【正文】 和實(shí)證文獻(xiàn) ,對(duì)匹配的影響 與塊但是 ,在許多聯(lián)邦國家 ,一個(gè)人也可以轉(zhuǎn)讓 ,觀察均衡的嘗試 subfederal 減少收入差距的政府之間相同的水平。最近theoreticalwork(聰明 ,1998。更普遍的是 ,這表明均衡轉(zhuǎn)移區(qū)域決策可能會(huì)扭曲 ,并由此可能產(chǎn)生各級(jí)財(cái)政外部性之間政府的權(quán)利。為我們的分析中 ,以下功能尤為突出重要的。而美國不能單獨(dú)征稅 ,但不管怎樣它們負(fù)責(zé)征收稅款。我們的論文的基本理念是這樣的。德國的聯(lián)邦系統(tǒng)讓我們能辨識(shí)出這些影響的邊際稅率以來實(shí)質(zhì)上是不同的越過州。此外 ,我們還會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn) ,一次性全額獎(jiǎng)助金被聯(lián)邦政府有負(fù)面的影響在稅收收入。第3 部分 ,開發(fā)的理論框架。德國的財(cái)政均衡系統(tǒng) :一個(gè)簡要概述在本節(jié)中 ,我們會(huì)提供一個(gè)簡單調(diào)查中的一些關(guān)鍵要素的德國財(cái)政均衡介紹了 制度 ,為我們進(jìn)一步分析以下幾個(gè)方面都是十分重要的。這也意味著 ,在接下來的 ,我們不需要考慮有關(guān)稅收政策選擇的州稅稅率和基地。值得注意的是 ,各州也征稅為聯(lián)邦政府 ,從而有效地服務(wù)代理聯(lián)邦政府在這方面的不足。例如 ,聯(lián)邦政府和州政府每人收到所得稅收入總額的 %的地方政府 ,而分享是 15%。這些規(guī)則決定一個(gè)初始分配的稅收。一個(gè)有趣的特點(diǎn)是 ,德國的系統(tǒng) ,與此相對(duì)照美國或其他許多聯(lián)邦國家 ,是中國一項(xiàng)明確的再分配稅收收入這樣 ,各國之間的 “富 ”州支付轉(zhuǎn)至 “差 ”狀態(tài)。在第一階段 (39。anderfinanzausgleich im)代表著的復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)美國間的轉(zhuǎn)帳。 Finanzbedarf”)。離開了一些更加復(fù)雜的細(xì)節(jié) ,一個(gè)州的財(cái)政的需要進(jìn)行了計(jì)算分析作為人均財(cái)政資源的州都次這 的人口然后確定的貢獻(xiàn)和轉(zhuǎn)移根據(jù)一個(gè)循序漸進(jìn)的時(shí)間表它是基于比例的國家的財(cái)政資源 ,它的財(cái)政的需要。貢獻(xiàn)的 “富 ”州決心 如下。此外 ,總捐款的 “富 ”狀態(tài)按比例增加或減少 ,以確?？偩杩顢?shù)額相等轉(zhuǎn)讓所獲得的 “窮人 ”狀態(tài)。)Fehlbetragsbundeserg anzungszuweisungen168。 %財(cái)政資源。而這些轉(zhuǎn)移的體積 (聯(lián)邦教育撥款 II 型 )支付給美國 ,在德國東部德國西部各州也收到一次性獎(jiǎng)助金。ander) take part in an extensive system of equalizing transfers which we describe in more detail below. Second, taxes, .,tax rates and the definition of tax bases, are determined by federal law and are, therefore,uniform across states. While states cannot independently levy taxes, they are however responsible for collecting Germany, as in other federalist countries, higher tax revenue in a state reduces the amount of equalizing transfers received by this state. Intuitively, this decline in equalizing transfers can be interpreted as a tax on a state?s tax revenue. Conceptually, one can then define a marginal tax rate which measures the fraction of additional tax revenue in this state flowing out of the region. The basic idea of our paper is as follows. Given that German states administer tax collection, the amount of tax revenue collected in a state will depend on the enforcement activity undertaken by the government of this state. Conventional economic theory suggests that, other things being equal, a state?s level of tax enforcement and thus tax revenue will be lower the higher the marginal tax rate on its tax revenue. In our empirical analysis, we examine how these marginal tax rates affect state?s tax revenue. Germany?s federal system allows us to identify these effects since marginal tax rates substantially vary across states. For example, the marginal tax rates on ine tax revenue in 1999 range between 70% (NordrheinWestfalen) and 92% (Saarland). Our main result is that the marginal tax rates imposed by the equalization system have a significantly negative effect on states? tax revenue. This indicates that equalizing transfers have a negative impact on tax enforcement and, thus, distort states? fiscal decisions. Furthermore,we also find that lump sum grants by the federal government have a negative effect on tax revenue. Again, this is in line with theoretical considerations where this response can be explained by an ine remainder of this paper is anized as follows.