIL) and UN charter, act like K law, as ―background.‖ One way to achieve law parable to that in the domestic legal system. d. CYPRUS AFTERMATH: ? 1963: gov‘t stalemate (p35) ? Nov 11, 2020—Kofi Annan presents plan for mon state governed by Council w/6 members (4 Greek, 2 Turkish) ? Turkish Cypriots insist on int‘l recognition of their selfproclaimed state ? April 2020—Greek C‘s signed accession agreement w/EU。 also could have gone to SC (though Soviets would have vetoed) o Turkey: ? Cyprus consented to force, so doesn‘t violate 103, thus doesn‘t violate 2(4)(prohibiting use of force), thus doesn‘t violate an int‘l norm, thus doesn‘t violate Art 53 ? We‘re just authorizing force when ok under 2(4)—humanitarian intervention ? VC Art 26 – treaties must be performed in good faith ? VC Art 31 – treaty shall be interpreted in good faith ? Can‘t interpret Art IV to be superfluous (. states can always use peaceful measures) o VC Article 7—Full Powers (see above), anyone w/ full power can sign a treaty ? Makarious amp。 Turkish Cypriots wanted partition ? 1960 Basic Structure of Republic of Cyprus = internal balance b/t the two munities (Turkish Cypriots 20%, Greek Cypriots 80%) ? Treaty of Alliance ? Treaty of Guarantee (b/t Cyprus, Greece and Turkey) Article IV – reserves right of Guaranty powers to take action Parties left this ambiguous b/c they could not agree!! o Cyprus (and . privately agrees): ? UN Charter Art 103—can‘t agree in advance to use of force. ? Bosnia o 1995: Republic of Bosnia amp。 principles of general application dealing with the interactions b/c states and their interactions with int‘l s and in certain instances, persons (natural or artificial) ? 50 yrs ago your state would pursue action on your behalf—―diplomatic protection.‖ o State was injured, not you. Now, human rights rules say individuals have rights on int‘l plane ? Sources of IL – ICJ Statute, Article 38: o Int’l conventions (treaties and agreements) – ―hard law‖ o Int’l custom – ―soft law‖ o General principles of law recognized by civilized nations o Judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified publicists B. TREATIES ―Treaty‖ = an international agreement concluded b/t States in written form and governed by int‘l law。 or sue FR in NZ courts ? NGO。 UN) ? no pulsory adjudication in int’l system o ICJ ignores terra nullius (belongs to noone) b/c reports went to Gen Ass‘y w/ precise km size of Chad and Libya didn‘t object。 institutionalists。 affirmation of IL‘s utility。 ICJ judicial review) ….…… 49 B. The Ontological Challenge: The War on Terrorism (how relevant is IL?) ………………………………….…..…… 50 1. US Article 51 SelfDefense Approach to Sept. 11 (test of state responsibility for nonstate actor) … ……… 50 2. Detainees。 debate over emering CIL norm) ……………..…………………………………. 47 2 X. LEGITIMACY amp。 (3) amnesty) …………………………………..…… 38 IX. THE USE OF FORCE A. Evolution of the Law (1945 UN Charter) ……………………………………………………………………………..... 41 B. Responding to Aggression: Gulf War and Aftermath (SC resolutions。 Rome Statute。 cons of legal argument) ……………………………….… 35 C. Protecting NonCombatants (Qana incident—shelling of UN camp) …………………………………………...…… 36 VIII. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW – individual accountability for violations of Human Dignity A. Fora For Justice: Rwandan Genocide 1994 (options。 ICCPR—. R/U/Ds and HCR reaction) …………….……………………………………………………… 30 C. Economic, Social amp。 counsel for torture detainee。 his ATCA suit against US。 European—Woodpulp implementation rule。 Seriously Eroded under Bernstein, Sabbatino。 INF treaty—Biden loses to Reagan) ………………………..…… 18 E. IL Claims in . Courts – Causes of Action ……………………………………………………………………...…… 18 1. Alien Tort Claims Act (Filartiga167。 Moore) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 C. Breaking IL – Execution of Angel Breard。 Sole Exec) ……………………………………..… 14 2. Trends in Usage (fewer Article II treaties。 declaratory ? FRY/ Badinter Comm‘n) ……………..….. 8 C. Succession (VC or Restatement: Continuity or Clean Slate? Divvying up treaties, property, membership in Int‘l Orgs) ……….……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…… 10 D. Legitimacy of New Gov‘t (3 approaches: Tinoco (China, Cambodia), Estrada (US approach), Tobar (OAS approach。PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OUTLINE – Professor Wippman, Fall 2020 I. INTRODUCTION A. ChadLibya Dispute (IL allowed Libya out of sticky situation) ………….…………………………………….…………3 B. Rainbow Warrior (use IL to cover prenegotiated agreement) ………………………………………………………….3 II. SOURCES OF LAW A. What is IL? and Sources of IL (ICJ Statute Article 38) …………………………………………….…………………… 4 B. Treaties (Cyprus… involves Bosnia, ECOWAS, VC on Treaties (authorization, coercion, good faith interpretation, peremptory norms (jus cogens), withdrawal amp。 Possible formation processes) .…………………………..… 8 B. Recognition (2 theories: constitutive ? Aaland Islands。 Monist—other countries) .. 13 B. Making IL ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...…… 14 1. Types of Agreements (Art II treaties, ExecCongressional。 Dames amp。 selfexecuting treaties ………………………………………………… …………………………………………...… 15 D. Interpreting IL (ABM Treaty—Sofaer vs. Biden。 could view as choice of law doctrine。 US– Hartford Fire rule。 Adolf Eichmann) …………………………………………………………………… 26 B. Jurisdiction to Enforce and Adjudicate