【正文】 (., atoms, light, ions) have the same ontological status as ordinary objects (., chair, table). Alternatively, when teachers were careful to use precise language with appropriate qualifications, students tended to adopt instrumentalist conception. The instrumentalist view emphasizes the practical utility of scientific explanations, the role of human imagination and creativity in the development of scientific knowledge, the tentative nature of science, and the utility of arbitrary constructs and models. In short, this view is more consistent with the currently accepted view of science. In the second study Lederman and O39。 conceptions of the tentative and revisionary nature of questionnaire was administered at the beginning of the school year and as a posttest at the end of the academic year. After students39。 and teachers39。 the most mon are (a) a better learning of the concepts of science, (b) increased interest and motivation, (c) an introduction to the philosophy of science, (d) a better attitude of the public towards science, and (e) an understanding of the social relevance of science (Solomon et al., 1992). To illustrate this point, this paper discusses findings by Duschl (1990) on teaching the nature of science. Duschl says, using a moon metaphor: 第 12 頁 “What is presently missing in our science curriculum are instructional units that teach about the other face of science – the how” (p. 41). In his article Duschl (1990) argues that science educators have focused upon teaching students “knowledge of science” and fotten the “knowledge about science” (history of science). Without the latter, students are simply taught “final form science”. They are, in effect, “being told where we are now, without being told how we got there”. He sees three dangers in presenting such a onesided view. Duschl (1990) warns that students may falsely conclude: (a) all scientific knowledge claims are considered equal in weight, (b) scientific knowledge claims do not interact with others, and (c) scientific theories do not change. It appears that by omitting the history of science, students cannot understand how the “collective mind of science” arrived at the knowledge it holds today. It shows that the emphasis in articles promoting the teaching of the nature of science ideas, written by science educators using a cognitive science learning theory perspective, was to teach students the history of science in science lessons. With the emergence of constructivist learning theory in the mid to late 1980s, science educators shifted their emphasis to helping students construct stronger and more generalized cognitive models of scientific ideas. Science educators also appeared to emphasize sequencing in instruction to help students for better construction of scientific models and improving teacher educational programs for better facilitating students in their constructivist classrooms. To illustrate these points, this paper discusses two articles on teaching the nature of science. In an article Lawson (1999) argued that “sequencing instruction that focuses on scientific reasoning pattern first in observable context and then in nonobservable context helps students better understand the nature of science and use scientific reasoning in and beyond the science classroom” (p. 第 13 頁 401). To the question “How can we help students develop theoretical reasoning patterns and acquire an accurate understanding of the nature of science?” asked by Lawson, he himself answered with the following statement, “If intellectual development is truly stagelake, then for “descriptive” students it would appear that we need to immerse them in “hypothetical” contexts and provide lots of opportunities for direct physical experience, for social interaction with others, and for equilibration. Once these students develop hypothetical reasoning patterns, we then need to repeat the process in theoretical contexts. In other words, teachers need to: 1) know where their students are in their intellectual development, 2) be aware of the intellectual demands that instructional tasks place on students reasoning abilities, 3) correctly match instructional contexts with students abilities, and 4) sequence contexts in a way that moves from description and classification, to casual hypothesis testing in familiar contexts, to casual hypothesis testing in notsofamiliar contexts, and then to theory testing (where theories are defined as general explanatory systems that postulate the existence of unseen entities and/or processes) (p. 407). In another article McComas (2021) argued that “misconceptions about science are most likely due to the lack of philosophy of science content in teacher education programs and the failure of such programs to provide real science research experiences for preservice teachers while another source of the problem may be the generally shallow treatment of the nature of science in the textbooks to which teachers might turn for guidance” (p. 53). The “myths of science” monly included in science textbooks, in classroom discourse, and in the minds of adult Americans, which are incorrect representations of the nature of science, are described by McComas as follows: ![endif] Hypothesis bee theories that in turn bees laws Scientific laws and other such ideas are absolute 第 14 頁 A hypothesis is an educated guess ![endif] A general and universal scientific method exists ![endif] Evidence accumulated carefully will result in sure knowledge Science and its methods provide absolute proof Science is procedural more than creative Science and its methods can answer all questions ![endif] Scientists are particularly objective Experiments are the principal route to scientific knowledge Scientific conclusions are reviewed for accuracy Acceptance of new