【正文】 運(yùn)用政策和規(guī)劃來進(jìn)行公共事業(yè)，比較復(fù)雜。每一項(xiàng)都有不同的優(yōu)點(diǎn)和局限性。 綜合經(jīng)合組織國家強(qiáng)調(diào)的必須采取長遠(yuǎn)辦法的重要性的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，對于提高績效和問責(zé)制的績效管理和績效預(yù)算能力，我有了一些比較實(shí)際的想法。如果該系統(tǒng)有太多的限制，導(dǎo)致管理者沒有足夠的資源提高績效，那么放寬投入控制的失敗會(huì)導(dǎo)致績效結(jié)果效率下降。傳統(tǒng)問責(zé)制的批評(píng)者認(rèn)為那些問責(zé)制強(qiáng)調(diào)要遵守的， 并且阻礙了效率的績效分層結(jié)構(gòu)規(guī)定，已在他們身上結(jié)束了。要達(dá)到跨政府的行為和文化上的改變，需要通過整體政府的形式，激勵(lì)和控制權(quán)（正式和非正式的）結(jié)構(gòu)的創(chuàng)建，對一整個(gè)系統(tǒng)的理解，以及怎樣行動(dòng)才能使關(guān)鍵行動(dòng)者們相互影響。這些改革通過向公眾提供更多的規(guī)定信息從而改善了政府績效的透明度。 政府績效的提高可以重點(diǎn)通 過政策咨詢的結(jié)果，中央和部門的管理流程，議會(huì)和公眾的問責(zé)制來實(shí)現(xiàn)。一些經(jīng)合組織國家設(shè)立了跨政府的橫向目標(biāo)和預(yù)算，但事實(shí)證明，很難實(shí)現(xiàn)跨部門協(xié)調(diào)。 獲取和保持政治家的支持：這是一個(gè)面臨改革者的關(guān)鍵挑戰(zhàn)。 在一個(gè)政府性的行為范圍內(nèi)，如果績效信息被政治家和財(cái)政部的 專家以任何方式利用，都可以建立激勵(lì)機(jī)制，影響管理人員的表現(xiàn)。在技術(shù)方面可能很難衡量一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)做什么，并銜接組織目標(biāo)到個(gè)人目標(biāo)。大多數(shù)國家不斷的在解決這個(gè)對于達(dá)到公務(wù)員和政治家的行為的變化問題 —— 這是一個(gè)長期的過程。在節(jié)約預(yù)算的大氣候下，有一個(gè)問題是：是否能提供額外資金給進(jìn)行績效 的機(jī)構(gòu)，尤其當(dāng)這不是一個(gè)政府的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)的情況下。如果真的這么做了，應(yīng)該怎么做？通過沒收資源來懲治失敗的績效，制造了一個(gè)明確的信號(hào)給其他機(jī)構(gòu)，讓它們認(rèn)識(shí)到績效的重要性。財(cái)政預(yù)算往往是按照體制和職能界限構(gòu)建的，而不是按結(jié)果類別。關(guān)鍵問題之一是取得有良好 質(zhì)量和可靠的績效數(shù)據(jù)。 避免扭曲行為：這對于所有政府來說都是挑戰(zhàn)。同樣的，這也需要時(shí)間來平衡。因此需要花費(fèi)時(shí)間去確認(rèn)績效水平，并獲得比較數(shù)據(jù)，以實(shí)現(xiàn)制定的目標(biāo)不會(huì)過高或過低。國家則繼續(xù)為目標(biāo)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)問題，比如水平和數(shù)字而尋求解決方案?？冃徲?jì)信息可以有助于提高績效標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，并為立法機(jī)關(guān)提供報(bào)告結(jié)果?？冃ЫY(jié)果對于公眾和政界來說，會(huì)形成強(qiáng)烈的反響。比如，在實(shí)際工作中怎樣聯(lián)系相關(guān) 機(jī)構(gòu)，具體的操作步驟該怎么做，使得最后可以得到高質(zhì)量的績效成果。對于所有國家來說，關(guān)鍵的挑戰(zhàn)在于要取得良好的質(zhì)量信息（包括有效，可靠，及時(shí)）。支持者認(rèn)為政府進(jìn)行績效行為可以改變政府活動(dòng)?？冃ьA(yù)算和績效管理使公眾忽略了對政府公共服務(wù)項(xiàng)目落成和項(xiàng)目開銷的關(guān)注，轉(zhuǎn)而重視預(yù)算編制、管理和問責(zé)制，即追求更好的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。 performance management。 this is a longterm process. Obtaining and maintaining the support of managers and employees within government organisations is crucial. This reform has the potential to improve the focus on organisational goals, to provide managers with better information for decision making on programmes, budgets and policies, and to improve internal reporting and controls. Gaining these benefits is challenging because it requires technical as well as cultural change. In technical terms it can be difficult to measure what an agency does and to link organisational objectives to individual goals. It is important to obtain the buyin of front line employees。 中文 4350 字 外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯 原文： Government Performance: Lesson and Challenges This article concentrates on attempts by OECD countries to introduce performancebased or resultsbased budgeting and management. The need to enhance public sector performance has bee more urgent as governments face mounting demands on public expenditure, calls for higher quality services and, in some countries, a public increasingly unwilling to pay higher taxes. Performance budgeting and performance management seek to move the focus of budgeting, management and accountability away from inputs towards results, . better value for money. Drawing on data from the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database, the article explores the trends and country approaches (different phases, various objectives), discusses accountability to the public (including external performance auditing), and recognises the importance of context and a wholeofgovernment approach, in particular for changing the behaviour of key actors and motivating politicians to use performance information. The limitations and tensions of performance budgeting and performance management are also discussed, as well as problems of measurement and the efficient use of performance information. A great deal of rhetoric has surrounded the introduction of performance management and budgeting. Supporters claim that it has the capacity to transform governments. However, it is important that this reform should not be seen as a panacea and that governments have realistic expectations about what it can achieve and the time needed to reach these objectives. Even countries that have been using this approach for over 15 years continue to struggle with issues of measurement。 too few targets create distortion effects. Again it takes time to get a realistic balance. Several countries have started out with a large number of targets and subsequently reduced them. For example, in the United Kingdom when performance agreements for departments were first introduced as part of the prehensive spending review in 1998, there were in total 600 targets across government. By the time of the revised spending review in 2020, that number had been reduced to 130 targets (. Treasu