【正文】 such as a slump, recession, or capital market constraints, may cause prospective acquiring firms to concentrate on their domestic business while postponing any international strategic moves. Acquisition of technological and human resourcesIf a firm falls behind in the level of technological knowledge necessary to efficiently in its industry, and it is unable or unwilling to obtain the required technology through research and development, then it may attempt to acquire a foreign firm which is technologically more advanced. In their study, Cebenoyan et al.(1992) support this point, showing that the expansion into new market through acquisitions allows firms to gain petitive advantage from the possession of special resources.Unfavorable acquisition factorsThe factors discussed thus far generally tend to encourage firms to make crossborder acquisitions. In contrast there are other variables that often appear to restrain crossborder bination. These include information asymmetry, monopolistic power, as well as government restrictions and regulations.Information asymmetryRoll (1986) contends that information about a prospective target firm (. market share, sales, and cash flow forecasts) is crucial in the decisionmaking process of acquiring firm. If the necessary information is not available, Roll (1986) argues that the prospective acquiring firm may be forced to delay or discontinue its plants, even though the foreign firm appears to be an attractive target. In contrast, Stoughton (1988) argues that information effects are not always harmful. He points out that the prospective acquirer may be able to obtain information about the target firm that is available to other market participants.Monopolistic powerIf a firm enjoys monopolistic power (a difficult prospect in the US, due to antitrust laws), then entry into the industry bee more difficult for potential petitors, domestic or foreign. Moreover, a monopolist is much more likely to resist a takeover attempt. Other barriers to entry that make crossborder acquisition especially difficult within a monopolistic environment include extensive outlays for research and development, capital expenditures necessary to establish greenfield production facilities, and/or product difference through a massive advertising campaign. Government reconstructions and regulations Most governments have some form of takeover regulations in place. In many instances, government approval is mandatory before an acquisition by a foreign firm can occur. In addition, there may exist government restrictions on capital repatriations, dividend payouts, interpany interest payments, and other remittances. Scholes and Wolfsan (1990) for example, discuss periods in the US where regulatory events discouraged acquisition activity。其他關(guān)于企業(yè)跨國(guó)并購(gòu)的研究中把跨境并購(gòu)形式產(chǎn)生的原因歸因于以下幾個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)因素，包括有利的和不利的。同時(shí)，我們也會(huì)特別關(guān)注那些對(duì)研究范圍中的國(guó)家有直接聯(lián)系的因素。從現(xiàn)有的研究中可以看出，研究者們對(duì)于匯率的作用各執(zhí)己見，尚未達(dá)成共識(shí)。相反，他們認(rèn)為這對(duì)國(guó)際投資環(huán)境是十分有利的，在提高資本流動(dòng)性和均衡性的同時(shí)也降低了投資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。然而，Harris and Ravens craft(1991)所得出的實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)論與戈德堡的觀點(diǎn)又是相悖的。與收購(gòu)相關(guān)的其他需要考慮的問(wèn)題都被放在這之后。例如經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑、衰退、尚未完全開放的資本市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)很可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致將來(lái)企業(yè)在收購(gòu)時(shí)只關(guān)注國(guó)內(nèi)的業(yè)務(wù)而忽視了國(guó)際戰(zhàn)略措施。到目前為止我們所討論的因都是鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)間進(jìn)行跨國(guó)并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的。如果這些必要的信息無(wú)從獲得的話，Roll (1986)認(rèn)為盡管這家外國(guó)公司看起來(lái)十分具有誘惑力，潛在收購(gòu)方可能還是會(huì)被迫推遲或終止這項(xiàng)收購(gòu)計(jì)劃。并且，壟斷者會(huì)更容抵制這類收購(gòu)的企圖。此外，也可能存在政府限制資本返還，派發(fā)福利，公司內(nèi)部的利息支付和其他匯款的情況。這些改變?cè)黾恿嗣绹?guó)內(nèi)外企業(yè)并購(gòu)交易者的成本。Scholes and Wolfsan (1990)的研究卻包括了1968年到1987年大部分的行業(yè)。匯率影響目標(biāo)企業(yè)當(dāng)前和未來(lái)現(xiàn)金量的現(xiàn)值。T’s acquisition of NCR, and losses began to mount, ATamp。這是協(xié)同效應(yīng)的陷阱，模型的分析結(jié)果，可以事前預(yù)測(cè)管理者在什么時(shí)候以及多達(dá)程度上達(dá)不到他們要求的目標(biāo)。為什么收購(gòu)后的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)增加？最初管理者為了增加從資源分配的決策中獲取高回報(bào)的機(jī)會(huì)采取高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的并購(gòu)整合計(jì)劃。大量的證據(jù)表明，管理者經(jīng)常會(huì)違反經(jīng)濟(jì)合理性假說(shuō)。Brockner(1986)等人認(rèn)為承諾現(xiàn)象至少在一定程度上是肯定的，“決策者通常不愿意承認(rèn)他們?yōu)榱诉x擇行動(dòng)策略而進(jìn)行事先分配資源的舉動(dòng)是徒勞的(自我辯解假說(shuō))” 管理者通常是不愿承認(rèn)失敗的，并會(huì)通過(guò)延長(zhǎng)時(shí)間來(lái)證明他們的決定最終是合理的。承諾升級(jí)理論也是從前景理論的觀點(diǎn)演變而來(lái)前景理論認(rèn)為當(dāng)人們失敗時(shí)會(huì)采取帶有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的行動(dòng)，反而在成功時(shí)采取風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的態(tài)度，這就是經(jīng)典的賭徒心理?？紤]到保值的因素，管理者僅僅會(huì)認(rèn)為采取高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的